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Abstract 
 
This thesis offers readings of a number of less discussed texts by J.M. 
Coetzee and attempts to take as full an account as possible of the human beings 
that are embodied in these works. Suggesting that critical approaches are often 
too invested in their specific ideologies to accommodate for the protean nature of 
certain Coetzee’s narratives, it contends that a better ground for approaching his 
writing can be found in the unmediated experience of living, which Elizabeth 
Costello—Coetzee’s lecture alter ego—once calls ‘the body-soul.’ This study 
thus traces Coetzee’s fascination with what it means to be fully alive as an 
individual being in his writing during the period between his apartheid-era novel 
Age of Iron (1990) and the final fictional memoir Summertime (2009). By paying 
attention specifically to the living beings of the characters, or in the case of 
Coetzee’s fictional memoirs, that of John Coetzee himself, this thesis shows how 
it is possible to make better sense of Coetzee’s puzzling late works and their 
formal inventiveness. 
While on the whole the thesis advances an alternative approach of 
reading Coetzee’s fiction, its individual chapters focus on employing the concept 
of the body-soul to help release the works’ meaning. The first chapter examines 
Coetzee’s fiction-as-lecture ‘The Lives of Animals: The Philosophers and the 
Animals,’ which forms part of Elizabeth Costello. I reconstitute Costello’s 
philosophical exposition about the ‘sympathetic imagination’ for animals as 
being inseparable from her personal desires as a body-soul vulnerable to death. 
Chapter Two also centres on Coetzee’s characters as living beings and connects 
the metafictional Slow Man (2005) with the epistolary Age of Iron through their 
common reiterations of the figure of a writer who follows another character with 
his/her imaginative writing. In Chapter Three, the living being of John Coetzee 
in Boyhood (1997), Youth (2002), and Summertime provides a basis from which 
to contend with the narratives’ mixed tactics of fictionalisation and confessional 
truth-telling. Chapter Four looks at Elizabeth Costello’s ‘The Problem of Evil’ 
and The Master of Petersburg. Here again, the attention to the body-souls of the 
protagonists enables a confrontation with the possibility that Coetzee’s fiction 
writing and the living beings within it may not always be a force for good. 
Throughout the thesis, I assert that the truths contained in these works of Coetzee 
are truths of the body-soul that cannot be fully extricated from their 
embodiments, yet by their embeddedness in living experiences that cannot be 
doubted, they seem to be what Coetzee, as he was in those times and places of 
writing, was able to believe in.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout his long career, J.M. Coetzee has consistently produced fictions that 
defy habits of reading and hermeneutic schemas of critical analysis. For María J. 
López, criticism of Coetzee’s works that is conducted under such wide-ranging 
critical tropes as ‘prevailing theoretical categories, moral conventions, historical 
assumptions and political concerns’ is prone to display ‘simplification, 
theoretical naivety, intertextual ignorance or ideological bias.’1 In the seminal 
monograph J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, Derek Attridge articulates 
that the ultimate challenge for critics in responding to Coetzee’s novels is to 
write criticism that is ‘fully responsive to [the text’s] singularity, inventiveness, 
and otherness.’2 As Coetzee’s oeuvre expands beyond the contested realm of 
South African/postcolonial concerns with his Australian phase works, 3  the 
critical community is again forced into revising its largely ethico-political 
approaches that now appear to delimit engagement of this particularly devious 
oeuvre.  
With more works and materials to contend with than ever, many recent 
studies on Coetzee have relinquished the impulse to make complete sense of the 
novels and have embraced instead the specialist side of literary studies. The main 
focus of Coetzee’s criticism is beginning to shift from the ethico-political 
towards the formalistic techniques and artistic quality of Coetzee’s literary 
works, i.e., the craft of writing and the works’ position in literary history. 
Notable examples of such studies are Carrol Clarkson’s J.M. Coetzee: 
Countervoices, the first linguistic account of Coetzee’s novels, Patrick Hayes’s 
J.M. Coetzee and the Novel, which traces the relationship of Coetzee’s fiction to 
                                                
1 María J. López, Acts of Visitation: The Narrative of J.M. Coetzee (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2011), xiii. 
2 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 11. 
3 By Australian works, I am referring to the three novels published between 2003 
and 2007—Elizabeth Costello, Slow Man and Diary of a Bad Year. They are 
highly experimental in their narrative forms, and are either set in Australia or 
have protagonists who are Australian. These characteristics are not as explicit in 
Coetzee’s most recent novel, The Childhood of Jesus (2013), which invokes an 
unidentified time and place in an otherwise conventional novel form. 
8 
the prose of Samuel Beckett and the development of the novel form, and Jarad 
Zimbler’s meditations on the maturation of the Coetzean style in J.M. Coetzee 
and the Politics of Style. These excellent studies have injected a literary 
sophistication into criticism on Coetzee and, by deepening the aesthetic 
appreciation of Coetzee’s novels, reconstitute them as literature and works of art. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the opening of the Coetzee Archive at 
the Harry Ransom Center in Austin, Texas in 2013, and the additional 
biographical source provided by JC Kannemeyer’s biography, J.M. Coetzee: A 
Life in Writing (2012), are launching new archival and biographical studies that 
are likely to dominate Coetzee’s studies in the years to come. Among the early 
studies, David Attwell’s ‘critical biography,’ J.M. Coetzee and the Life of 
Writing (2015), utilises the intimacy afforded by the archive’s biographical 
materials to move the discussion of Coetzee’s novels beyond the regimented 
discourse of literary criticism. Attwell notes that, unlike his first academic 
monograph on Coetzee, he writes this biography as one of the ‘ordinary 
readers,’4 reading a life of writing rather than the finished literary works. 
Caught between these two strands of critical developments, the latter half 
of Coetzee’s literary oeuvre—namely, his Australian novels and three fictional 
memoirs Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime—is incidentally being neglected as 
individual works by the critical world. The incisive literary lens of Hayes and 
Zimbler is not conducive to a discussion of these texts, which cross over to non-
literary genres. Hayes and Zimbler provide minimal remarks on the Australian 
novels, while the memoirs fall entirely outside their literary interests. On the 
other hand, earlier attempts by politically minded critics to read the Australian 
texts are often unable to accommodate the texts’ formal inventiveness. Their 
efforts to find an Australian reality in Coetzee’s late fictions have forced them to 
contend awkwardly with the paucity of mimetic details. In one such attempt, 
Melinda Harvey remarks that ‘the sense of Australian place in Coetzee’s 
[Elizabeth Costello, Slow Man and Diary of a Bad Year] is slight, even compared 
with the skinflint world-making that we have come to expect from him since 
                                                
4 David Attwell, J. M. Coetzee and the Life of Writing: Face-To-Face with Time 
(New York: Viking, 2015), 22. 
9 
Dusklands.’5 Ironically, instead of uncovering a meaningful engagement with 
Coetzee’s newly adopted country, Harvey’s discussion ends with the suggestion 
that Tolstoy and Dostoevsky may hold the elusive key to the novels’ meaning: ‘If 
Coetzee’s emigration to Australia points us in the direction of any place at all it 
is Russia’ (32).  
So with regard to Coetzee’s later works, the critical challenge laid down 
by Attridge to respond fully to the singularity of Coetzee’s fiction remains 
relevant today. But what this singularity means in the current Coetzean oeuvre 
will necessarily have to be formed differently from Attridge’s influential claim of 
‘the singularity of literature’ or from his emphasis on literature’s ethical power.6 
Specifically, the singularity of Coetzee’s later writings may need to be released 
from the literary bracket that has often defined commentaries on Coetzee. While 
it has been generally assumed that, whatever is doubted by a Coetzean narrative, 
Coetzee himself at least believes in the power of literature to convey the truth,7 
the cross-genre forms of Coetzee’s Australian novels are gradually challenging 
this assumption. We read, for example, Costello downplaying her own moral 
authority as a novelist: ‘she no longer believes that story telling is good in 
itself… If she, as she is nowadays, had to choose between telling a story and 
doing good, she would rather, she thinks, do good.’8 To respond to Costello at 
                                                
5 Melinda Harvey, ‘“In Australia You Start Zero”: The Escape from Place in 
J.M. Coetzee’s Late Novels’, in Strong Opinions: J.M. Coetzee and the Authority 
of Contemporary Fiction, ed. Chris Danta, Sue Kossew, and Julian Murphet 
(London: Continuum, 2011), 19. For a comparable effort, see in the same volume 
Elleke Boehmer, ‘J. M. Coetzee’s Australian Realism.’ 
6 ‘Reading a work of literature entails opening oneself to the unpredictable, the 
future, the other, and thereby accepting the responsibility laid upon one by the 
work’s singularity and difference… In a sense, the “literary” is the ethical.’ 
Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, 111. See also Derek Attridge, 
The Singularity of Literature (London: Routledge, 2004). 
7 Many critics consider Coetzee as a defender of literature. Writing of the 
essayistic Diary of a Bad Year in 2010, Peter McDonald still considers that 
‘Coetzee has devoted his life to defending literature as legitimate mode of public 
intervention in its own right, not to escape the burdens of history or politics but 
to confront them on his own resolutely literary terms.’ ‘The Ethics of Reading 
and the Question of the Novel: The Challenge of J. M. Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad 
Year’, Novel: A Forum on Fiction 43, no. 3 (1 September 2010): 497.  
8 J.M. Coetzee, ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Elizabeth Costello (London: Vintage, 
2004), 167. 
10 
least in this instance requires us to slacken our attachment to the literary in order 
to be able to squarely gauge the validity of her claim. 
Costello’s questioning of the literary must be placed in the context of 
Coetzee’s long-running self-interrogations through his writings. Each new 
publication by Coetzee has consistently challenged its predecessors and the way 
in which we have viewed them. Costello’s stance on storytelling, for instance, is 
a long way away from Coetzee’s own in his early 1987 lecture later published as 
‘The Novel Today’ (1988)—which he does not allow to be republished and in 
which he campaigns against the subsuming of the novel under history and 
strongly outlines the limits of historical discourse in a manner clearly preferential 
to the novel.9 It is not inconceivable that Costello’s preference for doing good 
may one day be doubted by some character in Coetzee’s subsequent works. 
Coetzee’s novels are likewise always evolving. They vary greatly in their 
thematic interests, formal strategies and the contexts they elicit. Their grounds 
are forever shifting. The early literary experiments of Dusklands and In the Heart 
of the Country fall away to the cogent imagined worlds of Waiting for the 
Barbarians (1980), Life & Times of Michael K (1983), and Foe (1986), which 
are in turn replaced by the historical reality of South Africa in Age of Iron (1990) 
and then the alienating Russia of The Master of Petersburg (1994). By the time 
of the multi-genre texts of Elizabeth Costello (2003), Slow Man (2005) and 
Diary of a Bad Year (2007), it is clear that the Coetzee’s oeuvre will not yield 
easily to a single critical framework, nor should we desire it to do so. 
To respond to the provisionality claims of Coetzee’s writing may require 
an equally modest mode of critical engagement that will not overstep the 
equivocal voice of his characters and the novels. The above quote from Elizabeth 
Costello, with its qualifications of ‘as she is nowadays’ or ‘she thinks,’ insists on 
an essential embeddedness in the limited existence of the character. One finds the 
                                                
9  ‘[O]rthodox history does not have the means to give the kind of dense 
realization of the texture of life that the novel, or certain kinds of novel, do so 
well. And history does not have the formal means to explore, except clumsily 
and “from the outside”, the individual experience of historical time, particularly 
the time of historical crisis.’ J.M. Coetzee, ‘The Novel Today’, Upstream 6, no. 
1 (1988): 2. 
11 
same characteristics throughout Coetzee’s oeuvre, including the interpellations of 
‘he thought’ in Michael K and ‘to his mind’ in the striking opening lines of 
Disgrace. While Attridge rightly notes that phrases like ‘he thought’ in Michael 
K remind us ‘that we are outside Michael K’s consciousness’ and cannot 
assimilate his otherness,10 this inserted boundary also simultaneously emphasises 
the embeddedness of thoughts in the character. Not only are the thoughts beyond 
our assimilation, they are in themselves provisional. In general, the claims made 
in Coetzee’s novels do not venture far beyond the characters who voice them at a 
specific point in time. This embeddedness then allows Coetzee’s writing to 
evolve with the character, to react to new stimuli, without invoking a permanent 
state of epistemological doubt. Though we may never make conclusive sense of 
the Coetzean oeuvre, we can at least say that it is living and refuses to be pinned 
down. The texts embody the ongoing lives of their protagonists, who are 
simultaneously underwritten by their implied authors and the life of Coetzee 
himself. Given Coetzee’s much-cited claim that ‘all writing is autobiography,’11 
the reality of Coetzee’s life ineluctably becomes the un-deconstructable basis of 
his writing.  
The aim of the present study is to preserve the distinctive livingness of 
Coetzee’s fiction as far as possible within the discourse of criticism. To do so, I 
will focus my attention within the limit of being in Coetzee’s writing or what I 
would call, following Elizabeth Costello, ‘the body-soul.’ A focus on the limit of 
the body-soul means the subsuming of external parameters, such as critical 
approaches and ethical judgement, to the characters’ specific state of being and 
the verbal forms it has given rise to. By enforcing this limit to reading and 
nothing else, it is possible to carve out a secure yet flexible stance to engage with 
Coetzee’s unpredictable course of writing. Given the multifariousness of 
Coetzee’s works, my readings of different texts and characters will have a degree 
of independence from one another, but throughout I try to accentuate the living 
presence that Coetzee is exceptionally alive to in his writing as being 
                                                
10 Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, 50. 
11 J.M. Coetzee and David Attwell, Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 17. 
12 
consistently the wellspring of the text’s meaning. Within the philosophical 
language of criticism, this will remain an incomplete effort, but it will provide an 
alternative perspective on some obscure portions of Coetzee’s oeuvre and their 
relationship to the rest of his writings. 
This thesis conducts readings of a selection of Coetzee’s works that have 
attracted limited critical attention or, due to their uncertain genres, are resistant to 
formal approaches of literary criticism. By giving attention to the protagonists’ 
body-souls—i.e., their fears, desires or vulnerabilities—one can gain a focal 
point from which to continuously engage with the texts in all their changeability 
and, hopefully, to bring the writing to life. My selection includes, first of all, the 
Costello’s fiction-as-lecture text ‘The Lives of Animals: The Philosophers and 
the Animals,’12 which is widely read in philosophy but whose narrative portrayal 
of Elizabeth Costello is often left underrepresented in comparison to her 
argument. Coetzee’s puzzling metafictional novel Slow Man is discussed 
alongside Age of Iron, with particular focus on the living beings of the writer and 
the character to help account for the novel’s metafictional conceit. This study 
additionally attends to the John Coetzee(s) of the three highly disparate fictional 
memoirs, Boyhood, Youth and Summertime, which challenge both literary 
interpretations and truth-directed readings. Finally, two unlovable Coetzee texts, 
‘The Problem of Evil,’ and the novel The Master of Petersburg, are examined 
with the same focus on the characters as living beings. In its limited scope, this 
thesis fails to address the earliest of Coetzee’s fiction such as Dusklands and In 
the Heart of the Country, or the group of novels from which Coetzee gained his 
global reputation like Waiting for the Barbarians, Life and Times of Michael K, 
Foe, and Disgrace. However, by comparison with the texts covered in this thesis, 
these omitted works may be said to have been well-accommodated within the 
sensitive criticism from the historical and ethical perspectives, notably by critics 
such as David Attwell13 and Derek Attridge. Meanwhile, Diary of a Bad Year 
                                                
12 J.M. Coetzee, ‘The Lives of Animals: The Philosophers and the Animals’, in 
Elizabeth Costello (London: Vintage, 2004), 59–90. 
13  David Attwell, J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
13 
and Coetzee’s most recent novel, The Childhood of Jesus (2015), are challenges 
that will have to be left for the future.14 
 
Approaching Elizabeth Costello’s ‘body-soul’ 
This study’s proposed attention to the body-soul is made conceptually 
possible by ‘The Philosophers and the Animals,’ the first of Coetzee’s two ‘The 
Lives of Animals’ lectures at Princeton University in 1997, which now form part 
of his 2003 novel Elizabeth Costello. The fiction-as-lecture provides a 
description of sympathetic engagement that deeply informs this thesis. In the 
lecture, the character Costello refers to the experience of being alive as the only 
essential ground required for sympathy with other beings. I call this basis in short 
as ‘the body-soul’ but, throughout Costello’s talk, she in fact never settles on a 
name for this basic experience of being alive. She speaks varyingly of ‘the living 
soul,’ ‘the body-soul,’ or ‘embodied soul,’ but never employs the same term 
more than once. Her explanation of this experience is entirely tautological, as if 
to suggest that such awareness should be self-evident for all beings without 
needing intellectual explanation: ‘To be full of being is to live as a body-soul. 
One name for the experience of full being is joy. (…) To be alive is to be a living 
soul. An animal—and we are all animals—is an embodied soul.’15 Indeed, to 
give a single name to the experience of being alive is to enforce a uniformity that 
does not exist, for living entails change. Unfortunately, a thesis cannot be 
coherently written on an experience with no name, so this singular experience is 
to be called by the most neutral of Costello’s multiplying terms, made up of two 
nouns without active or passive verb to suggest temporality: ‘the body-soul.’  
Costello provides more shape to ‘the body-soul’ by opposing this state of 
being to the Western ideal of human superiority over animals based on its 
possession of the rational thinking mind. In a magnificently forceful passage, 
Costello details the sense of being a body-soul as follows:  
                                                
14 The implications of this study on how one might approach The Childhood of 
Jesus are addressed in the thesis’s conclusion. 
15 Coetzee, ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’, 77–78 (emphasis original). 
14 
To thinking, cogitation, I oppose fullness, embodiedness, the 
sensation of being—not a consciousness of yourself as a kind 
of ghostly reasoning machine thinking thoughts, but on the 
contrary the sensation—a heavily affective sensation—of being 
a body with limbs that have extension in space, of being alive 
to the world. (78)  
For Costello, this embodied state of being, which she knows without having to 
think, knows by the fact of her being alive, is an irrefutable foundational reality. 
At special moments of clarity, Costello asserts that ‘we are that knowledge’ (77).  
The body-soul is clearly a development from Coetzee’s famous comment 
on his novel Foe in one of the interviews with David Attwell in Doubling the 
Point (1992), where he states that ‘If I look back over my own fiction, I see a 
simple (simple-minded?) standard erected. That standard is the body. Whatever 
else, the body is not “that which is not.”’16 This standard of the body has played 
a crucial role in distinguishing Coetzee’s novels since Barbarians as 
achievements that are independent from high modernism, whereas Coetzee’s first 
two novels, Dusklands and In the Heart of the Country, may be seen as 
influenced by disembodied poststructuralist experiments or Beckettian prose. For 
Brian May, Barbarians ‘provides a critique of, and passage beyond, the 
asceticism of In the Heart of the Country.’17 But it is less acknowledged that 
Coetzee speaks of the body’s dominance in South Africa as a politically 
inscribed force rather than a natural state of being. He continues that ‘in South 
Africa it is not possible to deny the authority of suffering and therefore of the 
body. It is not possible, not for logical reasons, not for ethical reasons… but for 
political reasons, for reason of power.’ The overall sense of this section is that 
Coetzee had longed to engage with other aspects of life, but could not since, as 
he says, ‘the suffering body takes this authority.’18 Coetzee thus sees the last 
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pages of Foe, in which it is written that mute bodies ‘are their own signs,’19 as 
‘[closing] the text by force,’ bringing to an abrupt end ‘the endlessness of its 
skepticism.’20 
Within this same interview, Coetzee hints at his interest in finding less 
coercive ways of closing a text. He mentions the Dostoevskian ideal of divine 
grace in confession, presenting it tentatively as an alternative way to end 
regressive confessions with ‘a measure of charity’ rather than force. Then, 
Coetzee’s writing in this final part of the interview turns strikingly ambivalent; 
as if he is describing a growing sense that cannot find full expression within 
available frames of reference. He switches liberally between different discourses, 
comparing the endlessness of Freudian psychology to the finality of 
Dostoevskian religious faith and then suddenly referring to himself as ‘a political 
novelist’ and to all human beings as ‘children.’ I will reproduce an extended 
quote here to give a sense of the confusion that stems from a lack of fitting 
intellectual ground: 
Politics, in its wise stupidity, is at one with religion here: one 
man, one soul: no half-measures. What saves me from a merely 
stupid stupidity, I would hope, is a measure of charity, which 
is, I suppose, the way in which grace allegorizes itself in the 
world. Another way of saying this is that I try not to lose sight 
of the reality that we are children, unreconstructed (Freud 
wouldn’t disagree at this point), to be treated with the charity 
that children have due to them (charity that doesn’t preclude 
clear-sightedness). (249)  
With the help from Costello’s subsequent evocation of ‘the body-soul,’ we are in 
a better position today to make sense of what Coetzee is gesturing at, namely, 
that in his writing he longs to find a mode in which to bring his own secular 
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narrative to an end that is truer to himself than psychology, which he sees as 
endless; than religion, for which he has not the faith; and than politics, which, to 
him, represents an unwelcome external force. The body is only one part in this 
larger concern of Coetzee, with the soul being another and the full experience of 
living being the complete picture.  
As the above passage may already suggest, I would also argue that ‘the 
soul’ evoked in Coetzee’s writing, and in Costello’s sense of ‘the body-soul,’ 
stems from a different source than religious doctrines. The soul is again part of 
the inexpressible and indivisible experience of being alive. In Costello’s use of 
the term, she brings the divine immortal soul down to earth, it now belonging 
neither to God nor to the Devil, but to the actual living experience in 
combination with bodily sensations. The Coetzean soul has irrational desires as 
the body has desires, which affect the actions of the characters. Two memorable 
passages from Elizabeth Costello and Disgrace show his characters acting out of 
raw impulses that are not explicable in discourses originating from outside the 
characters themselves. The first is Costello’s curt justification for her 
vegetarianism at a reception dinner after her ‘The Lives of Animals’ talk: 
‘But your own vegetarianism, Mrs Costello,’ says President 
Garrard, pouring oil on troubled waters: ‘it comes out of moral 
conviction does it not?’ 
‘No, I don’t think so,’ says his mother. ‘It comes out of a 
desire to save my soul.’21 
The second quote comes from Disgrace and concerns David Lurie’s rumination 
over his unnecessary effort to give euthanised dogs respectful burials: 
 Why has he taken on this job? To lighten the burden on 
Bev Shaw? For that it would be enough to drop off the bags at 
the dump and drive away. For the sake of the dogs? But the 
dogs are dead; and what do dogs know of honor and dishonor 
anyway? 
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 For himself, then. For his idea of the world, a world in 
which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a more 
convenient shape for processing.22 
In both these instances, the characters’ actions are clearly independent of their 
retrospective explanations. Costello and Lurie end up settling for very limited 
justifications that centre on their inner impulses. Often, criticism’s final word on 
the matter would be that the narratives are ironising these justifications of the 
characters, that Coetzee recognises the fundamental discrepancies within 
Costello’s vegetarianism or Lurie’s sentimental attachment to dogs over people; 
but I doubt this is entirely the case. The Coetzean narrating voice is often too 
close to the protagonist to fully satirise him or her. Some of the distance that it 
affords certainly does portray the characters’ actions as imperfect attempts to do 
the right thing, but these acts are seriously taken as life decisions in a universe 
where perfect answers are unavailable, where actions are called for before 
rational conclusion can be reached. 
 The characters seem to have an instinctive sense that beside bodily 
impulses, which are sexual in Lurie’s case and a matter of appetite in Costello’s, 
there is also a spiritual element to their unconscious, an impulse to do good for 
‘the soul’ that is as basic and irreducible as hunger or desire. In Lesson 5 of 
Elizabeth Costello, ‘The Humanities in Africa,’ Costello is caught in another 
feast following a graduation ceremony in which her sister has been given an 
honorary degree. During the meal that satisfies the body’s hunger, she thinks 
privately of ‘a soul with the hungers of a soul,’ that ‘perhaps that is what all of 
them are around this table, in their deepest being: hungering soul.’23 So far 
critical discussions have tended to align the frequent use of the word ‘soul’ in 
Coetzee to religious ideology, specifically in the Judeo-Christian tradition, but 
perhaps the term is altogether much more elemental. Beyond a similar set of 
words, the sanctity of religion is rather at variance with the grittiness of 
Coetzee’s portrayal of spirituality. While the word ‘soul’ or ‘evil’ in Coetzee 
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may refer to roughly the same thing as in religion, his characters are shown to be 
grasping at these concepts from their immediate experiences rather than as a 
pathway towards a version of religious faith.  
 
Historicising the body-soul 
The presence of the body-soul in Coetzee’s fiction was most likely 
formed as Coetzee contended with life in apartheid South Africa, where his own 
hyper-rationality and predilection for European high culture were rendered 
incapacitated. This founding experience is unique to the conflicted existence of 
the colonial intellectuals, whose received culture is formed far away from their 
immediate surrounding. In a lecture delivered in 1991 titled ‘What Is a Classic?,’ 
Coetzee observes the similar fate of the American-born British-domiciled poet 
T.S. Eliot in terms that clearly apply to himself:  
To [young colonials], the high culture of the metropolis may 
arrive in the form of powerful experiences which cannot, 
however, be embedded in their lives in any obvious way, and 
which seem therefore to have their existence in some 
transcendent realm. In extreme cases, they are led to blame 
their environment for not living up to art and to take up 
residence in an art world. This is a provincial fate… but 
particularly a colonial fate.24 
In Coetzee’s case, the result of this difficult struggle is an art that possesses the 
aesthetic and theoretical sophistication of European civilisation but a grounding 
in the primordiality of the living and dying body-soul.  
The relationship between these two lineages is presented by Coetzee in 
‘What Is a Classic?’ as an oppositional but dependent one; and insofar as the 
lecture is autobiographical, this antagonistic dependence also represents 
Coetzee’s attempt to conceive of his own standing in the history of Western 
literature. At the close of the lecture, Coetzee invokes Zbigniew Herbert’s notion 
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of the confrontation between ‘the classic’ and ‘the barbarian’ in an effort to 
rescue the fading idea of the classic in a globalised age. Coetzee’s proposal of 
what constitutes a classic is conspicuously devoid of geographical border or 
evocation of shared artistic qualities. Instead, it is founded upon living and 
surviving people; the classic, for Coetzee, is what survives with them: ‘what 
survives the worst of barbarism, surviving because generations of people cannot 
afford to let go of it and therefore hold on to it at all costs—that is the classic.’25 
The living basis of this definition is clearly congruent with Costello’s idea of the 
body-soul. Coetzee then adds that this survival is only meaningful if there are 
constant attacks; that is, to become a classic, a work of art may depend upon 
oppositions such as ‘criticism of the most sceptical kind’ to test its worthiness 
(19).  
By this definition, Coetzee’s fiction gains the capacity to become a world 
classic. It also bodes well that Coetzee has himself survived a fair share of 
critical attacks for the irrelevance of his fiction during the South African 
apartheid. But beyond this, it is difficult to trust the lecture’s statement as a 
universal criterion for the classic since the motivation behind its formation is so 
evidently self-interested and personal. Whatever the true answer to the question 
‘what is a classic?’ is, it does not directly concern the reading for the body-soul 
that I am interested in. This question is introduced here mainly to underline the 
historicity of the body-soul’s appearance in Coetzee’s fiction, and hopefully to 
then show that historicity does not necessarily dispel the meaning of the body-
soul as it does rational, universal truths. The truths of the body-soul are already 
living and dying. They are inherently provisional. In order to historicise the 
body-soul and draw out its provisional meaning, I will briefly read ‘What Is a 
Classic?’ against its aspiration to establish a classic by limiting its relevance to 
Coetzee’s own situation. 
Seen in a cold light, the appearance of ‘What Is a Classic?’ betrays 
Coetzee’s own anxiety of not belonging among the revered classics or of being 
perceived as only their exotic offshoot. This anxiety is understandably great as 
long as the authority of the old cultural centres remains absolute, both in 
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Coetzee’s own Western educated mind and in the global consciousness. 
Therefore, part of the reason why Coetzee’s texts often enact barbaric attacks 
upon their characters’ distinctly Western mentality—for instance, against the 
magistrate’s colonial power in Waiting for the Barbarian, Mrs. Curren’s 
classicist education in Age of Iron, or the Romanticism of David Lurie in 
Disgrace—is likely because the Coetzean texts are trying to stake out a place in 
the hall of fame for their provincial identity. On the other hand, reading from a 
sympathetic perspective of myself as also an outsider to Europe, these novels 
verbalise a true and much more ambiguous internal conflict, one that responds 
intimately to a colonial condition that is vaguely shared by much of the world’s 
population. In a sense that is not definitive, the non-rational component of 
Coetzee’s fiction—its accommodation of the body-soul—functions importantly 
to open up the Western corpus to interpretations from non-European, non-
Christian experiences, and even that of the animal. For Coetzee, it would seem 
that any writing does contain a living truth that, although it is limited in scope, is 
still relatable and true in the primordial sense of our experiences.  
With sensitivity to the body-soul, it is possible to historicise a piece of 
writing in a manner that does not delegitimise or delimit its assertions, but rather 
with an interest in understanding at an affective level the embodied truth of 
another’s life and, therefore, also of one’s own living truth. One sees Coetzee 
returning to living-ness often in his discursive writings. In The Good Story, a 
collection of Coetzee’s correspondence with psychoanalyst Arabella Kurtz, 
Coetzee casually expounds on the difference between ‘living reading’ and ‘dead 
reading.’ He writes that, while with dead reading ‘the words never come alive on 
the page,’ living reading ‘involves finding one’s way into the voice that speaks 
from the page, the voice of the Other, and inhabiting that voice, so that you speak 
to yourself (your self) from outside yourself.’26  
While this preferred manner of reading for Coetzee represents a critique 
of rationality and its Western locality, it has the capacity to step outside itself and 
recognise its own historical indebtedness to Western civilisation. One regularly 
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finds Coetzee’s ‘anti-rational’ writing suggesting its own historicity through the 
voices of their characters. In Age of Iron, Mrs. Curren reflects on her letter to her 
daughter—which is in effect the novel itself—as being ‘my truth: how I lived in 
these times, in this place.’27 Hers is further a living truth that, like the classic, 
depends upon life for its survival, upon being read and reimagined by another 
body-soul. Addressing her daughter, she writes: ‘If Vercueil does not send these 
writings on, you will never read them. You will never even know they existed. A 
certain body of truth will never take on flesh.’28 This study will attempt to act as 
that sympathetic reader who, in reading the texts, prolongs their life. 
 
Coetzean clarity and the role of critics 
 One feature of Coetzee’s fictions that has not been acknowledged enough 
in criticism is their remarkable clarity. I speak of this clarity firstly from the 
perspective of a critic who finds in Coetzee’s fiction a drastic reduction of 
narrative secrets that would require the uncovering process of interpretation, and 
I present this claim of the fiction’s transparency in part to recalibrate my own 
critical relationship with Coetzee’s texts. Literary criticism tends to begin by 
emphasising puzzling or obscure aspects of the text, which it will then strive to 
disentangle into neat exposition, but Coetzee’s fictions are compelling because of 
their clarity, in light of which one’s interpretative attempts feel superfluous. 
Secondly, this clarity depends on clear connections from Coetzee’s writings to 
his own life as a body-soul. That is, when one reads Coetzee with some 
familiarity with the author and his situation, one can imagine approximately the 
experiences or the real world coordinates from which the meanings are coming. 
There are a few considerable objections to my claim of Coetzean clarity 
that should be addressed at the outset. The most obvious of which is the common 
view that the ethics of Coetzean texts rests on their preservation of the Other’s 
obscurity. The text’s self-reflexivity problematises finalising interpretations and 
resists being made to support universalised and repeatable meanings. We are 
never sure what Coetzee’s novel says as a unified whole and, therefore, it is 
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assumed that the text must not be transparent but is rather calling into question 
notions of closure. Outside the texts, already notable for their difficulty, we also 
encounter Coetzee’s reputation as a deeply private individual, an impression left 
most pointedly in the few interviews he has taken part in, in which he comes 
across as unwilling to expand on the points proffered by his interviewers. 
Newspaper articles predominantly describe Coetzee with the words ‘reclusive’ 
and ‘private.’  
Though this image of a prickly, reclusive author is a tired stereotype, it 
curiously resonates with Coetzee’s own depiction of his young self as a secretive 
boy in Boyhood. The boy’s primal fear is the thought that ‘the ugly, black, 
crying, babyish core of him’ will be revealed to the world despite ‘all the stories 
that have been built up around him, built by himself, built by years of normal 
behaviour.’29 In the final memoir Summertime, a fictional biographer of John 
Coetzee describes the author’s reputation as ‘a cold and supercilious 
intellectual.’30 These self-parodies and critical and media portrayals contribute to 
an impression of Coetzee’s guardedness that can sometimes obscure the 
extraordinary forthrightness of his fiction—a forthrightness that is already 
apparent in the fact that we can quote from Coetzee’s writing to discuss his own 
abstruseness. 
The second resistance has to do with the limit of criticism itself as a 
discourse. To say that a work of fiction is clear in itself has serious ramifications 
for literary criticism, which is a discipline with a lot riding on the emotional and 
intellectual obscurity of its subject. Coetzee in his role as critic raised this 
conflict of interest in his 1984 lecture ‘Truth in Autobiography’ at the University 
of Cape Town. In the lecture, Coetzee sharply deconstructs the ‘truth’ as 
presented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The Confessions, but finishes by turning 
his attention back onto his own critical practice and pointedly asking: 
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What privilege do I claim to tell the truth of Rousseau that 
Rousseau cannot tell? What is the privilege of criticism by 
which it claims to tell the truth of literature?... Is it not possible 
that to tell what the privilege of criticism over literature is 
would be to tell a truth that criticism cannot afford to tell, 
namely, why it wants the literary text to stand there in all its 
ignorance, side by side with the radiant truth of the text 
supplied by criticism, without the latter supplanting the 
former?31 
So despite his critique of Rousseau’s text, Coetzee suggests that, rather than 
criticism being a superior form than the literary text in which to utter the truth, 
the truth uncovered in his critical reading also harbours its own secret. Like 
Rousseau’s autobiography, criticism has a truth that it cannot afford to spell out, 
specifically regarding its posture (or imposture) of perfect clarity and its 
dependence on literature. This point, Coetzee says, is ‘the heart of this lecture’; 
that ‘[a]ll forms of discourse may have secrets, of no great profundity, which 
they nevertheless cannot afford to unveil’ (5-6). The presence of a secret is not 
the fault of a discourse but a currency that underpins its being.  
As so much of Coetzee’s fiction does not owe allegiance to one 
discourse, but is rather a movement across critical thinking, affective life and 
fictional creation, there remains at least a possibility that his narratives can be 
more transparent than writings in a specific discourse. While further proof will 
have to be in the reading, for the moment we can take advantage of criticism’s 
dependence on textual obscurity to gauge the transparency of Coetzee’s fiction 
by looking at the difficulty experienced by critical respondents to the novels. It is 
notable that critically negative readings like the one Coetzee performs on 
Rousseau very rarely surface in relation to Coetzee’s novels; the only prominent 
one being Benita Parry’s 1998 ‘Speech and Silence in the Fictions of J.M. 
Coetzee,’ which argues that the persecuted characters in Coetzee’s novels are 
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ventriloquized and objectified.32 Her misgiving did not find much support in the 
critical community and its argument that Coetzee’s novels up to Age of Iron 
silenced their persecuted characters can be said to have been prefigured in the 
novels themselves. 
On the other hand, the most successful, which is to say most responsive, 
critical commentaries on Coetzee share an emphasis on what the novels do—
ethically, historically, stylistically, etc.—rather than on trying to say what they 
mean. The most influential demonstration of such criticism can be found in 
Attridge’s monograph J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, which avoids the 
violence of interpretation by shifting the critical gaze inward onto one’s activities 
as reader and critic in relation to Coetzee’s novels. The chapter ‘Against 
Allegory: Waiting for the Barbarians and Life & Times of Michael K,’ in 
particular, captures the major critical challenge posed by Coetzee’s texts by 
demonstrating that, before the critics arrive, Coetzee’s characters have already 
explored the allegorical possibilities of their stories, already scoured their own 
lives for meanings, yet still having to go on living in the unknown. In light of the 
characters’ self-critique, Attridge suggests an experiment whereby the readers 
‘resist the allegorical reading that the novels seem half to solicit, half to 
problematize, and take them, as it were, at their word.’33 In saying so, he argues 
for what he calls ‘literal reading,’ which is an experience of each reading as a 
singular event in which meanings, as Attridge puts it, ‘are derived from my 
familiarity with the genre, my participation in the shared meanings of my culture, 
and from my own personal history’ (40). As I see it, this is literary criticism 
practiced with a growing autobiographical awareness of the provisionality of its 
own truth, driven to self-reflection by a body of fictional text that wears its 
autobiographical truth on its sleeve.  
So to write criticism on Coetzee’s fiction is often to meet the challenge of 
a text with an already extraordinary clarity and also a complete oeuvre that 
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comes furnished with the disclosure of its most relevant literary and theoretical 
influences.34 In his study of the Coetzee archive, David Attwell reproduces a 
passage from Coetzee’s notebook that interestingly conjures an image of what 
Coetzee does when he writes: 
With every book I have written, the temptation has been to 
extend (to get length) by adding planes of consciousness. Every 
time this stratagem has been (rightly) avoided. Insofar as the 
books have achieved anything, it has been that they have 
reduced the planes to (projected the planes onto) a single 
plane.35 
This image of the single plane nicely captures Coetzean clarity. In Doubling the 
Point, Coetzee famously describes a state of clarity in Dostoevskian term of 
‘grace,’ which stands opposed to cynicism. He gives definitions of the two poles 
as follows: ‘Cynicism: the denial of any ultimate basis for values. Grace: a 
condition in which the truth can be told clearly, without blindness.’36 Coetzee 
does not attribute the debate between cynicism and grace to himself. Instead, he 
says that it ‘is staged by Dostoevsky’ or that they are ‘terms brought into 
prominence in the essay [‘Confession and Double Thoughts’]’ (392), which 
includes a discussion of Dostoevsky’s work. One senses that the meanings of 
cynicism and grace for Coetzee are based on the world of Dostoevsky’s novels 
and influenced by the Russian’s embattled Christian faith—in other words, they 
are the truth of Dostoevsky’s body-soul. In responding specifically to Coetzee’s 
fiction, it may be necessary to imagine a Coetzean version of the ideal condition 
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for truth and place it into a Coetzean world picture. From the above quote from 
Coetzee’s notebook, it appears that his writing vaguely conceives of this task as a 
condensation of various segregated ways of perceiving into one, which, I will 
argue, is the plane of his protagonist’s living body-soul.  
 
The body-soul and the Australian fictions 
 Costello’s evocation of the embodied soul comes at the start of Coetzee’s 
return to the formal experiment of Dusklands and In the Heart of the Country. 
The first three novels following his emigration from South Africa to Australia in 
2002 have author figures featuring prominently in all of them and are marked by 
increased metafictional self-referentiality. The criticism of his novels in turn 
responded to the change by transferring its focus from the ethico-political 
considerations of anti-apartheid readings, to explorations of delocalised literary 
concerns such as style, fictional genres and question of authorial authority. While 
the literary is no doubt interconnected with the ethico-political, the connection 
has not always been made. Criticism on Coetzee begins to split between 
appreciations of Coetzee’s subtle political engagement during works from the 
apartheid era and the literariness of his Australian works. The latter, viewed as 
dominated by epistemological uncertainty, are approached in an intellectual 
manner with less sympathetic recognition for their embodied quality.  
In her consideration of the Australian fictions, Elleke Boehmer describes 
Coetzee’s voice as ‘a famously stripped-down, standardized yet globalized 
English voice—one that assumes a broadly secular, humanist position.’37 This 
characterless rendition, however, runs quite contrary to the full-bodied presence 
recalled in Costello’s speech about the embodied soul that is tethered to its 
specific context. On the other hand, Graham Bradshaw and Michael Neill, 
editors of an influential collection of essays, J.M. Coetzee’s Austerities, 
recognise that there are more continuities than discontinuities between the J.M. 
Coetzee before and after the apartheid. Their introduction to the monograph 
relates an intention to ‘realign the South African Coetzee with the “late 
modernist” Coetzee, who has never abandoned or forgotten or ceased to care 
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about that modernist, linguistic and epistemological battlefield.’ 38  But this 
statement only further cements the idea that disembodied epistemological and 
formal questions will now be the overarching theme for discussions of Coetzee’s 
works.  
While this thematic shift allows criticism to revisit Coetzee’s South 
African novels with a keener appreciation for the technical complexity that 
underpins their political and ethical resonances, the reverse cannot be said about 
Coetzee’s Australian novels, for by and large, they are not viewed with the same 
affective engagement that is afforded his South African fiction. The experience 
of reading Coetzee’s late novels, of being led along their highly irregular 
narrative rhythms, is often dissected in criticisms down to static snapshots of 
formal contrivances or the characters’ argumentative assertions. Hayes’s 
monograph J.M. Coetzee and the Novel, for instance, approaches the Australian 
novels as creative arguments. To Hayes, this section of the oeuvre represents 
Coetzee’s intellectual foray into cultural criticism, whose meanings are best 
understood when placed ‘in a much wider tradition of debate on the nature and 
value of “high culture.”’39 While I have no objections to the insights from 
sensitive applications of such an approach, this study hopes to provide an 
alternative stance that will continue the embodied legacy of Coetzee’s South 
African experience. 
An important point is that the body-soul features not in an opposition to 
the intellectual opinions held by the characters in Coetzee’s novels. Its presence 
does not simplistically detract from assertions the voice is making, assertions 
which are what Coetzee’s criticism has so far picked up. Rather, the body-soul is 
a basis of the human (or non-human) in the writings, whether these writings be in 
the form of letters, ideas, opinions, arguments, or drunken babbles. Coetzee’s 
fictions speak with this troubled awareness of embodied souls, so that even as it 
depicts characters whose actions or viewpoints one finds instinctively repulsive 
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or ridiculous, one’s attention is still preserved by glimpses of the corporeal and 
spiritual agony that informs them. Alternatively, and this is an important point to 
get across, when the opinions expressed in the fiction are so logically persuasive 
that they overwhelm doubts, as is the case in the excellent discursive mode of 
Elizabeth Costello and Diary of a Bad Year, Coetzee’s texts still acknowledge 
the restricted impact of even a perfect argument on the characters’ ongoing lives. 
So rather than requiring a change of approach from the readers, in my view 
Coetzee’s Australian novels bring the body-soul into sharper focus by showing 
its survival even when the writing engages with postmodern techniques that are 
notoriously disembodied. The characters’ vulnerabilities continue to leak out of 
the seams between the different forms adopted by Coetzee’s late novels. 
The varied terrain of Coetzee’s fiction covered in this study helps show 
that whether Coetzee resorts to inventive formal devices in his narratives or does 
not—as in the instance of the predominantly realist Age of Iron—the formal 
decision still feeds into his adherence to the characters’ beings and their 
circumstances. It is not the case that the Coetzee who wrote Age of Iron had yet 
to consider the techniques of postmodern metafiction, but rather that the violent 
reality of South Africa under the State of Emergency, and under which Mrs. 
Curren lives her last days, would have been shortchanged by the insubstantiality 
communicated by the self-reflexive postmodern voice. The Australia of Slow 
Man, on the other hand, engenders a much less precarious life for Paul Rayment 
and comes equipped with a welfare system that takes care of his worst physical 
vulnerabilities, even if it fails to provide his soul with ‘loving care.’40 Thus, 
unlike the people under South African apartheid, Rayment’s life choices are 
divorced from matters of his own life and death. In a limited sense, his less 
fraught existence allows for the metafictional intervention of his author Elizabeth 
Costello and the interplay between the different novelistic genres that coexist in 
that novel. 
The living reality of Coetzee’s characters is, in other words, more 
foundational than the literary or discursive forms that house them. A reading that 
is focused on form cannot put us on a solid footing to engage with Coetzee’s 
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fiction, as the forms of his writing never cease to evolve with the characters. 
Without going into too much detail of individual works at this point, we can look 
at how The Childhood of Jesus, Coetzee’s most recent novel at this time, has 
already brought about a return to stable narration and an imaginary setting and 
disrupted the critical narrative of recent years that Coetzee’s Australian fiction 
signals a turn towards formally self-reflexive literature. The term ‘Australian 
fiction’ itself is rendered suspect by a new story that is set in an imaginary 
Spanish-speaking town named Novilla. Taken as a whole, the genre shifts from 
realist to metafiction, or from letters, to lectures, to essays, to fictional narrative, 
and to autobiographical tales, do not form a meaningful trajectory among 
themselves. A recognition of the body-soul in Coetzee’s writing, however, can 
free our reading from the endless task of enforcing coherence onto multiplicity 
and give us a mode of appreciating each literary or discursive form as readable 
representations of specific states of being.  
 
The autobiographical 
The claim I am making about reading for the body-soul differs slightly 
from Attridge’s argument that Coetzee’s fiction nudges the readers to read not 
for a specific message, but to experience it as an ‘ethically charged event, one 
that befalls individual readers and, at the same time, the culture within which, 
and through which, they read.’41 While I find immensely important Attridge’s 
inclusion of the reader and their context, I would question the assumption of a 
Levinasian ‘ethical’ undercurrent in Coetzee’s fiction, which suggests that the 
narratives are fundamentally concerned with how one should act towards the 
Other. The ethical imperative itself is historically situated. It may have been a 
central concern during Coetzee’s apartheid fiction, but it has noticeably less 
leverage in the democratic world of Australia. We can alternatively trace the life 
of ‘the ethical’ in Coetzee’s novels through the word ‘soul’ and its changing 
concerns. In Age of Iron, set during the height of apartheid violence, Mrs. Curren 
professes that she is ‘trying to keep the soul alive in times not hospitable to the 
soul,’ and one senses in her remark the threat from the moral corruption of the 
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age. On the other hand, the ‘soul-life’ of Paul Rayment in Slow Man’s Australia 
is gloomy rather than in peril, and it chooses to chase after earthly love for his 
nurse Marijana Jokíc instead of religious salvation: ‘It all feels one to him, one 
movement: the swelling of the soul, the swelling of the heart, the swelling of 
desire. He cannot imagine loving God more than he loves Marijana at this 
moment.’42  
Attridge’s influential ethical grounding has led to an overemphasis in 
subsequent critical commentaries on the unknowable figures of the Other in 
Coetzee’s writing, which in fact perpetuates the process of othering it criticises. 
The emphasis is also achieved at the expense of our attention for the central 
consciousness on whom we depend for the experience of the Other, and who is 
often already an other to ourselves. In my reading of Age of Iron in Chapter Four, 
the relationship between Mrs. Curren and the derelict Verceuil is shown to 
involve mutual likeness and difference that is never static as is suggested by the 
poles of the same and the other.  
Age of Iron additionally introduces the motif of ‘following’ that helps us 
concretise ‘the event’ of reading and writing into the image of living beings. Mrs. 
Curren writes that she follows Verceuil because ‘in the look he gives me I see 
myself in a way that can be written.’43 And indeed, the constant movement of 
Coetzee’s fiction may be best epitomised in this action of ‘following’ through 
which the writing self strives to transcend the restrictive view of its authoritative 
position by giving up the lead and becoming a bare body-soul that tails a 
fictional being. From Coetzee’s different critical essays on autobiography like 
‘Double Thoughts,’44 we can gather that he perceives the speaker’s position—
which is determined variously by the ‘automatism’45 built into language, genre or 
discourse, as well as the speaking self’s psyche and its infinite contexts—to 
always involve a measure of blindness. It is only by the constant shifting of all 
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these components while adhering to the foundational fact of being alive that he 
can see his writing breaking into new meaningful grounds for himself.  
By conceiving writing in this way, we are bringing into the picture the 
writing self who does the imaginative following and is himself registered in the 
text. There is a famous statement by Coetzee in Doubling the Point, written right 
after Age of Iron in 1991 that: ‘all writing is autobiography: everything that you 
write… writes you as you write it’ in the sense that writing ‘reveals… what you 
thought (or half-thought) you wanted to say in the first place’ (17-18). Today, the 
statement strikes me as an oddly insufficient description of his current oeuvre. Its 
preoccupation with the process of writing and thinking occludes the body-soul 
and its desires, which has now emerged to be crucially involved in his creative 
process. Perhaps Coetzee had wanted to leave the matter for later on in his 
writing career; in any case, we are at present blessed with a wealth of deeply 
personal works from Coetzee himself such as The Master of Petersburg and the 
three fictional memoirs, together with external sources such as JC Kannemeyer’s 
biography J.M. Coetzee: A Life in Writing, David Attwell’s critical monograph 
on Coetzee’s manuscripts J.M. Coetzee and the Life of Writing and a 
comprehensive Coetzee Archive at Harry Ransom Center in Austin, Texas.  
Given all these biographical materials, which will only grow with time, 
‘all writing is autobiography’ has a more literal meaning now than it did in the 
days of Doubling the Point, at least in so far as Coetzee’s own practice is 
concerned. In other words, Coetzee’s fiction has a dimension that is undeniably 
non-textual and real, which if we have not already felt within the text, is 
confessed to in its half-hidden autobiographical referents. The self-reflexivity of 
Coetzee’s fiction crucially differs from the technique literary postmodernism 
employs to reveal the hands that pull the strings, which reinstates the writer’s 
command over textual play as his vulnerabilities remains blanketed. Instead, 
Coetzean reflexivity is more often an effect of the autobiographical, meaning that 
it reaches for the being behind the writing and confronts its more resistant 
anxieties and desires. The writer in this case feels himself not in control since he 
is being half-uncovered as he half-creates his stories.  
v 
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 The chapters of this thesis are organised by the novels’ thematic interests 
and formal similarities. Starting with the border text between Coetzee’s South 
African and Australian works, Chapter One, ‘Sympathy for Elizabeth Costello,’ 
reads the chapter ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’ from Elizabeth Costello by 
following the eponymous protagonist’s argument in a lecture against the Western 
philosophical and rational conception of non-human animals. I demonstrate that 
parts of Costello’s lecture are rationally unfounded and hinge on the reader’s 
sympathy for her as a character. Her argument only makes the fullest sense when 
it is read with sympathy for the body-soul behind the words. The dependence of 
her lecture on sympathy parallels her assertion that, in place of rationality, one 
can relate to any animal through the ‘sympathetic imagination,’ a faculty that is 
based on one’s awareness of oneself as another vulnerable body-soul. While my 
reading begins with rational engagement with the philosophers cited by Costello 
during the lecture, it ends with the off-stage figure of Costello in a car with her 
son, uncertain that all that she has said—her embodied truth—may be no truer 
than the truth of her meat-eating family members. This particular chapter from 
Elizabeth Costello sensitively conceptualises, without abandoning the 
complexities of living, what it entails to relate to another body-soul.  
The second chapter expands the implications of the body-soul from the 
act of reading to the act of writing and approaches Slow Man’s baffling 
introduction of the authorial presence that has puzzled critics since its 
publication. I attend to the living figure of the writer in Slow Man and in Age of 
Iron as he/she ‘follows’ another character and advance the notion that Coetzee 
sees his writing as an act of ‘following’ another living being in hope of arriving 
at a deeper truth than is possible in a plain rational account written from the 
position of authority. In the process, I also attempt to make the Coetzean oeuvre 
cohere by linking the two formally and temporally disparate texts—the former a 
constricted realist narrative about the mid-1980s State of Emergency in South 
Africa and the latter a halting metafiction set in twenty-first century Adelaide, 
Australia—under the image of the body-soul. Chapter Three, ‘The Confessions 
of John Coetzee,’ confronts the living being of Coetzee in his writings, 
specifically in the fictional memoirs Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime. A focus 
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on the body-soul of John Coetzee provides a neutral platform to make sense of 
the series’s intriguing blend of truth and fiction without privileging one over the 
other. I trace how Coetzee draws on different discourses—of the memoir, the 
confession, fiction, etc.—to speak the truth of different phases of his life with 
keen awareness of their discursive blind spots.  
Chapter Four examines two devious Coetzee texts, Elizabeth Costello’s 
‘The Problem of Evil’ and The Master of Petersburg, which intentionally 
challenge the reader’s sympathy with the body-soul. They provocatively ask, if 
not every living being is the force for the good, should we still read with 
sympathy? Both these texts are at least mildly offensive: in ‘The Problem of 
Evil,’ Costello uses her lecture platform to criticise a real-life author Paul West 
for his novel’s portrayal of torture, while The Master of Petersburg presents, 
without any disclaimer, a false story about the Russian author Fyodor 
Dostoevsky mourning the death of his stepson that is more a story about Coetzee 
himself. My chapter explores the possibility that Coetzee’s fiction can be entirely 
unpleasant and unprincipled perversions, but still remain representations of 
experiences that are an inescapable part of living.  
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Sympathy for Elizabeth Costello 
  
Sympathy has become a prominent concept in commentaries on Coetzee’s novels 
following the provocative claim of Coetzee’s protagonist Elizabeth Costello that 
‘there are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination,’ delivered in the first of 
Coetzee’s two ‘The Lives of Animals’ lectures at Princeton University.46 Yet 
many of these literary responses do not embrace Costello’s sponsoring of 
sympathy, seeing it as cancelled out by the irony built into the Coetzee’s oeuvre. 
To Sam Durrant, ‘Coetzee’s fiction unequivocally rehearses the failure of 
Costello’s sympathetic imagination.’ 47  The novel Disgrace, in which the 
protagonist David Lurie faces the impossibility of his ever understanding the 
female experience of rape, is regularly touted as evidence of Coetzee’s 
acknowledgement of sympathetic limits. For Molly Abel Travis, Disgrace 
demonstrates the pitfalls of empathy and, instead, works by ‘eschewing 
resolution and calling forth an ethical response beyond empathy.’48 Geoffrey 
Baker echoes the opposition between Elizabeth Costello and Disgrace, 
contending that ‘Elizabeth Costello’s seemingly visionary proclamations on a 
sympathetic imagination without limits lie somewhat tarnished in the incinerator 
afterglow of Disgrace.’49 Rather than sympathy, the literary critics consider 
Coetzee’s fiction to espouse the Levinasian model of engagement with 
unknowable alterity, which distances itself from sympathy and its sentimental 
reputation. 
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35 
The two ‘The Lives of Animals’ lectures have also inspired a host of 
responses from animal studies and analytic philosophy,50 which, in a surprising 
contrast, are much more congenial to Costello’s privileging of the sympathetic 
imagination over philosophical thinking. Among them, Cora Diamond’s ‘The 
Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’51 stands out for its 
sensitivity to Costello’s embodied critique of philosophy. Diamond senses in 
Coetzee’s lecture-narrative a reality that is ‘resistant to our thinking it’ (45) and 
argues for the need to respond to the Costello piece from ‘our own sense of what 
it is to be a living animal’ as opposed to ‘pulling out ideas and arguments as if 
they had been simply clothed in fictional form as a way of putting them before 
us’ (53). Diamond notes that this reading as a living animal is not to say vaguely 
that one should read the text as literature, but she does not go further, restricting 
her discussion only to what philosophy should not do.  
While my argument in this thesis is obviously more in line with 
Diamond’s, I would like to highlight in these different strands of scholarly 
commentaries the tendency to stop at the limits of our respective discipline and 
sometimes even to declare what lies outside to be unknowable. In literary 
criticism, this is to reiterate the limit intrinsic to characters’ viewpoints,52 while 
in philosophy it is to stress the limit of rational thinking. Yet these restrictions 
curiously do not apply to Coetzee’s writing in quite the same way, given that it is 
capable of flagging out the discursive limits for us. The chapters of Elizabeth 
Costello are not altogether achieved within the discourse of philosophy or of 
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literature, unless we define the literary discourse senselessly as anything and 
everything. Coetzee’s writing in this case moves through generic boundaries and 
presents us with texts that increase possibilities rather than delimit them. 
This chapter is interested in Coetzee’s overriding interest in the living 
being of Elizabeth Costello that, from where I see it, allows Coetzee’s fiction-as-
lecture to divest discursive limits and subjects them to our gaze. While we often 
hear critics repeat that Coetzee’s fictions are difficult and unyielding, it may be 
possible that these impressions of textual obscurity are produced by the fixed 
critical demands that are unable to track the living text along its full course. As I 
have indicated in the introduction, though Coetzee’s texts consistently gesture 
towards difficult, unknowable experiences beyond themselves, in themselves 
they strive to be, and are, highly knowable. This knowability does not produce 
Foucauldian knowledge belonging to the discourse of power, but involves a 
sympathetic grasp of the body-soul of his protagonist, which in this case is 
Costello herself. Costello’s provocative claim about the boundless sympathetic 
capacity, in a sense, frames the narrative’s challenge for us to sympathise with its 
leading lady. 
Admittedly, my effort to address Coetzee’s evolving fiction from within 
the critical discourse also entails a partial view. In reading ‘The Lives of 
Animals’ lectures, I have striven to remain adaptable to Costello and the text’s 
changing discourses as far as possible, but this aim remains ineluctably 
incomplete. My focus for this chapter is to show that the body-soul is not an 
occult concept of transcendence, but is methodically embodied within the text’s 
tangible structures and in the context of its delivery. In spirit, my reading is a 
continuation of Diamond’s response and it shares her belief in the living mode of 
relating to Costello. It differs, however, in coming from a tradition of literary 
criticism that affords a more formally attentive analysis, perhaps at the expense 
of the direct simplicity of analytic philosophy.  
Beside my general claim about the body-soul, this chapter also delves 
into Costello’s horror over humans’ treatment of animals. I identify how 
Costello’s argument falls silent at decisive moments so that one is required to 
reach into one’s own parallel experience as living being and ask oneself if her 
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claim is true. Her concerns are presented in an intricate weave that stretches over 
two lectures of impressive philosophical analysis, her son’s thoughts, the 
audience’s responses, the opinions of her daughter-in-law, the conversations 
before and after the lecture, etc., and I argue that this contextualising composite 
conveys the fundamental provisionality of Costello’s argument for the animals. 
However, Costello’s claim is provisional not because human sympathetic 
capacity is in fact limited, but rather because Coetzee plants this claim into the 
circumstances of its mortal speaker.  
The chapter starts outside the text by reviewing the theoretical history of 
the term ‘sympathy,’ which is a notable absence from the lecture despite it being 
otherwise a theoretically sophisticated speech. This absence clearly signals 
Costello’s break from rational discourse in the matter of sympathy. This 
background is followed by an explication of the rational component of Costello’s 
lecture, which includes her engagement with the philosopher Thomas Nagel. I 
additionally compare Costello’s stance to Jacques Derrida’s writing on the 
animal, which has been highly influential in critical readings of this particular 
Coetzee text, and begins to highlight the significance of Costello’s fragile voice 
versus Derridean equanimity. Finally, I draw on the first chapter of Elizabeth 
Costello, ‘Realism,’ to assert the achievement of ‘The Philosophers’ in providing 
Costello and her concern for the animal with the solidity of the body-soul. 
 
I. Sympathy/empathy: the missing theoretical context and definition 
 While Costello’s evocation of the ‘sympathetic imagination’ puts her in 
contact with the complex history of the term ‘sympathy,’ this history is notably 
absent from her lecture. The wholesale omission of the term’s conceptual 
development and the philosophers’ names usually associated with it appears to 
be a conscious decision by Coetzee behind Costello, as he seems otherwise 
comfortable with discussing the matter outside his fiction. The strategy certainly 
helps to further divorce this portion of Costello’s speech from the rational 
discourse that otherwise determines her lecture format. A brief survey of the 
term’s history, however, should help us appreciate the nuances of Costello’s call 
for non-rational engagement with other beings. This history additionally involves 
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the differentiation between the two sister terms ‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy,’ which 
sees Coetzee making an interesting choice to go with the former.  
‘Empathy’, from the German word Einfühlung, is much newer than 
‘sympathy,’ having been first coined in German by Johann Friedrich Herbart in 
1831 and later introduced into the English language via the casual translation of 
British psychologist Edward Titchener in 1909. ‘Sympathy,’ on the other hand, is 
first recorded by the OED in 1578, but its origin stretches as far back as the late 
Latin word of sympathia. The distinctions that have been proposed between 
sympathy and empathy show little agreement both in their daily usage and across 
different academic disciplines. Initially, the German ‘empathy’ or Einfühlung 
was employed in the service of aesthetic theories and was most influentially 
associated with the work of the German philosopher Theodor Lipps at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Lipps employs it to explain how one appreciates 
art by projecting oneself into that which is beautiful.53  
The object of Lipps’s empathy can be either animate or inanimate—a 
rock, a tree, etc.—and the aesthetic experience runs only one way from the 
subject to the object with no accounting of how the object’s actual experience 
may affect the subject emotionally. Lipps himself downplays the distinction 
between empathy (‘feeling into’) and ‘sympathy’ or Mitfühlung (direct 
translation: ‘feeling with’), saying that ‘[t]he word “sympathy” appears to be 
only another word for Einfühlung.’54 However, in his own use, ‘sympathy’ in 
fact has a broader meaning and can refer to both the negative and positive 
projections, while his use of empathy focuses mainly on positive aesthetic 
experiences. Though Lipps’s conception of empathy is clearly too limited as a 
ground for examining Coetzee’s fiction, it was later interestingly picked up in the 
field of psychology through Lipps’s admirer Sigmund Freud and, across the 
pond, through Titchener. In its psychological guise, empathy retains the sense of 
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psychological projection into another being, but the empathetic identifications 
become more specific to other human subjects or other sentient animals. In 
addition, the range of relevant feelings is broadened to include both the positive 
and the negative emotions. 
On the other hand, the most influential use of ‘sympathy’ can be 
attributed to Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) where 
similarly it is used to denote ‘our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.’55 
Smith’s definition of sympathy is rather similar to that of Costello, save for its 
Cartesian heritage that excludes non-human animals and its professed moral 
aspirations. For Smith, sympathy is an aspect of ‘human nature’ or a ‘faculty’ 
that everyone possesses (I.i.1.2). It does not reproduce the other’s exact feeling 
but the feeling ‘we ourselves should feel in the like situation’ that is conjured ‘by 
the imagination’ and encompasses the sharing of both misery and joy (I.i.1.2).  
Another relevant conception of sympathy is to be found in the Romantic 
Movement of the arts in the late 18th and early 19th century. As with aesthetics, 
sympathy for the Romantics can be applied to any object but, unlike Lipps’s 
conception, it sports an idealism that claims a fundamental oneness with nature 
that allows human-being direct access to all the world’s experiences.56 After this, 
sympathy slowly fell out of fashion within academic circles as its popularisation 
through the Romantic movement meant that it became more and more associated 
with a patronising sense of superiority that selectively recognises only the 
sufferings of others but not their joy. There is a sense today that empathy is a 
more equitable and inclusive version of sympathy or, as Rae Greiner put it, 
empathy is ‘sympathy minus the attitude.’57  
It would seem that for Coetzee the hairsplitting between sympathy and 
empathy is an inconsequential point that he is impatient to get beyond. In one of 
the email correspondences with Arabella Kurtz published in ‘Nevertheless, My 
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Sympathies are with the Karamazovs,’ Coetzee simply cites his desire to 
maintain connection with the 18th century writings on sympathy as the reason 
behind his preference for the word: ‘I use sympathy where I can because there is 
a whole body of writing about sympathy (=empathy), particularly in the 18th 
century, which it would be a pity to lose touch with.’58 Coetzee was probably 
thinking about Smith in making this statement. Nevertheless, Coetzee’s own 
conception of sympathy in conversations with Kurtz and in ‘The Philosophers’ is 
more likely to be informed by the psychological appropriation of Lipps’s 
‘empathy’ as a projection into another being. In his first correspondence with 
Kurtz, Coetzee mentions that he draws from ‘an earlier psychology: sympathy as 
a power of projecting oneself into the subjectivity of the other, and thinking and 
feeling from within him/her.’ 59  Additionally, Coetzee also appears most 
comfortable discussing the matter within the confines of psychology, as can be 
seen in how the concept features centrally in his two collaborations with the 
psychoanalyst Kurtz while it rarely crops up in his copious literary criticism.  
It is to be expected that Coetzee would conceive sympathy as a 
psychological projection as opposed to an authentic representation of others’ 
experiences as claimed by the Romantics, since Coetzee’s fiction clearly 
demonstrates a deep respect for the sanctity of others’ experiences.60 In the more 
recent collaboration with Kurtz titled The Good Story, Coetzee acknowledges 
that ‘[i]t goes without saying that the other lives we live at such times are not 
necessarily the true lives of the others to whom they belong’ and may produce 
only ‘fictional truths.’61 What this chapter will seek to understand is how Coetzee 
goes much further in his stories from this basic realisation of the difference 
between sympathetic truth and the truth of the other. In ‘The Philosophers,’ 
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Coetzee becomes interested in the very real impact that fictional truths can have 
on their creator. 
A final observation I wish to make at this juncture is that, since Coetzean 
sympathy is partly influenced by the scientific curiosity of psychology, it 
distances itself from the moralism often found in evocations of sympathy within 
the fields of the humanities, where sympathy (or empathy) is overwhelmingly 
prized on the ground of its moral value. Coetzee seems to evade the moral 
question altogether and describes sympathy carefully as a capacity that is 
conditional on individual circumstances—‘an inborn capacity in human beings 
which may or may not grow, may or may not atrophy, may or may not be 
fostered’62—rather than pressing it forward as an innate moral sensibility or 
responsibility. It is possible to view the Coetzean sympathy as an alternative field 
of exploration that can add to, as well as qualify, human rational enquiries. 
 
II. Costello’s sympathetic imagination and the philosophers 
The story of Elizabeth Costello’s lecture in support of the sympathetic 
imagination makes up the first of the two ‘Lives of Animals’ lectures, which 
were initially delivered as part of the annual Tanner Lectures by Coetzee himself 
at Princeton University. The lecture is then published twice with minor 
alterations as a chapter in Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals63  and Elizabeth 
Costello. Subtitled ‘The Philosophers and the Animals,’ the short prose fiction is 
told through the perspective of Costello’s physicist son John Bernard, who 
accompanies his mother on an official visit that mirrors the very one Coetzee was 
taking part in (though Princeton is instead called Appleton College, while ‘the 
annual Gates lectures’ replaces the Tanner lectures).  
Within the son’s perspective is lodged this lecture by the fictional 
Australian novelist Elizabeth Costello on the subject of animals, which offers an 
impassioned attack on the rational underpinnings of human treatment of animals. 
The talk has a labyrinthine structure as Costello strings unconnected fragments of 
historical, philosophical, scientific, and literary references together with her own 
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personal sense and experiences. The confused organisation of her lecture betrays 
a voice that feels deeply about its subject—so aghast with the wrongs being 
perpetrated against farm animals that it is prepared to attack them from all angles 
imaginable. The impassioned plea is a natural form for Costello’s critique of 
human reason, but Coetzee also conceives of its potential offensiveness—that it 
may stir similarly emotional responses—as Costello’s contentious speech is 
depicted to ruffle the equable atmosphere of a public lecture event. Her analogy 
between the industrialised slaughter of animals and the Holocaust draws a letter 
of condemnation from a person in the audience: ‘The inversion insults the 
memory of the dead. It also trades on the horrors of the camps in a cheap way.’64 
On the other hand, with the clever fictionalised distance Coetzee has created, his 
actual lecture at Princeton must have given off a different air altogether, even 
though there is a possibility that he could be privately beset with the same sense 
of indignation as his character. 
The unflattering framing of Costello’s lecture nevertheless does not 
completely ironise her position since that position is never directly stated and 
seems also to be undergoing its own interrogations. It displays the qualities of 
both conviction and self-doubt that positions her at the enigmatic centre of the 
whole episode. Repeatedly, she expatiates on what is possible—what can be 
done—but does not venture to proclaim what should be done. While the two 
‘Lives of Animals’ lectures are unmistakably directed towards a better treatment 
of animals, this is strictly-speaking only implicit in Costello’s explorations of 
other tangential issues and in the narrative’s representation of her own 
vegetarianism; itself is never directly stated. The first question from the audience 
after the first talk addresses this very ambiguity. A man says, ‘What wasn’t clear 
to me… is what you are actually targeting.’ He asks that Costello clarify.65 
Costello’s response is stubbornly cryptic: ‘If principles are what you want to take 
away from this talk, I would have to respond, open your heart and listen to what 
your heart says’ (82). 
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The closest Costello gets to advancing a should—and the closest Coetzee 
himself has possibly ever gotten—is in the part of her lecture where the concept 
of the sympathetic imagination is broached and more or less conferred an ideal 
status. The main thrust of Costello’s argument is to establish that the sympathetic 
imagination is unbounded. While there are confusingly many entry points into 
Costello’s serpentine assertions, I will first examine her discussion of Thomas 
Nagel’s authoritative article titled ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’66 I will trace the 
implications behind the ways that Costello’s burning speech contrasts with the 
rarefied philosophical model embodied here in Nagel and in the more complex 
thinking of Jacques Derrida, before moving on to Costello’s more positive 
engagements with Franz Kafka’s short story, ‘A Report to an Academy.’67 
 
 Thomas Nagel and Jacques Derrida 
In his influential article, Nagel attempts to overcome the disjuncture 
between two approaches of philosophical enquiries, namely, subjective 
phenomenology and objective physicalism. Nagel is trying to find a way to 
combine the forces of the human mind and body into ‘an objective 
phenomenology [that is] not dependent on empathy or the imagination.’68 It is a 
project that clearly puts him at odds with Costello, who seems, moreover, to 
completely ignore this philosophical premise of Nagel’s work. Costello seizes 
instead on Nagel’s advancement, in the course of his larger argument, that the 
human mind is incapable of fully knowing what it is like to be a bat: ‘cannot 
form more than a schematic conception of what it is like.’69 While he views that 
any knowledge of this kind will always remain ‘incompletable,’ Nagel argues 
that the more an organism resembles human being, the better we can understand 
it. Costello thus summarises Nagel’s concept as one that perceives a ‘continuum 
that stretches from the Martian at one end to the bat to the dog to the ape… to the 
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human being,’70 a diagram that shows measurable degrees of difference that 
culminate in the epitome of human image.  
Having singled out this assumption in Nagel’s work, Costello abruptly 
brings up death by saying that she sometimes imagine herself as a corpse: ‘For 
instants at a time,… I know what it is like to be a corpse. The knowledge repels 
me. It fills me with terror’ (77). As an argumentative move, this contention of 
Costello is strangely tenuous and has no moorings in shared or knowable reality, 
but it serves in its fervent and irrational way to introduce death as the missing 
consideration in Nagel’s formulation. Costello contends that imagining one’s 
own death demands much more imaginative power than the task Nagel sets out: 
‘if we are capable of thinking our own death, why on earth should we not be 
capable of thinking our way into the life of a bat?’ (77). 
Sam Durrant reads the curious invocation of a corpse as Coetzee’s way of 
emphasising the embodiment we share with the animals (and corpses), which can 
serve as a ground for sympathy in place of Nagel’s problematic model of 
consciousness.71 However, my own sense is that Costello goes even further than 
the bound of embodiment. Her sympathy with a corpse is not indicative of other 
beings, but of the possibility to sympathise with anything at all. A corpse is, by 
definition, not an embodiment. In saying that there is no bound to the 
sympathetic imagination, Costello is suggesting a connection forged beyond 
embodiment, beyond life and, indeed, beyond all bounds. The corpse, in this 
case, stands for the horizon of our own living knowledge and consciousness. To 
be able to sympathise with a corpse entails an ability to break out of one’s own 
subjective and mortal confines with one’s imagination. 
Such mention of death in relation to sympathy is not at all unusual. Adam 
Smith, the great advocate of sympathy, famously writes that ‘[w]e sympathize 
even with the dead.’72 Both Smith and Costello acknowledge that sympathy with 
the dead produces fictive sentiments that the dead can never entertain, but are the 
subject’s own as he or she imaginatively fills in its position. ‘What I know is 
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what a corpse cannot know,’ speaks Costello, ‘that it is extinct, that it knows 
nothing and never will know anything any more. For an instant, before my whole 
structure of knowledge collapses in panic, I am alive inside that contradiction, 
dead and alive at the same time.’73 Smith similarly writes that fellow feeling with 
the dead causes misery in the present because one experiences this extinction as 
one’s own: 
‘…our lodging, if I may be allowed to say so, our own living 
souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence conceiving what 
would be our emotions in this case. It is from this very illusion 
of the imagination, that the foresight of our own dissolution is 
so terrible to us, and that the idea of those circumstances, 
which undoubtedly can give us no pain when we are dead, 
makes us miserable while we are alive.’ (I.i.1.13) 
Smith’s conception of sympathy is thus deeply informed by an awareness of its 
illusory ground and contrasts with Nagel’s insistence on the basis of shared 
sensory faculties. Michael McKeon asserts that the Smithian concept of a society 
is in fact based on a ‘virtual reality’ engendered by ‘imaginative acts of 
sympathy.’74  
In recalling death, Costello begins to break up Nagel’s linear diagram of 
beings by adding to his orderly picture the negativity of death, to which every 
life form entertains a radically personal relation. Death is both shared and not 
shared. One’s death, as Derrida famously describes in The Gift of Death 
following Heidegger, is radically one’s own in a way that it is not possible to die 
‘in the place of the other,’ or to save the other forever from his/her eventual 
death by one’s dying.75 Thus, for Derrida death can never be given or taken. This 
contradictory nature of the private and universal end to one’s self is embodied in 
Costello’s speech as she attempts to evoke the common experience of death in a 
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way that is borderline incomprehensible. She continues: ‘All of us have such 
moments, particularly as we grow older… We live the impossible: we live 
beyond our death, look back on it, yet look back as only a dead self can.’76 
Costello’s knowledge of her own death is here brought out with such detachment 
from what has gone before in her speech (the discussion of Nagel) and from the 
shared intellectual premise with the lecture audience and the reader. It not only 
refutes the neat continuity of Nagel’s thinking on human terms, but also bluntly 
appeals for an understanding on a sympathetically corporeal level, on which 
there is no continuity between beings but perhaps a parallelism that the 
sympathetic imagination can unlock. 
v 
As an alternative to Nagel’s pragmatic thinking, Derrida’s poignant 
writings on the human-animal relation, especially in The Animal That Therefore I 
Am, have been highly influential within the field of animal studies and have also 
subsequently been employed in pro-animal readings of ‘The Lives of Animals.’77 
But in spite of notable similarities between Derrida’s and Coetzee’s works that 
would require a dedicated chapter to fully explicate, Derridean readings of ‘The 
Lives’ tend to elide the rigorous deferral of authority and embodied vulnerability 
of the Coetzee’s text. As Derrida is one of the foremost thinkers on the topic of 
animals, a comparison of the differences between his philosophical works and 
Coetzee’s genre-defying piece may better specify Costello’s compromised 
position and its implications on the pseudo-argument she is advancing. 
It will be noted that, apart from the non-linear organisation of her two 
animal lectures, Costello also appears to speak out of an intellectual confusion. 
To her son’s private enquiry after her intention behind the lecture, she cannot 
articulate what she is hoping to accomplish: ‘John, I don’t know what I want to 
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do. I just don’t want to sit silent.’78 While, as Robert McKay remarks, a lecture is 
generally expected to take ‘the form of a univocal expression of authorial 
meaning,’ 79  Costello steps out and, with her confused but strongly felt 
conviction, underdelivers on this expectation. A Derridean interpretation of this 
might be that Coetzee has, through his creation of the passionate Costello, 
deconstructed the control exerted by the genre of the lecture. In this line of 
reading, the content of Costello’s passion would be turned into a clever textual 
ruse, while the real authorial meaning gets deferred. But could the truth not be 
simpler and closer to what is said, namely that Costello speaks out for the 
animals because she could not stand not to, and could this moral confusion not be 
projected onto Costello because it is also plaguing Coetzee? For McKay, when 
Coetzee lent his voice to Costello’s lecture at Princeton, the distinction between 
author and character becomes severely compromised, which ‘allow[s] the 
fictional creation uncannily to usurp the performing space that Coetzee himself 
inhabits’ (77).80 
Turning to Derrida’s work, his voice in Animal impressively commands 
an emotive and ethical authority. Conceptually speaking, Derrida is close to 
Costello. He places emphasis on the position of vulnerability and mortality, 
arguing that the shared vulnerability of beings is the basis for our feeling of 
compassion:  
Mortality resides there, as the most radical means of thinking 
the finitude that we share with animals, the mortality that 
belongs to the very finitude of life, to the experience of 
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compassion, to the possibility of sharing the possibility of this 
nonpower, the possibility of this impossibility, the anguish of 
this vulnerability and the vulnerability of this anguish.81  
Derrida conceives of this vulnerability from his critical engagement with the long 
philosophical tradition of establishing human and animal rights on the basis of 
their capabilities—whether an animal can, for example, think or speak—that 
lends itself to exclusive anthropocentrism. Following the philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham, Derrida proposes that the question should be ‘Can they suffer?’ which 
is a form of ‘Can they not be able?’ (28), that will put the obligation to support, 
for lack of a better word, animal rights beyond dispute.  
 A Costellan reading of Derrida may question the authoritative position 
from which Derrida speaks, one that still implies a belief that a philosophical re-
conception of the animal figure holds the key to unlocking the pathos, a belief 
that the head controls the gate to the heart. Even as he is endorsing the heart to be 
open, his discourse itself forgoes doing so. Apropos of the animal, Derrida aligns 
himself with a relatively clear ethical scheme, which is to allow human pathos 
‘to awaken us to our responsibilities and our obligations vis-à-vis the living in 
general’ (27). For Derrida, the ethical is in itself unavoidable: human pity for 
suffering is ‘a necessity, a constraint that, like it or not, directly or indirectly, no 
one can escape’ (29). It is an admirable stance whose ethical authority and 
eloquence can subdue most cynicism. 
As an alternative to this trust in human ethical nature, we can look again 
to Costello and her pessimistic remark on the human callousness during the 
Holocaust which concludes her first animal lecture. The final passage can be 
described as overdramatic in tone, propelled by dismay at the possibility of 
untethered heartlessness rather than by any kind of intellectual enlightenment: 
‘We point to the Germans and Poles and Ukrainians who did 
and did not know of the atrocities around them. We like to 
think they were inwardly marked by the after-effects of that 
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special form of ignorance. We like to think that in their 
nightmares the ones whose suffering they had refused to enter 
come back to haunt them... But probably it was not so. The 
evidence points in the opposite direction: that we can do 
anything and get away with it; that there is no punishment.’82  
One is instinctively inclined to reject Costello’s dystopian verdict by a personal 
sense, to contend that surely there is some form of justice in the world and 
dismiss her conclusion as being an overemotional response to a terrible atrocity. 
In fact, given Costello’s compromised authority within the text, one is even 
afforded a space to do so comfortably.  
But is Derrida’s contention of a fundamental human compassion or a 
personal sense of justice not an equally naïve response to atrocity, though of a 
more palatable utopian variety? Would Derrida’s nuanced development of 
philosophical thought be able to affect us deeply enough—we who expose 
ourselves to his words willingly—that we stop consuming meat? Or if 
vegetarianism is not the point of this call for compassion for the animals, then 
what is? Costello is shown to be troubled by this inability of rigorous 
philosophical reflections, or even a halting one like her own, to alter moral 
failings and thwart the world’s endless cycles of suffering. During the reception 
dinner afterwards, Costello acknowledges to her table that she still uses leather 
shoes and purse: ‘I wouldn’t have overmuch respect [for me] if I were you’ (89). 
Costello’s personal vulnerability is not confined to the physical sphere 
but implies also her spiritual vulnerability to temptations. Ethically, she is also 
one of the animals. Costello compares her vulnerability to an intractable wound, 
which she covers up under the clothes of her pseudo-rational discourse but 
senses more acutely as her faith in the power of human rationality to cure it is 
dwindling: ‘I am not a philosopher of mind,’ she utters—imagine also this 
sentence conveyed by Coetzee’s voice from a podium—‘but an animal 
exhibiting, yet not exhibiting, to a gathering of scholars, a wound, which I cover 
up under my clothes but touch on in every word I speak’ (71).  
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But what kind of speech is generated from such a position that is halfway 
between breast-beating and a philosophical discourse? Costello herself outlines 
the problem of her imperfect rejection of rationality: 
And that, you see, is my dilemma this afternoon. Both reason 
and seven decades of life experience tell me that reason is 
neither the being of the universe nor the being of God… And if 
this is so, if that is what I believe, then why should I bow to 
reason this afternoon and content myself with embroidering on 
the discourse of the old philosophers? (67) 
By accepting the invitation to give the lectures, Costello and Coetzee have 
partially acceded to reason, but only partially. For Coetzee, his use of fictional 
techniques to frame the philosophical discourse obviously saves him from the 
charge of self-contradiction. But Costello’s lecture itself is also dotted with 
blocks of private experiences that have not been conceptualised into transferable 
knowledge. In the above passage, her ‘seven decades of life experience’ stands 
impenetrably alongside reason as supports of her claim. Later on she says: 
‘…although I see that the best way to win acceptance from this 
learned gathering would be for me to join myself, like a 
tributary stream running into a great river, to the great Western 
discourse of man versus beast, of reason versus unreason, 
something in me resists, foreseeing in that step the concession 
of the entire battle.’83 
Here again, there is a dead spot in an otherwise incisive picture—the ‘something 
in me’ that remains unyieldingly private and unexplained. The tail end of 
Costello’s lecture is further scattered with unanswered questions that are half-
rhetorical but also half-real. One paragraph ends with: ‘If I do not subject my 
discourse to reason, whatever that is, what is left for me but to gibber and emote 
and knock over my water glass and generally make a monkey of myself?’ (68). 
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At this prompt, one expect that Costello is about to justify how she differently 
subjects her discourse to reason, but the following paragraph drops the matter 
and relates instead a new case study of the gifted mathematicians Srinivasa 
Ramanujan. Perhaps to logically explain herself would be too much of a 
concession to reason. 
So despite its engagement with reason, Costello’s lecture neither offers an 
alternative philosophical position nor the authority of one. Costello lives, thinks, 
and speaks under the burden of her vulnerability. As I have related earlier, 
pressed by her son in private, she says that she gives the animal lectures because 
she cannot stand being silent. It is the kind of non-reason behind actions that one 
finds in many of Coetzee’s characters—stemming from a private imperative that 
will never be explained. By all accounts, this is not a place from which a clear 
assertion can be made, but if Derrida is right that vulnerability is the true and 
inevitable basis for compassion, then this state of being and speaking may be 
where the sympathetic souls find themselves all of the time. 
v 
Besides Derrida’s thinking on the animal, Costello’s sense of the 
sympathetic imagination also challenges the socially-engaged wing of 
philosophy that came out of 1980s America through philosophers like Richard 
Rorty and Martha Nussbaum, whose names have since dominated discussions of 
sympathy in literature. Their arguments for the edifying influence of sympathy 
through literature certainly gathers momentum as the art form, and by extension 
the humanities, becomes more entrenched as cultural practices and is under 
pressure to justify its existence in the modern capitalist marketplace.84 Their 
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views belong also to a tradition of social theories that, contrary to the untrusting 
poststructuralists, positively aspires for social impacts and is driven by ideals of a 
good society. Novelistic sympathy is subsequently assimilated by such discourse 
as a channel through which narrative art can lay claim to concrete impacts on the 
world.85 
While it would be easy to accuse this practical discourse of naivety, its 
sense of urgency that something can and should be done to lessen the world’s 
sufferings nevertheless resonates with Costello’s lecture, even if the site and the 
nature of required actions are conceived of differently. To begin with their 
similarities, Costello’s plea for sympathy shares the focus on imagination with 
Richard Rorty’s description of his utopia. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 
Rorty advances a vision of a society that is based on the work of imaginative 
understanding:  
In my utopia, human solidarity would be seen not as a fact to 
be recognized by clearing away “prejudice” or burrowing down 
to previously hidden depths but, rather, as a goal to be 
achieved. It is to be achieved not by inquiry but by 
imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as 
fellow sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but 
created. It is created by increasing our sensitivity to the 
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particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, 
unfamiliar sorts of people.86 
In a way more like Rorty than Derrida, Costello cannot remain equable about the 
colossal amount of suffering in the world. Her lecture exhibits an urgent yearning 
for a more just arrangement in the world that is fierce enough to spawn a public 
endorsement of what she considers to be a less violent mode of knowing. But 
besides their similar predilection, Rorty’s theoretical proposal stems from a 
fundamental confidence in human impact on a world, which, notably, is 
populated by other ‘people’ rather than animals. This human confidence 
occasions his thinking to regularly transcend the realm of one’s living being to 
which Costello confines herself. Costello probably would not have evoked terms 
such as ‘fellow sufferers’ or ‘solidarity,’ seemingly inoffensive as they are, since 
they would mark the beginning of the expansion of the self. The expansion 
entails a boundary for Rorty’s imagination to improve upon and he would 
advance the clichéd goal to ‘see other human beings as “one of us” rather than as 
“them”’ (xvi), with the non-human animals being again part of neither groups.  
In the Coetzean world, human decisions are rarely what determine the 
state of the world. Coetzee’s 2008 novel Diary of a Bad Year87 provides a 
memorable case of sympathetic thinking and action that are contained within 
finite beings. One of its chapters, entitled ‘On Compassion,’88 shows the author 
(whose initials are incidentally ‘JC’) pondering over a seemingly pointless action 
of his neighbor. The neighbour Bella Saunders is concerned for the wellbeing of 
river frogs during an unusually hot and dry period in Australia. Daily, she leaves 
a bowl of water out in the creek ‘[i]n case the little ones get thirsty.’ JC writes:  
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It is easy to make fun of people like Bella, to point out that 
heatwaves are part of a larger ecological process with which 
human beings ought not to interfere. But does this criticism not 
miss something? Are we human beings not part of that ecology 
too, and is our compassion for the wee beasties not as much an 
element of it as is the cruelty of the crow?89  
Like Costello, JC senses something missing in rational judgement against 
someone like Bella, a judgement in which human figures are elevated above the 
fray, thinking and overseeing the ecological system. His personal sense seems to 
be that we are part of it and, in our actions, are as blinded about how the world 
works as the other creatures. 
v 
Though Costello’s lecture forecloses a rational rebuttal against those she 
disagrees with, her impassioned plea disturbs the philosophers’ clarity and 
decorum in the manner of Freud’s return of the repressed. By its entry in our 
consciousness, it irreparably spoils the atmosphere. Freud has interestingly 
drawn a similar analogy of the lecture room to elucidate his concept of repression 
in a lecture at Clark University in 1909. In Freud’s lecture, which Coetzee is no 
doubt aware of, he compares desire to an unruly member in the audience:  
Let us suppose that in this lecture-room and among this 
audience, whose exemplary quiet and attentiveness I cannot 
sufficiently commend, there is nevertheless someone who is 
causing a disturbance and whose ill-mannered laughter, 
chattering and shuffling with his feet are distracting my 
attention from my task. I have to announce that I cannot 
proceed with my lecture; and thereupon three or four of you 
who are strong men stand up and, after a short struggle, put the 
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interrupter outside the door. So now he is ‘repressed’, and I can 
continue my lecture.90  
But according to Freud, these attempts at repression can never be wholly 
successful since ‘the repressed wishful impulse continues to exist in the 
unconscious,’ waiting for a chance to spring back up again.91 Costello is that 
unruly audience member who takes the podium and stirs up repressed meanings 
for the occupants of that lecture hall and for the list of philosophers and scientists 
whose names she calls up. 
But what someone like Nagel or even the unnamed Derrida represses is 
by no means unusual or particularly blameworthy. Their writings cannot help but 
be an exercise of authority, for otherwise no one will care to read. The Costello 
lecture similarly rests on the authority of Coetzee as a renowned writer of fiction. 
What is original and worth highlighting, however, is rather Costello’s manner of 
responding that inventively performs an uncompromised resistance to the throng 
of human logic. To lucidly summarise Costello’s argument would mean to forfeit 
its unique achievement and would result, as Costello says, in ‘the concession of 
the entire battle.’ So for a piece of discursive writing such as mine to remain 
sensitive to the refrains of Costello’s performance, it might be necessary to admit 
that, rather than capturing the gist of Costello’s ‘argument,’ one is in fact 
constructing the kind of philosophical debate that could have occurred if Costello 
(and Coetzee behind her) had been less successful. The blanks left by Costello 
are being filled here not with what has been left unrepresented, but a different 
and more restrictive form of enquiry that takes its cue from her.  
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To this purpose, I will return to explore Costello’s comment on Nagel 
with more focus on what her lecture says. Costello writes that ‘[Nagel’s] denial 
that we can know what it is to be anything but one of ourselves seems to me 
tragically restrictive, restrictive and restricted.’92 She regards the aim of Nagel’s 
project ‘to experience bat life through the sense modalities of a bat’ to be ‘a false 
trail’ (77). Why it should be false Costello does not elaborate but instead 
becomes caught up in describing ‘the embodied soul.’ Now that we are 
somewhat familiar with Costello’s argument, we can go back to place her idea of 
the body-soul in relation to Nagel’s writing to determine how the inceptions of 
their utterances differ.  
In ‘What Is It Like To Be a Bat?,’ Nagel states that he hopes to develop 
‘a method of expressing in objective terms much more than we can at present, 
and with much greater precision.’93 Coming from our contact with the refrains of 
Costello’s performance, Nagel’s preference here for comprehensive knowledge 
and the objective character over the subjective may strike one as strangely 
incautious. What is unexamined in Nagel’s entire piece—the inexplicable 
‘something in me’ that he keeps submerged under tautological explanation—is 
the basis behind the pedantic desire to better describe his object in ‘objective’ 
terms. All our academic endeavours are so often justified with similarly 
tautological structure: ‘I want to describe this because I want to describe it 
better,’ which serves uninspiringly to hide the more unsightly human ambitions 
and insecurities. Nagel’s piece is in effect driven by the age-old expansionist 
goal, which is now being applied to the boundary of human experience through 
the subsuming of a foreign species’ experience. The interesting specificity of the 
bat in his title is revealed within his essay to be borne by abstracted 
considerations rather than a genuine interest in the creatures. As Nagel explains, 
he settles on bats because they represent for him ‘a fundamentally alien form of 
life’ from ‘our own case’ of human beings while still being a mammal species 
close enough to us that ‘we all believe that bats have experience.’94 
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94 Nagel, ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’, 438 (emphasis original). 
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The unfeelingness of this explanation appears jarring with Costello in the 
back of our mind. While Costello concedes that ‘Nagel strikes me as an 
intelligent and not unsympathetic man,’95 yet even a person of such quality, 
writing in 1974, is not immune to a closedness of the heart to his subject. Animal 
studies within philosophy has certainly developed much more nuanced 
sensitivity with regards to the non-human animals since Nagel’s time. But as 
long as one adopts a purely discursive method that only partially accommodates 
the human experience, the tautological blind will always be there somewhere, 
covering up the more private and immediate impulses that sustain the discourse.  
Psychoanalysis may be pointed to as an obvious method for uncovering 
these hidden impulses, but the process is time-consuming and its success 
determined by uncontrollable factors, when the animal suffering for which 
Costello speaks is harrowingly in the now: ‘the horrors of [animals’] lives and 
deaths’ being played out ‘at this moment in production facilities… in abattoirs, in 
trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world’ (63).96 The sympathetic imagination 
in turn represents for Costello a mode of exploration that she believes, contrary 
to rational thinking, immediately engages the heart: ‘The heart is the seat of a 
faculty, sympathy, that allows us to share at times the being of another’ (79, 
emphasis original).  
This ardent contention of Costello’s is made in a complex web of context 
that is not often considered. From its first sentence, the lecture has been 
conducted on the back of different texts from various disciplines. It begins with a 
mention of Franz Kafka’s ‘A Report to an Academy’ and, from then on, never 
strays beyond a few sentences from making references to human history and 
philosophical thoughts on the animals. Then comes the part of Costello’s 
treatment of the term ‘sympathy,’ during which Costello’s speech suddenly turns 
ahistorical and uncritical. As I have mentioned, Costello makes no examination 
of the varied history of sympathy as a concept within the arts, philosophy or 
                                                
95 Coetzee, ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’, 76. 
96 A more detailed discussion of psychoanalysis’s limitations and its relevance to 
Coetzee’s works can be found in Chapter Four, where I argue that, in his three 
fictional memoirs, Coetzee thinks through the problem of analysis’s 
indeterminability that Freud has identified.  
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psychology. Adding up to the minor blips of lecture, this part defines Costello’s 
lecture as an incomplete theoretical discourse, but it more importantly serves to 
cement Costello’s refusal to let sympathy be incorporated into the greater 
Western stream of rational discourse. 
It is a compliment to the spell of Coetzee’s writing that despite the 
various logical loopholes he places in Costello’s lecture, the lecture within the 
lecture is still regarded by the academic audience as an exceptional contribution 
to the current philosophical debate on the animal. If ‘The Philosophers’ can be 
accused of one thing, it would be that, for its own purpose, it has misrepresented 
contemporary academic audiences as representatives of the rational discourse, 
when the facts on the ground suggest that they have acquired enough distance 
from the theoretical heyday to be rather willing to submit to the emotive words 
of Costello.97 McKay, for example, voices a positive appraisal: 
Elizabeth’s lecture as quoted is perfectly clear, coherent, and 
compelling, to judge by my own response; and this is 
confirmed by most critical readers, even those who eventually 
disagree with her claims. Her extremely self-aware discussion 
of the pitfalls of reason as a theoretical discourse, which 
nonetheless prefaces her strategic use of it, is close enough to 
orthodox deconstructive methodology to demand at least 
recognition and respect, if not agreement, from a university 
audience.98 
I have of course argued that Costello’s lecture is strictly speaking not perfectly 
clear, but it is understandable that the logical ambiguities within the lecture 
would be conceptually perceived from McKay’s perspective as a deconstructive 
                                                
97 Admittedly, it is difficult for anyone to explicate his/her response to Costello’s 
lecture proper from the impression made by its metafictional framing. It is 
conceivable that if Coetzee had stepped onto the stage and said only what 
Costello says, he would not have gained this level of acceptance. But it is 
unlikely that the audience would have gotten to the level of Costello’s daughter-
in-law Norma, who feels that Costello is old and confused and ‘has lost her 
thread.’ Coetzee, ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’, 75. 
98 McKay, ‘Metafiction, Vegetarianism’, 76. 
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‘staging’ of Costello’s critique against the theoretical discourse, hence allowing 
her argument to continue to make sense schematically. This well-meaning 
identification ironically testifies to how the theoretical position can always 
reappropriate any challenge posed to it, but it nevertheless still detracts from the 
seriousness of Costello’s embodied disruption of the rational discourse. The 
Costello piece works by the facts that Costello’s speech is fundamentally 
unclear, that her despair at the possibility of changing the course of the world 
comes across in the speech as real and unabating, and that these feelings cannot 
be subsumed into abstract thinking. In taking her leave, Costello parts with a 
diatribe: ‘Each day a fresh holocaust, yet, as far as I can see, our moral being is 
untouched. We do not feel tainted. We can do anything it seems, and come away 
clean.’99 Her ending illogically condemns everyone and sends uneasiness into the 
room that would have an unshakable effect on the rest of the story. This 
overflowing of emotion suggests, I think, that Costello is rather more indignant 
than self-aware. 
 
 Costello and Franz Kafka 
The next thing to consider is how Costello verbalises sympathy in her 
lecture and eludes it becoming a part of rational discourse. We still find traces of 
opaqueness in this part of her speech as she employs various names to refer to 
the site of sympathy. As I have previously quoted, Costello explains that ‘[t]he 
heart is the seat of a faculty, sympathy’ (79). But the heart is a metaphor that 
stands in for what Costello calls, to name but a few of her terms, the ‘body-soul’ 
or ‘embodied soul’ (78), which refer similarly to what is not the thinking mind in 
human beings. Further proliferations of similar terms and phrases can also be 
observed in italics in the following sentence:  
To thinking, cogitation, I oppose fullness, embodiedness, the 
sensation of being – not a consciousness of yourself as a kind 
of ghostly reasoning machine thinking thoughts, but on the 
contrary the sensation – a heavily affective sensation – of being 
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a body with limbs that have extension in space, of being alive 
to the world. (78, emphasis mine) 
If naming is an exercise in power, Costello does not possess the power to name. 
Still, there is no internal uncertainty as to what she is referring to; the confusion 
is only created in her attempt to select one exact term for it. The marks left in 
Costello’s words are thus of a certainty of experience in the flux of unstable and 
multiplying word signs.  
One of the most important qualifications Costello makes regarding 
sympathy is to contend that it ‘has everything to do with the subject and little to 
do with the object’ (79). This is one of the key distinctions that, conceptually 
speaking, prevent Costello’s sympathetic experience from slipping into the 
abstract and from requiring some kind of mediation either through language, 
scientific advancements, or the talent of artists. Seated within the subject’s 
experience of being itself, the sympathy that Costello gestures at relies on no 
external conditions. She offers a model of parallelism for sympathy that ‘to be a 
living bat is to be full of being; being fully a bat is like being fully human, which 
is also to be full of being’ (77).  
The phrase ‘be full of being’ is itself a tautology within Costello’s lecture 
and, as in the discourse of philosophers, it signals a private lived experience that 
her words cannot reach. To say that ‘I am full of being’ or, more pointedly, ‘a 
being being full of being’ seems to collapse the subject, verb, and object 
separation in language into a single unit focalised around the subject. The 
sympathy that results from this basis can therefore be more inclusive than one 
based on shared attributes or even, in Derrida’s case, a shared lack of one—
though it is worth reiterating that no matter how well or how badly sympathy is 
described, Costello would likely contend that our experience of it remains 
unaffected. 
Costello’s sense of sympathy’s boundlessness turns out to involve letting 
go of the need, which we have identified in Nagel, to produce infinitely more 
accurate descriptions and to pursue affective truth instead. Her lecture’s 
imprecise exposition of sympathy is a case in point, but Costello also further 
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cites as proof one of her novels titled The House on Eccles Street that fleshes out 
the character Marion Bloom of James Joyce’s Ulysses, similar to how Coetzee’s 
Foe reimagines the origin of Robinson Crusoe. ‘If I can think my way into the 
existence of a being who has never existed,’ asserts Costello, ‘then I can think 
my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with 
whom I share the substrate of life.’100 It would seem that the shared embodiment 
many critics have latched onto is nonessential to Costello’s sympathetic 
imagination. According to her, the ability to sympathise does not even belong to 
all humans: ‘There are people who have the capacity to imagine themselves as 
someone else, there are people who have no such capacity (when the lack is 
extreme, we call them psychopaths), and there are people who have the capacity 
but choose not to exercise it’ (79). No basis, then, and no guarantee that it will be 
exercised, merely the occasional experience—it is little wonder that Costello’s 
lecture ends with such pessimism. 
What little hope there is in ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’ is placed 
on the figure of Red Peter, the great ape from Franz Kafka’s short story ‘A 
Report to an Academy.’ Kafka’s story is summarised by Costello as pertaining to 
‘an educated ape, Red Peter, who stands before the members of a learned society 
telling the story of his life—of his ascent from beast to something approaching 
man’ (62). Costello says that standing on stage, she feels ‘a little like Red Peter 
myself’ (62). This comparison, she emphasises, is not meant ironically: ‘It means 
what it says. I say what I mean. I am an old woman. I do not have the time any 
longer to say things I do not mean’ (62).  
Why is it that Costello is able to relate to Red Peter in a way that she 
perhaps could not do with real animals which only feature peripherally in her 
lecture? Kafka’s talking ape seems to represent a product of the sympathetic 
imagination that is interestingly more riveting to her than real animals. ‘Red 
Peter was not an investigator of primate behaviour,’ declares Costello, ‘but a 
branded, marked, wounded animal presenting himself as speaking testimony to a 
gathering of scholars’ (70). Costello’s allusion to Red Peter crucially tries to 
ground him in reality by presenting a hypothesis that Red Peter is modelled after 
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the apes in the experiment of the psychologist Wolfgang Köhler in the early 20th 
century. Costello introduces Köhler’s star pupil named Sultan and relays the 
experiments he was put through in detail. On the strength of this connection, 
Costello proceeds to regard the surreal work of Franz Kafka not allegorically but 
as a sympathetic thinking through of the real and heartbreaking tribulation of an 
ape who was forced to dispense with his ape sensibility. 
A common alternative reading is reported by Costello to be to view the 
story as ‘an allegory of Kafka the Jew performing for Gentiles’ (62). The tone of 
the story in such allegorical reading is ironic and the details about physical 
sufferings inflicted on Red Peter by the hunt inevitably lose some of its gravity to 
the comic effect. On the other hand, Costello has provided us with a reading that 
is sympathetic to the animal himself—that refuses to be torn away from the ape 
experience into the knowing ironic stance often adopted when animals are 
deemed but vehicles of allegories. Rereading Kafka’s ‘A Report to an Academy’ 
in this light, the story is transformed into a tragedy and conveys a tremendous 
sadness that few writings can lay claim to. This short story seems to provide a 
proof, for Costello, of the kind of affective power that is possible through 
application of the sympathetic imagination. 
By mentioning the literary examples of Kafka as well as her own novel, 
Costello obliquely suggests the possibility of comparing sympathy with the act 
of fiction writing, but she does not in fact make the comparison explicit. The 
analogy, if pursued, would work on the ground that both are acts of creation that 
bring into being something new within the subject’s sensibility rather than a 
strict identification with a given external object. At its most successful, the result 
of this imaginative act is a hybrid of the body-soul and the thinking mind that 
mirrors the inherent hybridity of its creator. But in her discussion of Red Peter, 
Costello details only the hybridity of Kafka himself:  
Kafka saw both himself and Red Peter as hybrids, as monstrous 
thinking devices mounted inexplicably on suffering animal 
bodies. The stare that we meet in all the surviving photographs 
of Kafka is a stare of pure surprise: surprise, astonishment, 
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alarm. Of all men Kafka is the most insecure in his humanity. 
This, he seems to say: this is the image of God?101  
In this section—as in most of her lecture—Costello refuses to leave the 
specificity of her example. For Costello, the immensity of Red Peter seems to be 
born of the specific immensity that belongs to Franz Kafka, which is not fully 
communicable in clear statements. While this would normally have been the 
natural point in the argument to extrapolate from Kafka to an ideal model of the 
sympathetic imagination, Costello refuses to make the leap and abruptly moves 
on to another example. At this point, Norma in the audience says to her husband, 
‘[s]he is rambling. She has lost her thread’ (75). But to Costello, it would seem 
that the thread has in fact run out—it does not connect—and for her to go on 
beyond Red Peter and Kafka would be to leave behind the true ground of 
sympathy itself. 
Costello nevertheless at least manages to incorporate Kafka’s hybrids in a 
further disruption of Nagel’s continuum. Her delineation of Nagel’s diagram, 
which I have earlier quoted in abbreviated form, appears in full as follows:  
So we have set up a continuum that stretches from the Martian 
at one end to the bat to the dog to the ape (not, however, Red 
Peter) to the human being (not, however, Franz Kafka) at the 
other. (76) 
Nagel’s linear diagram is here broken up by the examples from Kafka, held in 
parentheses, whose particular experiences do not serve or conform to Nagel’s 
abstracted blueprint of the species—(Which bat? Which dog? Which ape?). 
Speaking theoretically, this disruption by Costello is congenial to Derrida’s 
fierce objection to the notion of ‘homogeneous continuity between what calls 
itself man and what he calls the animal.’102  Derrida proposes that human and 
what s/he calls the animal is separated by an ‘abyssal rupture’ which cannot be 
presented as a single indivisible line but are multiple limits existing both 
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internally and externally (30). Instead, Derrida advocates a picture of ‘a 
heterogeneous multiplicity of the living’ that disproves any attempt to 
sweepingly name ‘The Animal’ (31). But Derrida’s language unfortunately 
thinks but does not live the multiple ruptures and, in effect, it leaves Costello to 
fend for herself at the conference dinner table. 
 
III. Sympathetic realism 
 In his discussion of Elizabeth Costello, Derek Attridge identifies the 
novel as an attempt to address a problem it poses in the first chapter: ‘can the 
tradition of realism (on which Coetzee’s writing… depends for the readerly 
empathy that is crucial to its purpose) deal with ideas?’103 In relation to the 
sympathetic imagination, this question seems to address the constraints of 
Costello’s sympathetic approach itself. Given that she has to piggyback on the 
works of various writers, does she manage to communicate a meaningful idea 
that is still her own without betraying the truth of her body-soul? Or has its 
articulation in a common language already defeated the effectiveness of the 
whole enterprise?  
At the risk of appearing evasive, rather than trying to answer the question 
for Costello, I find it more helpful to reflect upon the appropriateness of 
demanding an answer to such questions from Costello. ‘Can your sympathetic 
writing deal with ideas?’ is by no means a question that can be answered fully 
without Costello having to abandon her embodied stance. In its generalising 
demand to see ideas in their pristine and detached forms, it would already have 
failed to accommodate Costello’s project. A more sympathetic question can be 
formed and posed, not to Costello, but to ourselves: ‘Do I sense what Costello is 
trying to communicate?’ for which the answer is certainly individually available. 
The first chapter of Elizabeth Costello, ‘Realism,’ raises the issue of ideas 
in fiction directly, but presents it neither in the form of a question nor a problem. 
The peculiarity of Coetzee’s writing in the chapter deserves a closer attention, 
and in order to do so I will reproduce in full here a passage in which the 
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omniscient narrator of ‘Realism’ interjects a lucid observation on literary realism 
into an ongoing story of Costello’s trip to receive a literary award:  
 Realism has never been comfortable with ideas. It could 
not be otherwise: realism is premised on the idea that ideas 
have no autonomous existence, can exist only in things. So 
when it needs to debate ideas, as here, realism is driven to 
invent situations – walks in the countryside, conversations – in 
which characters give voice to contending ideas and thereby in 
a certain sense embody them. The notion of embodying turns 
out to be pivotal. In such debates ideas do not and indeed 
cannot float free: they are tied to the speakers by whom they 
are enounced, and generated from the matrix of individual 
interests out of which their speakers act in the world – for 
instance, the son’s concern that his mother not be treated as a 
Mickey Mouse post-colonial writer, or Wheatley’s concern not 
to seem an old-fashioned absolutist.104 
The meta-narrative method of this section is an anomaly among the fictions of 
Coetzee. The independent existence of a narrator is not found in any of his other 
novels where the narrating voice has always seemed transparent and regimentally 
focalised through one character at a time. At first glance, the narrator here 
appears to command an authority over the progress of the story since he105 is the 
one able to determine the matrix of interests of the characters and align them 
with a larger and more coherent theory of realism. He seems to have the 
authority, also, because he has the clearest message. Contrary to realist narrative 
itself, this narrator is a philosophical creature who is not only comfortable around 
ideas, but also possesses all the answers.  
There is, however, one paradoxical statement in this account of the 
omniscient narrator: ‘realism is premised on the idea that ideas have no 
                                                
104 Coetzee, ‘Realism’, 9. 
105 For convenience’s sake, I shall be referring to the narrator of ‘Realism’ as a 
he even though ‘his’ sex is actually not prescribed. 
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autonomous existence.’ There are two possible explanations for this paradox: 
first, that it comes out of an inconsistency within realism, which hypocritically is 
still based on a floating idea; or, second, the paradox is caused by the weakness 
of the narrator’s generalising discourse which is incapable of portraying anything 
as being more fundamental than ideas. Which way does the deconstruction really 
run—does the commentary deconstruct the narrative or does the narrative force 
trouble the commentary? An image from Coetzee’s Slow Man comes to mind of 
the old and frail Elizabeth Costello being helped to a sofa by her one-legged 
character Paul Rayment: ‘The halt leading the halt, he thinks.’106 
 In my eyes, the central juxtaposition of this chapter is not limited to the 
literary genres of the self-aware fiction and the realist. As in ‘The Lives of the 
Animals,’ it is between two manners of knowing and expression: one that 
operates through objective enquiries (philosophical discourse, intellectual 
debates, lectures, literary criticism) and the other that burrows more into the 
murky experiences (sympathetic narrative). Costello’s son also attempts to sum 
up the two strands, saying that his mother is ‘[a] writer, not a thinker. Writers 
and thinkers… fish and fowl. But which is she, the fish or the fowl? Which is her 
medium: water or air?’107 
 Coetzee’s ‘Realism’ comprises a mix of three narrative techniques: (1) 
the omniscient narrator, (2) the free indirect discourse of the son’s consciousness, 
and (3) Costello’s acceptance speech. As with ‘The Lives of Animals,’ the piece 
was originally composed by Coetzee to be delivered at a real public lecture, this 
time in Bennington College in November 1996.108 The lecture’s original title 
‘What is Realism?’ helps give us a rough idea of Coetzee’s point of entry into its 
writing. He must have been dealing with the problem of how to do justice to 
realism through the inhospitable discourse of a lecture format. The traditional 
approach of defining realism as a literary genre will be unavoidably anti-realist, 
and will ask of realism to produce what it by nature does not do: to articulate the 
idea that it represents. Under the omniscient narrator’s meta-commentary, for 
                                                
106 Coetzee, Slow Man, 84. 
107 Coetzee, ‘Realism’, 10. 
108 Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, 194. 
67 
example, the truth-value of the characters’ opinions, which are the currency of 
realism, is severely diminished. As soon as the commentator mentions ‘the son’s 
concern that his mother not be treated as a Mickey Mouse post-colonial writer,’ 
the son’s wish that the award would recognise his mother’s writing for its own 
merits suddenly feels trivialised. By splitting his narration into three, Coetzee can 
somewhat balance out the unfairness inherent in the examination of one position 
with the discourse of another. It is understandable that Coetzee would want to cut 
the title down from ‘What Is Realism?’ to ‘Realism’ since the former still 
implicitly favours the objective answer. 
The narrator of ‘Realism’ lucidly credits Daniel Defoe as the pioneer of 
the method of ‘moderate realism’ in literature. As is his discursive custom, he 
also gives an illustrative example: the idea of death in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, 
which is not directly referred to but becomes embodied in the pieces of 
abandoned clothing that are swept ashore: ‘Supply the particulars, allow the 
significations to emerge of themselves… No large words, no despair, just hats 
and caps and shoes.’109 On the other hand, in an award acceptance speech titled 
‘What is Realism?,’ Costello again speaks of Franz Kafka’s ‘A Report to an 
Academy’, but—in a way that is also usual for her—does not make any clear 
connection from it to the concept of realism in her title. The Kafka’s story is not 
fashioned into an instance of anything and the word ‘realism’ never occurs 
outside the repeating of the lecture’s title. The focus of Costello’s talk is not on 
the literary genre or even on how the Kafka’s story may have been composed. It 
instead tracks ‘us’ readers and our changing perception of the same Kafka’s 
narrative: ‘We don’t know and will never know, with certainty, what is really 
going on in this story: whether it is about a man speaking to men or an ape 
speaking to apes or an ape speaking to men or a man speaking to apes…’ (19). 
Through Kafka, Costello notices the demise of an old belief, implicitly aligned 
with realism but is still evident in the omniscient narrating voice, that there is one 
true set of meaning. While once ‘we could say who we were,’ ‘it looks to us like 
an illusion now’, she says, ‘Now we are just performers speaking our parts’ (19).  
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Coetzee presents to us, then, two ways of answering a question, or two 
types of constative speech act: one being the divine truth of the narrator; and the 
other the monologue of the confused and uncertain Costello who is placed in an 
authoritative position she is uncomfortable with. Between them stands the figure 
of Costello’s son who does not have to speak, housed in the style of free indirect 
discourse common among Coetzee’s novels. Passages on the son offer a third 
alternative to Costello’s confused speech and the rarefied commentary, one that 
is not an attempt at constative speech but an embodied representation that still 
acknowledges the character’s personal desires.  
This additional aspect becomes especially evident in the son’s tête-à-tête 
with an attractive female academic Susan Moebius. Their conversation is an 
exchange of ideas about the difference between men’s and women’s writings, but 
the opinions each of them voices carry sensuous subtext of their desire for each 
other. Moebius says ‘[w]omen are good at mimicry, better at it than men. At 
parody, even. Our touch is lighter,’ after which follows what appears to be the 
thought of John in free indirect discourse: ‘She is smiling again. See how light 
my touch can be, her lips seem to say. Soft lips.’110 This scene is realist if we 
accept the narrator’s definition, that is to say it contains an inseparable conflation 
of ideas and their embodiment. The references to touch, the smile, and the lips 
that said those sentences about women’s writing are ‘the hats and caps and 
shoes’ that here communicate seduction. The two characters spend the night 
together, but when the son wakes up in the middle of the night, he experiences an 
intense sadness. The body that lies next to him that had previously engaged his 
desire is now empty of meaning: ‘He runs the hand down her body: breast, flank, 
hip, thigh, knee. Handsome in every detail, no doubt about that, but in a blank 
way that no longer moves him’ (26). This scene is again realist, but the meaning 
of the same body has disconcertingly changed. The same set of particulars may 
be supplied within the same embodiment, but the significations cannot be trusted 
to stay the same. 
Realism in Coetzee’s ‘Realism’ seems rather whatever is alive to each 
moment of living. It is not embodiment that impedes free-floating ideas but the 
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constant change of the characters, who at another moment may generate another 
idea set and let the old one floats away. In this night, for example, rather than 
succumbing to despair that there is no meaning, the son soon registers his desire 
to sleep, bringing the matter down briefly to the level of his body, before drifting 
away again on the idea of sleep through the words of Shakespeare: 
Sleep, he thinks, that knits up the ravelled sleeve of care. What 
an extraordinary way of putting it! Not all the monkeys in the 
world picking away at typewriters all their lives would come 
up with those words in that arrangement. Out of the dark 
emerging, out of nowhere: first not there, then there, like a 
newborn child, heart working, brain working, all the processes 
of that intricate electrochemical labyrinth working. A miracle. 
He closes his eyes.111 
This passage about the miracle of creation can be compared to the chapter’s final 
scene when the mother and son are on a plane heading to Australia. Borne 
through the air by a feat of human engineering, John is in the mood to observe 
his mother with a rational pair of eyes. What he sees repudiates his sleep-induced 
image of the miracle of creation:  
She lies slumped deep in her seat. Her head is sideways, her 
mouth open. She is snoring faintly… He can see up her 
nostrils, into her mouth, down the back of her throat. And what 
he cannot see he can imagine: the gullet, pink and ugly, 
contracting as it swallows, like a python, drawing things down 
to the pear-shaped belly-sac. He draws away, tightens his own 
belt, sits up, facing forward. No, he tells himself, that is not 
where I come from, that is not it (34). 
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Which vision of life is the true one, the beguilingly beautiful or the meaningless 
mundane? The answer seems to be that they have all been true in their limited 
time frame. 
Coetzee’s references to Defoe and Kafka, two disparate authors who are 
brought together in ‘Realism,’ helps somewhat quell this anxiety of unstable 
meanings. Coetzee has shown admiration for both Defoe and Kafka for their 
exceptional attentiveness that makes their works essentially ‘realistic’ within 
themselves. In Coetzee’s introduction to the World’s Classics edition of 
Robinson Crusoe (1999), he elaborates on Defoe’s ability to masterfully dedicate 
himself to his practical subject:  
For page after page—for the first time in the history of 
fiction—we see minute, ordered description of how things are 
done. It is a matter of pure writerly attentiveness, pure 
submission to the exigencies of a world which, through being 
submitted to in a state so close to spiritual absorption, becomes 
transfigured, real.112 
Coetzee’s alter ego Costello, on the other hand, speaks of Kafka’s relation to 
realism in terms of the same complete attentiveness, if not to a whole world this 
time, then at least to his character:  
Kafka’s ape is embedded in life. It is the embeddedness that is 
important, not the life itself. His ape is embedded as we are 
embedded, you in me, I in you. That ape is followed through to 
the end, to the bitter unsayable end, whether or not there are 
traces left on the page. Kafka stays awake during the gaps 
when we are sleeping. That is where Kafka fits in.113 
                                                
112 J.M. Coetzee, ‘Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe’, in Stranger Shores: Essays 
1986-1999 (London: Vintage, 2002), 24. 
113 Coetzee, ‘Realism’, 32. 
71 
Coetzee’s own practice resembles Kafka and his smaller scale operation. His 
fiction believes in the characters’ living beings, and believes that if it can remain 
attentive enough, they can become a real evolving being. 
As for Elizabeth Costello, her insistence on the boundlessness of the 
sympathetic imagination also continues to evolve with her. Her lecture implicitly 
accuses meat-eating human beings of a failure of the imagination; yet, at the 
same time, Costello knows that people are no great monsters. At the close of her 
visit to Appleton College, she reveals to her son: ‘I look into your eyes, into 
Norma’s, into the children’s, and I see only kindness, human kindness. Calm 
down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill. This is life. 
Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t you? Why can’t you?’114 The 
figure of speech ‘making a mountain out of a molehill’ is uttered to provide 
comfort, but it does little to appease Costello, for there is real immovable 
contradiction in her life that figurative language cannot cover up. Coetzee is so 
good at invoking these unsettling moments beyond the territory of empirical 
knowledge and the arts, an instant of realisation that one’s firmly-held, richly-
argued beliefs are incomplete. Despite the scene’s bleak overtone, the faltering 
and doubt-ridden Elizabeth Costello is one ‘example’ of an especially Coetzean 
vulnerability and strength. One could argue that it is the novel’s self-conscious 
moments such as this one that unveil the full extent of Costello’s sympathetic 
imagination: it is never finished as long as one’s alive. For every character, there 
is a different set of embodied truth to be sympathetically imagined.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
‘Stories in which you lead, I follow’:  
Writer-character Relationship in Age of Iron  
and Slow Man 
 
Life & Times of Michael K,115 a story of Michael K’s journey in the South 
African hinterland, may be read as Coetzee’s trialing of the idea of solitude as a 
route to freedom during a time of political oppression. K’s lone wandering in the 
vast and empty Karoo following the death of his mother produces irresistible 
passages of silence that counteract the novel’s apocalyptic vision of the apartheid 
regime’s neurotic surveillance. But critics have noted that the free indirect 
passages that relay K’s solitary existence in the Karoo expose the impossibility 
of the novel’s narration, for silence and solitude are experiences that should be 
outside language. For Michael Valdez Moses, this impossibility results in 
Michael K’s ‘postmodern’ characteristics: ‘a heightened self-consciousness of 
presentation and a deliberate disruption of conventional (unselfcritical) forms of 
narrative representation.’116 But there is a hollowness to this line of explanation 
that does not account for the vividness of the scenes. In the passage that follows, 
we witness K daydreaming of owning a piece of silent land in the Karoo. It is an 
immensely attractive vision, but we are troubled by the question of whether our 
reading contaminates the pure silence of K’s dream: 
I could live here forever, he thought, or till I die. Nothing 
would happen, every day would be the same as the day before, 
there would be nothing to say… He could understand that 
people should have retreated here and fenced themselves in 
with miles and miles of silence: he could understand that they 
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should have wanted to bequeath the privilege of so much 
silence to their children and grandchildren in perpetuity. (47) 
As beautiful as the silence of the Karoo is in this passage, irony breaks through 
in the fact that a voice is narrating K’s ‘silent’ thought to the reader. This sense 
only grows stronger as K retreats further into the mountain range:  
Now surely I have come as far as a man can come; surely no 
one will be mad enough to cross these plains, climb these 
mountains, search these rocks to find me, surely now that in all 
the world only I know where I am, I can think of myself as 
lost.117 
But K is not lost to the world as his story is being narrated by the above narrative 
voice and read by us. The voice and the readers have been traversing over the 
plains, the mountains, and the rocks with him. Already, the repetition of ‘surely’ 
in the passage carries K’s doubt of his success in securing isolation, as well as 
the narrative’s own self-consciousness about its illusion of solitude and silence. 
In addition to aligning Michael K with postmodernism, Critics have 
persuasively written of Michael K’s self-conscious representation of silence as 
Coetzee’s strategy to unsettle the unreflexive narratives of the dominant 
discourse. But it seems to me that the passages above are powerful not only 
because they push back against oppressive ideologies, but also because it 
poignantly conveys K’s desperation for peace to come right then and there. To 
bring our consideration of the writing back to the body-soul’s urgent yearnings, I 
would like to instead ask a different embodied question of the self-reflexive 
scene that, if we establish that K is neither alone nor silent in the mountain, who 
is with him and who speaks? What kind of companions to Michael K are this 
narrative voice that we hear and, equally important, what kind are we readers?  
In Coetzee’s fiction, human relationships on the ground are so often 
restrictive. As Carrol Clarkson rightly observes of Coetzee’s narratives, ‘the 
process of “drawing together”… often comes with negative connotations of 
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exclusion, or of coercion, a loss of individual freedoms.’118 The characters in 
Coetzee’s apartheid era fiction often find themselves trapped in oppositional 
social and racial roles—of master and slave in Dusklands and In the Heart of the 
Country, the civilized and the barbaric in Waiting for the Barbarians, or white 
and black in Age of Iron and Disgrace—that restrict their relationships and their 
identities to seemingly unshakable patterns. But the relationship between the 
implied author and the character that I am trying to draw out here seems at least 
to hold out the possibility of being a positive one.  
This chapter will be tracking the living beings of the writer figure and 
character in Coetzee’s fictions, which interestingly occur not as part of a 
‘drawing together’ but rather according to the motif of ‘following’ another 
character through the sympathetic imagination. In most of Coetzee’s narratives—
as is the case in Michael K—the narrating body that follows the characters 
remains largely obscure to the readers, but in a few works this intimate 
relationship becomes the subject of the fictional dramatisation. This chapter will 
look at three of Coetzee’s works in particular that feature both the character who 
writes and the character who is written; namely, Age of Iron (1990) with Mrs. 
Curren’s written account of Vercueil, Coetzee’s metafictional Nobel Lecture ‘He 
and His Man’ (2003), 119  and Slow Man (2005) with the author Elizabeth 
Costello’s involvement in the life of her character Paul Rayment. By taking 
advantage of these embodiments of writer-character relationship, I hope to arrive 
at a more meaningful account of self-reflexivity in Coetzee’s narratives that 
expresses the need to tell stories as being part of the desires of the vulnerable 
body-soul.  
 
Storytelling as ‘following’ 
Despite being fifteen years apart and belonging to disparate genres, Age 
of Iron and Slow Man intimately speak to each other as representations of the act 
of storytelling. In Slow Man, Costello writes Paul Rayment as Mrs. Curren of 
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Age of Iron can be said to write Vercueil in her letter to her daughter, and, 
interestingly, both narratives produce the metaphor of leading and following in 
their attempts to describe the characters’ act of writing. In Slow Man, the 
Australian novelist Elizabeth Costello infiltrates into the fiction she is writing 
and befriends her protagonist Paul Rayment, hoping to guide him towards an 
exciting life that will be worthy of a book. The metaphor of ‘following’ is used 
by Costello to explain to Paul why she has chosen him for a protagonist. She 
chants: ‘For me alone Paul Rayment was born and I for him. His is the power of 
leading, mine of following; his of acting, mine of writing.’120 Costello lifts this 
sentence almost verbatim from the final part of Cervantes’s Don Quixote, in 
which the fictional historian Cid Hamet Benengeli says to his pen ‘For me alone 
was Don Quixote born, and I for him; he knew how to act, and I to write.’121 By 
evoking this passage, Coetzee recalls the novelistic desire behind writing that has 
manifested itself ever since Cervantes’s first modern novel—an ambivalent 
longing for guidance that harks back to the days of religious faith and its one true 
text. In Cervantes’s novel, God has been imperfectly replaced by these 
imaginative acts of writing and of Don Quixote’s self-creation. 
In Age of Iron, this desire increases in urgency as a result of its 
protagonist’s losing battle with cancer and apartheid’s violent reality. The novel 
also repeats Cervantes’s formulation of the character being tightly bound up with 
the writer. As Mrs. Curren nears death, her writing of Vercueil becomes a search 
for spiritual salvation. To the vagrant, Mrs. Curren reveals: 
So I have continued to tell myself stories in which you lead, I 
follow. And if you say not a word, that is, I tell myself, because 
the angel is wordless. The angel goes before, the woman 
follows. His eyes are open, he sees; hers are shut, she is still 
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sunk in the sleep of worldliness. That is why I keep turning to 
you for guidance, for help.122 
Storytelling takes on a spiritual dimension for Mrs. Curren and becomes a 
vehicle that she uses to explore her own spiritual life. In my reading of the novel, 
I will further show that, as the novel progresses, the question of who leads and 
who follows gets ever more complicated; the writer-character relationship in 
Coetzee becomes a sympathetic space for both parties without an overseeing 
authoritative figure. 
Coetzee seems to value highly his writing’s capacity to allow this 
sympathetic following to take place. In a Doubling the Point interview, he speaks 
of Age of Iron as offering a sympathetic venue for its characters to speak. 
Coetzee says that within the novel ‘a contest is staged… a contest about having a 
say’ of which the result is to him ‘irrelevant.’ Rather, ‘[w]hat matters is that the 
contest is staged, that the dead have their say, even those who speak from a 
totally untenable historical position. So even in an age of iron, pity is not 
silenced.’123 With his own works, Coetzee has consistently negotiated different 
modes of address where he does not occupy the position of authority. Yet in 
criticism of Coetzee we can still do more to understand this careful positioning of 
writer and character in order to finally give the characters’ voices the weight due 
to them. In one of his most revealing passages on writing, Coetzee presents 
serious writing as a business of relinquishing one’s hold on authority and 
venturing into a relationship with ‘the countervoices’ within oneself: 
Writing is not free expression. There is a true sense in which 
writing is dialogic: a matter of awakening the countervoices in 
oneself and embarking upon speech with them. It is some 
measure of a writer’s seriousness whether he does 
evoke/invoke those countervoices in himself, that is, step down 
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from the position of what Lacan calls ‘the subject supposed to 
know.’124 
Thus, in this chapter, I advance the argument that the figurations of the 
relationship between writer and character in Coetzee’s novels offer a unique 
view into the motivation of Coetzee’s art and offer a basis for more sympathetic 
reading of apartheid texts like Age of Iron. Reading Mrs. Curren’s letter as a 
fiction with a character named Vercueil, I trace how Mrs. Curren’s desire to tell 
stories is connected with her concern for the fate of her body-soul after death. 
The stories she tells about Vercueil enable her to leave something of her 
outmoded existence behind in a wrapping that would slip through the South 
African age of iron. As Mrs. Curren says, her stories are ‘like sweets for my 
daughter… Words out of my body, drops of myself, for her to unpack in her own 
time,’125 and my reading hopes to unpack some of these truths. This is followed 
by an examination of Coetzee’s Nobel lecture ‘He and His Man,’ in which 
Coetzee traces the continuity from the writer-character relation to the intertextual 
relationship with literary forebears, specifically the figure of Daniel Defoe. ‘He 
and His Man’ posits these different levels of relationship as figurations of the 
same set of human desires. The text is significant in helping to open up the 
possibility of reading different forms of the novel back and forth to the embodied 
being behind them. Following in the footsteps of this examination, I end with a 
reading of Slow Man, a novel that features a prominent metafictional 
relationship, and identify Elizabeth Costello and Paul Rayment as representations 
of two novelistic genres—the postmodern novel and the Realist novel—whose 
fortune is fast fading in the twenty-first century. In a sense, Slow Man is 
Coetzee’s unflinching rumination on the future of the novel form. 
Through the explorations outlined above, we can return to Coetzee texts 
like Michael K with an awareness of the presence of an implied author who 
follows K on his solitary wandering and reports back to us. Under this figuration, 
our engagement with the text can be conceptualised without precluding our own 
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sympathetic stake in the scene, as would be the case when we say that the text is 
self-conscious about its own fictionality. K’s impossible thought that ‘surely now 
that in all the world only I know where I am, I can think of myself as lost’ can be 
absorbed not as an ironic or misguided statement of an other, but rather as a 
sentence brought out through the sympathetic matrix between the character, the 
writer and the readers who, when they allow themselves, no less share in K’s 
frustrated desire for the ever elusive freedom. 
 
I. Age of Iron 
  Mrs. Curren’s realism 
Age of Iron, Coetzee’s novel of 1990, arguably produces one of the most 
sustained relationships in Coetzee’s fiction between the protagonist Mrs. Curren 
and the vagrant Vercueil; yet in contrast with this vital relationship, the novel is 
delivered entirely in the monologic form of a long letter written between 1984 
and 1986 by Mrs. Curren, a retired professor of Classics. The letter is addressed 
to her daughter, who has permanently emigrated from South Africa to the US out 
of distaste for the nation’s apartheid policy. The letter begins with Mrs. Curren 
relating her discovery of two things in quick succession: the news that she is 
terminally ill with cancer and the appearance of a derelict named Vercueil who 
has set up a cardboard shelter in the alley next to her home. Interpolated into this 
personal drama is the State of Emergency in South Africa in the late 1980s that 
puts a strain on the domestic lives of the novel’s characters. Apart from her 
daughter’s relocation, Mrs. Curren witnesses the violent deaths of her domestic’s 
son and his young friends at the hands of the South African police for their part 
in the black revolutionary movement. Only the listless Vercueil, a being outside 
society and its race politics, is left behind to act as the messenger for Mrs. 
Curren’s parting letter. 
The fact that we read this private letter without any external interjection 
or framing is an unexplained logical implausibility similar to what Coetzee 
creates for Michael K. The readers are placed in the unlikely position of 
observers who are engaged with Mrs. Curren’s letter without any indication of 
how it got into our hands. Little in the letter itself calls attention to this unrealism 
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of our reading. There is no hint of paranoia from Mrs. Curren that her message 
could be intercepted, and her first-person account exhibits no doubt as to the 
reality of South Africa that it inhabits. Though critics have variously commented 
on Age of Iron’s lack of self-reflexivity,126 there has been only limited attempt to 
understand the reason behind the letter’s internal realism and how it may embody 
Mrs. Curren’s entrenched state of existence. In this section, I endeavour to bring 
Mrs. Curren’s classicist position into sharper focus and argue for its limited 
legitimacy, which is capable of challenging our grasp of the complex situation no 
less than the silence of Vercueil. 
From Coetzee’s Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech in 1987, the year 
leading up to the publication of Age of Iron, one can get a sense of how the social 
and political context of Age of Iron’s writing informs its claustrophobic space. 
On the occasion, Coetzee speaks of South African literature as ‘literature in 
bondage.’127 Age of Iron’s premise is reflected in his description of a milieu in 
which one’s body, acts and thoughts are aggressively invaded by the political: 
‘The deformed and stunted relations between human beings that were created 
under colonialism and exacerbated under what is loosely called apartheid have 
their psychic representation in a deformed and stunted inner life’ (98). The 
Jerusalem speech has a distinctly bitter tone, as Coetzee admits that his grim 
portrait ‘applies to my self and my own writing as much as to anyone else.’  It 
strongly suggests that Coetzee’s instinct is to resist the brute subjugation of his 
intellectual freedom and to enter ‘the vast and complex human world that lies 
beyond’ (98). But South African writers, says Coetzee in a famous closing off, 
are prevented from ignoring the reality of their situation: 
 [w]hat prevents him is… the power of the world his body lives 
in to impose itself on him and ultimately on his imagination, 
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which, whether he likes it or not has its residence in his body. 
The crudity of life in South Africa, the naked force of its 
appeals, not only at the physical level but at the moral level 
too, its callousness and its brutalities, its hungers and its rages, 
its greed and its lies, make it as irresistible as it is unlovable. 
(99, emphasis original)  
Already in the Jerusalem speech, elements of Elizabeth Costello’s interest in the 
body-soul are present in Coetzee’s acknowledgement of his inexplicable physical 
and moral receptivity to the South African situation. The piece touches on how 
Coetzee’s writing bears the mark of a reality of existence that lags behind his 
Western education—an essentially colonial experience impinging upon the 
Western novel form. Mrs. Curren’s classicist education clearly heightens this 
conflict between daily experience of crudity in South Africa and the classical 
origin of Western civilization itself.  
If we consider that the modern novel was born with Alonso Quixano’s 
transformation into Don Quixote, the valourous knight, out of a desire to give 
meaning to his drab existence in a quiet Spanish rural town, Coetzee’s Age of 
Iron signals a markedly different reality. Mrs. Curren’s reality is a monstrosity 
that does not need the stage make-up of her imagination. Instead, the imagination 
is paralysed under the weight of apartheid experiences and this condition is 
interestingly refracted through the novel’s stifling realist space. If the Western 
novel has since progressed to entertain ‘more sophisticated’ self-reflexivity, Age 
of Iron reminds us that this development is conditioned by more progressive 
societies outside the experience of Mrs. Curren’s generation—the generation of 
Coetzee’s parents128—who grew up in the apartheid system and has never left. 
Postmodern influence and the outside world can still be felt in the peripheries of 
Age of Iron, mainly in the implausibility of our reading the text or in mentions of 
Mrs. Curren’s daughter in America whom one suspects is a reflection of 
Coetzee’s own expatriate spell in the States. However, the text seems to lay 
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down a mandate that it will not leave behind the body-soul of Mrs. Curren and 
her unique experience of South Africa, an experience whose natural form is 
ineluctably realism. 
Mrs. Curren’s sojourn in the black township of Guguletu represents the 
moment when the authority of reality over the Western collection of literary 
tropes becomes the most forceful. The episode is as thick in literary allusions and 
metaphors as any in Coetzee, but none of them are remotely convincing. In an 
unreliable Hillman car nicknamed ‘Rocinante’129 after Don Quixote’s old horse, 
Mrs. Curren sets off with her domestic Florence and her daughters Hope and 
Beauty in search of Florence’s missing son Bheki. ‘Hope and Beauty,’ Mrs. 
Curren remarks, ‘It was like living in an allegory’ (90). They are then joined by 
Florence’s cousin, Mr. Thabane, a former teacher whose learned air recalls ‘the 
cousin’ who guides Quixote and Panza to their quest at the Cave of 
Montesinos.130 Also unmistakably, as David E. Hoegberg details, the description 
of the scene at Guguletu reworks Dante’s journey through hell in Inferno, with 
the irony that the destructions are ‘a brute fact’ on earth.131 
During this journey, Mrs. Curren sees the shanties of the township being 
torn down and set on fire by a gang of men as a sighing crowd watch on. The 
residents are forced out bodily and a chaos of shouts and fights is breaking out all 
around her. Terrorised by the crudity and at the limit of her physical endurance, 
Mrs. Curren lets out that she wants to go home, to which Mr. Thabane retorts 
‘But what of the people who live here? When they want to go home, this is 
where they must go. What do you think of that?’132 The question is a heavy blow 
to Mrs. Curren’s previous ‘civilised’ critique of the black characters’ readiness to 
take part in violent resistance. Her literary rendition of the scene is further 
acknowledged as insufficient when she declares to a crowd that has gathered to 
watch their argument: ‘These are terrible sights. They are to be condemned. But I 
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cannot denounce them in other people’s words. I must find my own words, from 
myself. Otherwise it is not the truth’ (99). It is clear that Mrs. Curren is painfully 
aware that her parade of allusions is not performing efficiently to illuminate this 
reality, yet has not the access to better alternatives. Like her British car that 
occasionally will not start (yet another allegory, ‘From the time when British was 
Best’), her allusions cannot ignite real understanding between the racial divide. 
The tropes of Dante and Cervantes are failing to communicate the truth of 
Guguletu. If anything, the scene’s urgency feels muffled by reproductions of 
classical, universalising themes. Despite Mrs. Curren’s powerful protest: ‘But 
what do you expect?... To speak of this… you would need the tongue of a god,’ 
she registers in her letter a man in the crowd repeatedly saying: ‘This woman 
talks shit’ (99). 
Thus, Mrs. Curren’s doubtful voice is duly confined in her letter of 
reportage; with her mortal clock ticking in the background, trapped also under 
the weight of South Africa’s sinister colonialist legacy and in a white, old and 
undesirable body with outmoded humanist views for what many see as a decisive 
time for action. Neither the reader nor Mrs. Curren will ever know if this letter, 
this voice, is ever delivered to her daughter. Thus, the experience of release from 
this enclosed space is infinitely postponed for the reader as it is for the 
character—except, of course, for the fact that Coetzee is sympathetically 
releasing it through his novel and that Mrs. Curren still has Vercueil. The novel, 
the letter and Vercueil, in other words, function in the same way; they provide a 
space to keep alive the spirit of humour and understanding during a dark time. 
No matter how invalidated her stance may be, Mrs. Curren’s views are still given 
a voice in her letter, meant for her daughter to whom she is more than an allegory 
of white South Africans. 
That the shackles of Mrs. Curren’s self deprive her of the authority to 
speak and to be heard in apartheid South Africa is especially apparent in her 
relationship with a boy who goes under the nom de guerre of ‘John.’ Mrs. Curren 
is brought into close contact with him through her bearing witness to a police car 
knocking the boy and Bheki off their bicycle in front of her house. Mrs. Curren 
finds herself holding down John’s head wound as they wait for an ambulance; his 
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thick, flowing blood stirring her into a sense of human commonality that is to be 
short-lived. It occurs to her that she must stop the blood ‘[b]ecause blood is one: 
a pool of life dispersed among us in separate existences, but belonging by nature 
together: lent, not given, held in common, in trust, to be preserved.’133 But upon 
visiting John at the hospital, her utter social alienation from the boy becomes 
evident: ‘My words fell off him like dead leaves the moment they were uttered. 
The words of a woman, therefore negligible; of an old woman, therefore doubly 
negligible; but above all of a white’ (79).  
This restrictive self of Mrs. Curren is depicted not merely as imposed 
upon her but as constituting her very mode of being. It is her reality as apartheid 
was the reality of South Africa. Both are too immovable to be changed by 
quixotic imagination or rational appeals, as their roots go deeper than imageries 
and thoughts. To draw on Costello’s term, they are registered in the body-souls 
of the characters. Mrs. Curren feels the rupture of apartheid physically during her 
visit to John. As she reaches out to touch the boy’s hand—‘it was the merest 
brush, the merest of lingering of my fingertips on the back of his hand’—she 
feels his body stiffen, ‘[feels] an angry electric recoil’ (79). From this bodily 
repulsion, Mrs. Curren becomes acutely aware of her irredeemably despicable 
position to the boy. She begins, even, to be infected with it: ‘Though it does me 
no good, I flinch from the white touch as much as [John] does; would even flinch 
from the old white woman who pats his hand if she were not I’ (80). 
Unfortunately, this ‘she’ is Mrs. Curren in a way that she cannot transcend. 
Between her and the boy, there is an impasse that stems from centuries of 
oppression and warfare beyond the reach and validity of her ideas.  
Mrs. Curren’s background in the classics serves to highlight the 
discrepancies between the daily struggles of conflict and the realm of universal 
ideas—the result of which is only temporarily conclusive. Ideas are outmuscled 
all around Mrs. Curren, restrained and invalidated. Faced with John’s ingrained 
distaste of her, Mrs. Curren breaks into a lecture on the Athenian historian 
Thucydides, a figure who embodies a rationalist and humanist understanding of 
historical events. Thucydides’s major work, History of the Peloponnesian War, 
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pioneers an objective approach to history that looks to synthesise from varied 
accounts the true causes of war that will be superior to the subjective narratives 
of specific sides. What Thucydides has to say about war is still found to be 
highly relevant to world conflicts today, but his name interpolated into the heat 
of the South African conflict, specifically into John’s daily struggle to fight and 
stay alive, is sidelined by a truth of a more vital order. John’s reaction is as if he 
does not hear her or that he trusts more the immediate truth of his body: ‘Quite 
deliberately he put his good hand under the sheet, in case I should touch it 
again.’134 
John and his revolutionary community represent a force of action that 
Mrs. Curren recognises as being even more timeless and authoritative than the 
classical wisdoms she rehearses. Though she cannot submit to its brutalist 
ideology, she cannot help staring in horrified fascination. Late in the novel, Mrs. 
Curren has a vision of her domestic Florence as an ancient barefoot and bare-
breasted goddess from time before Aphrodite: ‘an older figure, a figure of 
urgency, of cries in the dark, short and sharp, of blood and earth’ (178). Her 
description of Florence also recalls the image of the goddess of liberty that was 
formerly evoked during the French revolution as leading a crowd of people 
towards a fight. But Florence is described as walking without the goddess’s 
Phrygian cap that signifies freedom: ‘her head bare.’ She carries her surviving 
daughters Hope and Beauty and walks with her eyes fixed forward past the 
burning Mrs. Curren. In the vision, Mrs. Curren fails to follow the family: 
‘Forever the goddess is passing, forever, caught in a posture of surprise and 
regret, I do no follow’ (178). As the fight for liberty trudges forward, purposeful, 
Mrs. Curren’s transcendental views stand burning and paralysed, appearing as an 
empty spectacle for the gathered crowd. What is most intriguing, however, is 
how the narrative maintains the undecidability between the two ideologies that 
are embodied in Mrs. Curren and in the black revolutionary movement. 
Critics have variously noted the inappropriateness with which Mrs. 
Curren airs her opinions. For Gilbert Yeoh, her letter betrays her 
‘presumptuousness, her propensity to stereotype and, in a symbolic sense, her 
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myopia and blindness amidst political crisis.’135 Yet such a critical stance elides 
Mrs. Curren’s ever growing embodied awareness of her unjust position that is 
intensified by John’s recoil and the death of Bheki. Mrs. Curren’s grasp of the 
situation eventually penetrates into a realm inaccessible by our external 
perception and judgement. Her agony speaks not of her oblivion of the reality of 
violence around her, but of a fuller realisation that her life has been the 
embodiment of an ugly truth, its vitality blotted out by the ignominy of colonial 
oppression: ‘In blood and milk I drank [my mother’s] body and came to life. And 
then was stolen, and have been lost ever since.’136 Her memory is becoming 
intertwined with an awareness of the persecuted absences. A picture of her 
family in a flourishing garden brings to mind the thought: ‘Who, outside the 
picture, leaning on their rakes, leaning on their spades, waiting to get back to 
work, lean also against the edge of the rectangle, bending it, bursting it in?’ 
(111). Perversely, Mrs. Curren finds her cancer an apt metaphor: ‘I am hollow, I 
am a shell. To each of us fate sends the right disease. Mine a disease that eats me 
out from inside’ (112). 
It does not escape Mrs. Curren that this impassioned conflation of body 
and history is empty, but her feeling of impurity nevertheless has a kernel of 
psychic truth. Her self—its body and thought—is a cause for shame and a prison 
that cannot be escaped by her developing more precise understanding or even 
more intense feelings of shame. Mrs. Curren is beset with the impossible 
problem of how to get outside her tarnished self on her own. This difficulty is 
best captured in one of her several contemplations on suicide where she finally 
concludes that external help is required: 
But how hard it is to kill oneself! One clings so tight to life! It 
seems to me that something other than the will must come into 
play at the last instant, something foreign, something 
thoughtless, to sweep you over the brink. You have to become 
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someone other than yourself. But who? Who is it that waits for 
me to step into his shadow? Where do I find him?137  
Age of Iron contains various moments like this one when Coetzee gives voice to 
a desire to be saved, or seen off, by an external entity, a desire which, to Mrs. 
Curren, always points to the vagrant Vercueil.  
Critics have suggested, following the Levinasian model, that Mrs. 
Curren’s salvation indeed lies in her opening herself up to be affected by the 
figure of ‘the Other’ as embodied in Vercueil.138 However, in the next section, I 
will argue that the Coetzee’s text and its characters are in fact more clueless in 
the matter of salvation. Rather than the alterity of Vercueil, Mrs. Curren is drawn 
by his abjectness and vulnerability that reflects her own, and the two are 
involved in an interdependence relationship which leads not to salvation, but to a 
brief yet affecting respite. I can be taken to echo Rachel Ann Walsh, who, in her 
article on Age of Iron, objects Levinasian ‘universalising metaphors,’ which she 
sees as having the effect of diluting the novel’s South African context.139 
However, whereas Walsh trades Levinas’s ethical paradigm for Judith Butler’s 
more circumspect thinking about the body under the concept of ‘creaturely 
precarity,’ I will be highlighting Coetzee’s novels’ sympathetic mode of 
knowing, which requires not more accurate conception of the truth but rather an 
acceptance of the inborn limits of living beings. In Coetzee’s novels in particular, 
these limits become the most pronounced in the struggles of the author figure in 
the writing of her text. 
 
 Writing Vercueil 
At various points in Age of Iron, it is suggested that Vercueil is partially 
Mrs. Curren’s willed creation; that she does not open up to him as who he is, but 
plays a crucial hand in fashioning him into the role of her angel of death. In 
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writing of Vercueil, Mrs. Curren has cast her own angelic saviour out of a 
stranger who shows up in her driveway. The literary template for the derelict’s 
role is laid down early on in her letter when Mrs. Curren expresses a desire to 
stumble upon a divine saviour as in a short story by Leo Tolstoy, ‘What Men 
Live By.’ Tolstoy’s story tells of a shoemaker who takes into his home a naked 
stranger freezing by the roadside. After six years together, the stranger is 
revealed to be one of God’s angels of death, banished down to earth as a 
punishment for failing to take the life of an ailing mother. It is given to the angel 
to learn what men need, and the lesson appears to be that men’s individual 
knowledge is limited but their kindness is universal: ‘I understood that God does 
not wish men to live apart, and therefore he does not reveal to them what each 
one needs for himself; but he wishes them to live united, and therefore reveals to 
each of them what is necessary for all.’140 In Tolstoy’s parable, the people save 
each other in life through their love and kindness, while in their deaths the angel 
delivers their faithful souls to God. 
 Tolstoy’s angel arrives naked but pristine: ‘his body was clean and in 
good condition, his hands and feet shapely, and his face good and kind’ (759), all 
of which are contrary to Vercueil with his ‘horsy, weather-beaten face,’ ‘three 
crooked fingers’ and ‘their dirty nails’ (11). Mrs. Curren in fact reads Tolstoy’s 
story and laments:  
What chance is there, if I take a walk down to Mill Street, of 
finding my own angel to bring home and succor?... When a 
ragged stranger comes knocking at the door he is never 
anything but a derelict, an alcoholic, a lost soul. Yet how, in 
our hearts, we long for these sedate homes of ours to tremble, 
as in the story, with angelic chanting! (14) 
It is possible that her longing drives her to transform reality, transform the 
unlikely Vercueil into her angel of death and final messenger. Her description of 
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‘his high, peaked shoulders’ is reminiscent of an angel’s wings. Vercueil through 
Mrs. Curren’s pen is a testament to her idealistic desire for a life outside politics 
and contestations that, amidst her immediate reality, seem entirely inappropriate. 
She invests hope in him to release her from the shackles of her shameful state 
when she does not know how. Near the end, Mrs. Curren confesses to Vercueil 
the role she has cast him in: 
The day I first saw you behind the garage was the day I had the 
bad news about myself, about my case. It was too much of a 
coincidence. I wondered whether you were not, if you will 
excuse the word, an angel come to show me the way. Of course 
you were not, are not, cannot be—I see that. But that is only 
half the story, isn’t it? We half-perceive but we also half-
create. (168) 
As a flight of fancy housed in a story without the absolute Christian faith 
of Tolstoy, Mrs. Curren’s creation of Vercueil remains in a sense transitory. On 
this point, it is important to recognise a parallel model of Cervantes’s Don 
Quixote as another counterbalancing intertext with Age of Iron, which helps 
Coetzee to reconstitute the imagination as a secular substitute for divine faith. 
Harold Bloom considers Don Quixote to provide ‘secular and literary, and not 
Catholic,’ transcendence.141 Cervantes’s self-fashioning knight is a model of the 
a fictional construct that, though afflicted by Alonso Quixano’s mortality, can be 
productive in its own limited way. Even from its secular stronghold, Age of Iron 
suggests that Mrs. Curren is investing the product of her creative imagination 
with an important spiritual role. As Mrs. Curren writes, ‘[t]his was never meant 
to be the story of a body, but of the soul it houses.’142 
So let us entertain the thought that, in her letter, Mrs. Curren is writing 
into shape Vercueil, who, beside descriptions of his physical grubbiness, remains 
an essentially nebulous character to his writer. Through his lack of definition, his 
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irrelevance to the rule of the political,143 Vercueil is the unmarked page that 
enables Mrs. Curren to create and to lay down her unloved self into writing: 
He watches but does not judge. Always a faint haze of alcohol 
about him. Alcohol, that softens, preserves. Mollificans. That 
helps us to forgive. He drinks and makes allowances. His life 
all allowances. He, Mr. V., to whom I speak. Speak and then 
write. Speak in order to write. While to the rising generation 
who do not drink, I cannot speak, can only lecture.144 
Conversing with and then writing about Vercueil are for Mrs. Curren a reflective 
process of unburdening the self into a forbearing receptacle that then takes a 
shape of its own. Through interpersonal communication, she is hopeful of 
learning the lesson of Tolstoy’s angel about what is necessary for all, of setting 
down a truth that will finally be larger than her circumscribed life and, because 
of that, will outlast her. Addressing her daughter, Mrs. Curren reveals: ‘Why do I 
write about him? Because he is and is not I. Because in the look he gives me I 
see myself in a way that can be written. Otherwise what would this writing be 
but a kind of moaning, now high, now low?’ (9). 
 Coetzee occasionally turns the metaphor of writing into the organic 
image of procreation. The ‘responsibility towards something that has not yet 
emerged’ in writing becomes the responsibility of speaking to a hypothetical 
newborn who arrives fresh, pure and willing. Towards the end of the novel, Mrs. 
Curren gradually recognises that Vercueil’s openness owes its effect to the man’s 
innocence rather than divine wisdom or alterity: ‘He does not know how to love 
as a boy does not know how to love’ (196). Vercueil gazes and listens as a child 
with childlike curiosity; since he does not know, he also does not judge. 
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Precisely because, like her, he does not have the answer, Vercueil brings Mrs. 
Curren back to the forgiving and playful atmosphere of childhood, which recalls 
Coetzee’s expression in Doubling the Point that, when writing, he tries to keep in 
mind how ‘we are children unreconstructed…, to be treated with the charity that 
children have due to them.’145 Mrs. Curren thus gets to briefly experience the 
mercy preserved for the young in an Iron Age when children such as John and 
Bheki cannot afford to wallow in innocence. About them, she says ‘children 
scorning childhood, the time of wonder, the growing time of the soul’ (7). On the 
other side of the world, her two grandchildren in America feel to her like 
children who are not allowed to play: ‘soul-stunted too, spinning themselves 
tighter and tighter into their sleepy cocoons’ (7). In a sense, Vercueil is a 
surrogate for them and for Mrs. Curren’s daughter, whose ultimatum never to 
return to South Africa until the regime has fallen has fractured her family ties. 
Vercueil provides solace for the here and now: ‘Him, not you. Because he is 
here, beside me, now’ (162).  
Mrs. Curren only confronts the reality of Vercueil’s stupefied 
innocence—as opposed to his angelic patience—near the end of her letter. After 
the outpourings of her grievances have subsided, the story of Vercueil’s mortal 
vulnerability begins to emerge, which severely dampens the hope that this man 
possesses any saintly power to deliver her soul across. Vercueil relates to Mrs. 
Curren how he once worked in a boat and, through an accident, got his hand 
crushed by a pulley and had to wait for rescue at sea under severe pain. ‘I’ll 
never set foot in a boat again,’ he declares. When Mrs. Curren presses 
optimistically: ‘If you had faith in yourself you could walk on water. Don’t you 
believe in the doings of faith?,’ Vercueil simply falls silent. This silence has a 
different ring than his many previous ones. With the unveiling of his own story 
of fear and pain, Vercueil appears to be as lost as Mrs. Curren in the matter of 
faith, and as full of fear of death and the unknown. Mrs. Curren then writes to her 
daughter that ‘I am going to release you soon from this rope of words. There is 
no need to be sorry for me. But spare a thought for this man left behind who 
cannot swim, does not yet know how to fly’ (197). This characterisation 
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discloses Mrs. Curren’s acceptance that Vercueil would do badly in the role of 
either Charon or the archangel Michael. Though in life he has led and 
accompanied her, Mrs. Curren concedes that ‘he needs help too’ (196). The 
leader and the follower in this narrative are revealed to be interchangeable.  
It can be said that, in watching over him, Mrs. Curren has been giving an 
obscure life, ‘as obscure as any on earth’ (187), a prolonged existence in a text 
along with her own. Now she begins to worry about what would become of 
Vercueil when she is gone, when the story is finished and when we stop reading: 
‘What is in store for him next, I wonder, when the episode of the old woman in 
the big house is over with?... Alone: stoksielalleen: a stick in an empty field, a 
soul alone, sole. Who will watch over him?’ (187). We can additionally ask the 
same question of the unlovable Mrs. Curren; that, without this text of Coetzee, 
who will watch over her? Perhaps the existence of the novel comes from a much 
less ambitious desire than to offer insights into the possibility of ethics during an 
iron age. Perhaps it wants to bear witness to this life that, before the novel, is also 
‘as obscure as any on earth’ from a sympathetic position and, in that complex act 
of writing as following, be watched over too. Mrs. Curren’s revised view of her 
relationship with Vercueil near the end of her letter wonderfully embodies the 
deeper value of creative writing. She writes: ‘I have fallen and he has caught me. 
It is not he who fell under my care when he arrived, I now understand, nor I who 
fell under his: we fell under each other, and have tumbled and risen since then in 
the flights and swoops of that mutual election’ (196). 
 
II. Metafictional relationships: ‘He and His Man’ and Slow Man 
 While in Age of Iron Coetzee may have felt constrained to 
monologic realism by the reality of apartheid; by the time of his enigmatic 2003 
Nobel address, ‘He and His Man,’ and 2005 novel Slow Man, he finds himself in 
the mood to revive the Cervantes project of exploring the interstice between the 
real and the imaginary and takes on the subject of the metafictional relationship 
between the novelists and their principal characters. These narratives reinforce 
Coetzee’s preoccupation with the relationship between creator and creation that 
has been only implicit in Age of Iron. While Coetzee’s fiction has always 
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exhibited a certain level of self-consciousness, he only puts authors and 
characters into the same literary orbit in these two texts, which are also the first 
full-length fictional works after his relocation to Australia in 2002. The burst of 
metafictional activities is likely to be related to the freedom Coetzee experienced 
in the wake of his emigration, which allows his career of fiction writing to be 
turned into a central metaphor. I will first briefly examine Coetzee’s enigmatic 
2003 Nobel address, ‘He and His Man,’ written while Coetzee was also 
preparing Slow Man. The Nobel lecture importantly destabilises the traditional 
perception of the relationship between an author and his creation. In the story, 
the author is no longer a Godlike figure who creates and reigns over his 
character. Instead, the two parties are depicted in a fundamentally dependent 
relationship that, like the one between Mrs. Curren and Vercueil, produces 
moments of transcendence but no eternal salvation. 
 
‘He and His Man’ 
On 7 December 2003, the day of his Nobel lecture, Coetzee candidly 
feigned confusion about the word order in his lecture’s title. He told his 
Stockholm audience that he would read them ‘the piece called “He and His Man” 
or “His Man and He”, I can’t remember which comes first, He or His Man.’146 
Given the unlikelihood of someone with a copy of his speech in front of him to 
forget its title, it is clear that Coetzee was concerned to dispel the linearity and 
hierarchy of the coming story as thoroughly as he could. Once the lecture began, 
Coetzee picked up the life of Robinson Crusoe after Daniel Defoe’s version of 
the story has ended. Crusoe, now a writer famous for having published an 
account of his time on a deserted island, is leading a quiet gentrified life on the 
waterfront of Bristol. The fictional Crusoe assumes the position of the ‘he’ in the 
title and perceives himself the master of ‘his man’ Daniel Defoe.147 Crusoe 
would receive written reports from his man from his travels around Britain.  
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Thus, the story presents a reversal of traditional roles; the author is now 
‘his man,’ out on adventures that serve the interests of the ‘he,’ who sits with a 
pen in front of his desk and feels himself responsible for the texts that come 
forth. On a basic level, Coetzee suggests a sense in which the writer’s identity is 
being written and altered through the authority his character commands. The 
character of Robinson Crusoe has been so impressively realised by Defoe that it 
is possible to imagine him as real—or at least as real as Daniel Defoe himself. 
But the lecture as a whole goes on to paint an even more complex picture. The 
writer’s authority in the story is an evanescent state that is endlessly being 
recycled. One passage relates how Coetzee’s Crusoe feels he is not always wiser 
than Defoe in the area of writing but, in demonstrating this claim, he gives an 
example of a phrase Defoe did not entirely invent. The phrase comes, firstly, 
from Defoe’s The Journal of the Plague Year and describes people’s fatal 
struggle against the plague: ‘it was like charging Death itself on his pale horse.’ 
For Crusoe, ‘those are words he would not think of. Only when he yields himself 
up to this man of his do such words come.’148  
The figure of death riding a pale horse is in fact borrowed from the New 
Testament in which it is written, arguably in a less dynamic arrangement: ‘And I 
looked, and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him was Death, and 
Hell followed with him.’149 The scripture, the fictions, and the non-fiction 
writing of Defoe are hence placed in a matrix over which no texts claim full 
authority. In the context of the Nobel Prize, it is possible to see Coetzee as 
acknowledging the pervasive debt every writer owes to the corpus that has gone 
before him and, more surprisingly, the indebtedness he owes to the works he 
‘created.’150 
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 Since little is truly new in their writing, especially when the fabulist 
Defoe is involved, 151 Coetzee’s Crusoe begins to develop a sympathetic attitude 
in his reading and writing practice, placing less emphasis on the originality of 
specific works and more on the desire behind the writing. Each representation 
appears to Crusoe to tap into the same limited repertoire of fundamental 
experiences, yet all equally deserve to be voiced:  
[T]here begins to creep into [Crusoe’s] breast a touch of 
fellow-feeling for his imitators. For it seems to him now that 
there are but a handful of stories in the world; and if the young 
are to be forbidden to prey upon the old, then they must sit 
forever in silence.152 
Crusoe recognises a repetition of themes in all the stories he reads and the 
experiences he encounters. All seem to him different figurations of ‘the dark side 
of the soul and the light’ (20).  
In The Life of Writing, David Attwell senses that, in presenting this story 
on the grand occasion of the Nobel lecture, Coetzee was signalling his waning 
interest in the specific social issues that once had a stranglehold on his attention. 
In writing terms, he was losing interest with the chore of fashioning a distinct 
verisimilitude of people and scenes for each of his fictions.153 Additionally, from 
Attwell’s commentary on the drafts of Slow Man, there seems evidence that 
Coetzee himself found the stories that arise out of Adelaide, Australia to be but 
different versions of his South African themes. Attwell reports that initially the 
drafts of Slow Man realistically address the Australian social issues of migration 
and belonging, before Coetzee later decided that the novel needed the 
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metafictional intrusion of Elizabeth Costello. Attwell provides a synopsis of the 
realist version of Slow Man as follows:  
Coetzee had written a thoroughly consummated relationship 
between Rayment and Marijana, which would have put his 
erotic life more clearly at the centre. The Jokićs were also 
going to prove to be a more dubious conquest, pilfering from 
Rayment and abusing his hospitality more obviously.154 
Though this summary is limited, we can immediately recognise repeats of 
Coetzee’s apartheid themes in a different social context. Disgrace had already 
addressed the question of inappropriate erotic desires, while unconditional 
hospitality features centrally in Age of Iron. In fact, to pursue further the line that 
‘He and His Man’ has given us, there are in Coetzee reproductions of received 
themes from Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Kafka, Cervantes, Beckett, Rousseau and 
many others as critics are wont to identify. After a career of roaming over these 
thematic terrains, perhaps Coetzee too would like to retire to the waterside with 
Crusoe and engage in what Attwell calls the ‘second-order questions’ (241), 
which involves a self-reflection on his own craft as a fiction writer. 
 The ending of ‘He and His Man’ prefaces the form of the second-order 
question that Slow Man will take up: the metafictional form. Crusoe expresses a 
longing to meet Defoe in person, but ‘he fears there will be no meeting.’155 No 
explanation is given for this fear but it is not difficult to infer that the biggest 
obstacle is their realist affiliations. In lieu of an explanation, Crusoe offers an 
allegory of he and his man that depicts the unremitting toil required to maintain 
their illusion of realism: 
[T]hey are deckhands toiling in the rigging, the one on a ship 
sailing west, the other on a ship sailing east. Their ships pass 
close, close enough to hail. But the seas are rough, the weather 
is stormy: their eyes lashed by the spray, their hands burned by 
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the cordage, they pass each other by, too busy even to wave. 
(20) 
In the calm sea of Slow Man, on the other hand, the writer and her realistic 
character get brief a respite from their lonely adventures. The metafictional 
relationship between Paul Rayment and Elizabeth Costello provides the first 
direct figuration in Coetzee of the significant choices a writer makes regarding 
novelistic genres. But ironically, at its core, it remains a story consistent with 
other works by Coetzee in its replays of familiar themes. Depending on how we 
read the novel, it can be a story about the relationship between ‘the dark side of 
the soul and the light’; the tragic and the comic; the real and the imaginary; love 
and lost, or life and death. ‘He and His Man’ serves as an important disclaimer 
that metafiction is still fiction, and the second-order question is really the same 
order as before. 
 
Slow Man 
Slow Man begins innocuously enough as a realist narrative about a retired 
and divorced French emigrant, Paul Rayment, living in Adelaide, Australia. 
Paul156 has a bicycling accident and undergoes a right-leg amputation. He is then 
required by the state’s welfare system to engage the service of a string of carers 
with whom he is unhappy, until he is assigned the Croatian-born Marijana Jokić, 
a woman with an old-world self-possession he finds particularly attractive. 
Despite the fact that Marijana is married with three children, Paul imprudently 
confesses his love and asks for permission to pay for her son Drago’s private 
school fees. It is at this awkward impasse in Paul’s life that the novel presses the 
metafictional button and Elizabeth Costello, the eponymous protagonist of 
Coetzee’s previous novel, rings Paul’s doorbell, becoming a character in a novel 
she herself is purportedly writing. The newly-arrived Costello informs Paul that 
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unless he picks ‘a course of action’ with regard to his desire, she will remain 
with him.157 
In this arrangement, Coetzee brings into full-embodied contact two 
novelistic tropes usually seen as operating on two oppositional impulses: realism 
and postmodernism. Reminiscent of ‘He and His Man’ with its metaphor of 
writers as deckhands, Paul finds Costello pictured on the jacket of one of her 
novels ‘wearing a windbreaker, standing against what appears to be the rigging 
of a yacht’ (120). Their meeting seems facilitated by the fact that neither figure is 
at the height of their old powers. The two characters, along with the novelistic 
illusions embodied in them, are both physically challenged. To Melinda Harvey, 
what survives of realism in Coetzee’s Australian novels can be compared to the 
disabled Paul, whose mimetic credence is undercut by the metafictional 
imperative in the figure of Costello.158 We can push Harvey’s apt metaphor 
further: for when Costello, a figure of the metafictional, climbs up the stairs to 
Paul’s flat for the first time, panting heavily, she says, ‘Bad heart… Nearly as 
much of an impediment as… a bad leg.’159 Thus, Coetzee also satirises the 
impediment that plagues the genre of postmodern metafiction: its weak affective 
apparatus, its inability to take seriously the matter of love, life and death. 
 Most commentaries have ignored the extensive satire that Coetzee 
performs on metafiction. The realist façade that begins Slow Man is instead seen 
as successfully broken by the metafictional trick of Costello’s intrusion. The 
point of the novel, such readings say, is to expose the real as another of the many 
possible illusions. For Zoë Wicomb, Costello’s arrival ‘throws into question the 
very nature of mimesis.’ 160  The real in Slow Man is viewed through the 
postmodern prism to be ‘renewable, substitutable, supplementary, and 
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characterized by slippage between reference and phenomenalism’ (227). Peter 
Vermeulen’s reading of Slow Man also finds a postmodern multiplicity where 
‘desire and empathy,’ which are mechanisms he identifies with the traditional 
novel, are rendered ‘inoperative, in order to make room for the exploration of 
different forms of life.’ 161  But the novel in fact makes this 
metafictional/postmodern point only lightly. Hardly with any pause, the drama of 
Paul’s love for Marijana continues to chime on in spite of Costello’s presence. 
Attridge’s observation in relation to Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello is pertinent 
here: for Attridge, postmodernism has always known how ‘the realistic illusion 
can survive the author’s showing of his or her hand.’162  A more interesting 
question is, once we have established that realism is an illusion, what is next.  
As Costello settles into Paul’s life, the stress on the novel’s mimetic 
illusion gets thoroughly absorbed into their relationship. Instead of disrupting 
meanings, Costello is intent on producing a traditional novel and she tells Paul to 
act on his passion: ‘So that you may be worth putting in a book. Alongside 
Alonso and Emma. Become major, Paul. Live like a hero.’163 Rather than 
employing the technique of metafiction to correct realism, Coetzee endows both 
the metafictional of Costello and the real of Paul with an equal level of gritty 
corporeality and unleashes them into the modern Australian context to see how 
they fare. The two characters represent, on the one hand, two humourously 
struggling novelistic genres, while, on the other, they are living beings facing 
genuine existential crisis and obsolescence. These two strands of meaning are 
inextricably intertwined in the novel. The question of genre is also an 
autobiographical question. Paul had a respectable story he tells about himself that 
is shaken by the loss of his leg and of his physical autonomy. His actions and 
desires seem to have lost their proper weight as a consequence and now appear 
harrowingly light and comical. Correspondingly, he is losing control of his life 
narrative to this author figure Costello, who is there to tell him: ‘Losing a leg is 
not a tragedy. On the contrary, losing a leg is comic’ (99) and to point out the 
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obsolescence of his chivalric love for Marijana. Costello at one point half-
ironically comments: ‘One is embarrassed… to find oneself in the presence of 
true, old-fashioned love. I bow before you’ (94).  
Coetzee’s interweaving of novelistic metaphors into Paul’s physical and 
existential disability is particularly discernible in Paul’s angry fantasy in which 
he beats Costello with his crutch. The fantasy recalls the horrific murder in 
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, when Raskolnikov brings down his axe 
repeatedly on the skull of the pawnbroker’s sister and kills her. The menace of 
that original realist scene is, however, entirely dispelled in Paul’s imagined 
scenario that is played out in an efficient welfare state where one’s actions are no 
longer a matter of life and death:  
[Paul’s] hand tightens on his crutch. If it were a proper, old-
fashioned crutch of ash or jarrah, with some weight to it, 
instead of aluminium, he would bring it down on the old hag’s 
skull, again and again, as often as might be necessary, till she 
lay dead at his feet and her blood soaked the carpet.164 
The murder that in Dostoevsky’s milieu evokes real terror is turned into this 
quixotic fantasy that has no weight behind it. When compared to Age of Iron, 
death is a much less palpable presence in Slow Man. The bodies of Paul and 
Costello may remain vulnerable as ever, but their lives are ultimately protected 
by a dependable system that renders the above vision implausible, even slightly 
comical. In a sense, the quixotic has already replaced the real as the order of 
Paul’s day even before Costello arrives to exacerbate his condition. 
Alongside the literary metafictional-realist tension between Costello and 
Paul, Coetzee also constructs another narrative style for the Jokićs, an attractive 
family of unself-conscious individuals, who appear characters out of plot-driven 
genre fiction rather than a novel by J.M. Coetzee. The Jokićs are portrayed as an 
honest, well-adapted family of immigrants from Dubrovnik, Croatia, who are 
labouriously climbing the Australian social ladder. Their inner lives are perfectly 
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consistent with their outer forms. The children are preternaturally good-looking 
as if to reflect their good hearts. To Paul, the youngest, Ljuba, is ‘a true beauty, 
with dark curls and a perfect skin and eyes that glint with what can only be 
intelligence’ (31). The oldest boy Drago has ‘one of the angelic smiles that must 
have the girls swooning’ (216)—where else in Coetzee would we find such 
good-looking characters? Occasionally, the narrative of Slow Man stresses the 
Jokićs’ matter-of-factness to quite comic effect; for instance, ‘“We must go,” 
[Marijana] says, and is gone’ (127) or when Marijana, in her own house, tells 
Paul and Costello ‘I make tea’ and then come back with ‘tea, but no cake’ (243). 
Not a group to delay action, the Jokićs parents get into jealous fights, physically 
hit each other, but then make up. One of the children runs away from home. 
Another steals trinkets from a store, but again, as in popular sitcoms, they are 
back together by the end: a heartwarming image of a family, in itself 
unencumbered by irony.  
The Jokićs face their own threat of obsolescence in Australia where their 
old-world skills are not valued. Back in Dubrovnik, Marijana and her husband 
Miroslav are skilled craftsmen, the former trained in painting restoration and the 
latter a technician of ‘antique technology’ (86) who gained moderate fame by 
successfully reassembling a mechanical duck for an art institute. Marijana is not 
immune to a pang of nostalgia and loss: ‘In Australia nobody hear of mechanical 
duck,’ she reveals to Paul, ‘Don’t know what is it. Miroslav Jokić, nobody hear 
of him. Just auto worker. Is nothing, auto worker’ (92). Yet the Jokićs differ 
from the figures of Paul and Costello in that, pragmatically or perhaps out of 
necessity, they adapt themselves to the new material-oriented environment. 
Unable to restore old things, they turn to nursing and auto work for the cliché 
reason, one would guess, of providing a better future for their children.  
Needless to say, the Jokićs’ popularised modern story is categorically 
different from the grim and idealistic realism of Paul Rayment. Rather than 
‘slow,’ the family are adaptable modern folks. In Slow Man, their conventional 
story occupies the pivotal role that the chivalric romance occupies in Cervantes’s 
Don Quixote; that is, it serves as the natural object of desire which fuels the 
writing. This positioning allows Coetzee to refocus on the Manichaean nature of 
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the novel as a distant descendent of Don Quixote and test the relevance of the 
lineage in contemporary Australia. While Cervantes’s great novel desires to 
recreate the chivalric fantasy but is held back by historical reality, Costello 
desires to write a winning story like that of the Jokićs with Paul as her 
protagonist. She becomes exasperated with Paul’s slow ways and lashes out at 
him to become more like the Croatian family:  
Have a proper scene! Stamp your foot (I speak 
metaphorically)! Shout! Say, “I will not be treated like this!” 
That is how normal people behave, people like Marijana and 
Miroslav. Life is not an exchange of diplomatic notes. Au 
contraire, life is drama, life is action, action and passion!’165 
However, what holds her and Paul back is not the reality of Australia per se, but 
their own inflexible natures that are entrenched in high Western European 
culture. In an important sense, the relevance of the Cervantean novel rests on the 
discrepancy between fantasy and reality, but, for better or for worse, the modern 
fantasy has become a real possibility for thes Jokićs and this phenomenon 
renders the novel form strangely redundant. Enamoured with the family, Paul 
checks out a book called ‘People of the Balkans’ from the library. It has a 
subtitle suggestive of the family’s versatility: ‘Between East and West’ (64). 
The most difficult aspect to come to terms with in Slow Man is precisely 
that, despite some perfunctory satire, the novel contains barely any damaging 
jibe against the storyline of the Jokićs and its ‘illusion’ of a good life. The jokes 
are not on the family in the same way that it was on Quixote’s chivalric fantasy. 
Their family name even comfortably assimilates the ridicule. In an unreservedly 
idyllic final scene that features the Jokićs, the family collectively gift Paul with a 
recumbent bicycle made by Drago and welded by Miroslav, the father. Paul 
notes that ‘Out of nowhere Ljuba has appeared. Even Blanka, who disapproved 
of him from the first, has joined the group’ and he becomes overtaken by this 
unexpected gesture of generosity, especially when he has gone to their home to 
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demand back a vintage photograph that Drago has taken from him without 
permission. His protectiveness of a piece of cultural heritage suddenly appears 
unjust in relation to the Jokićs’ personal, though culturally meaningless, gift: the 
gift is ‘Much more than [he] deserves.’ Paul feels ‘a blush of shame’, which ‘is 
what he deserves’ (254). With the recumbent that replaces the broken bicycle, 
the family seem to be guilelessly urging Paul to adapt and embrace his new 
condition, instead hankering over what was.  
One is forced to consider that Coetzee acknowledges the Jokićs’ way of 
being to be a real possibility in Australia or, if one is to be more cautious, that a 
happy and prosperous life is a real possibility for some blessed people; even if, 
along with Paul and Costello, Coetzee cannot himself share in the dream. When 
Costello visits the Jokićs’ home in the suburb of Munno Para and sees their loud 
white leather sofa and a big screen TV, she assures Paul: ‘I’m not sneering. On 
the contrary, I’m full of admiration’ (243). Her words come across as half-
ironic—that is after all her unique metafictional curse—yet by that stage, it is 
clear that this family has been the object of admiration that accounts for this 
narrative’s existence. When it comes down to it, the Coetzean pair yearn to join 
the Jokićs’ world. 
In its failure to slay its object of desire, Slow Man departs from its urtext 
of Don Quixote. When Quixote and his appointed squire Sancho Panza set out to 
enter the world of chivalric romance, that old genre gets fatally satirised and, in a 
sense, slain to make way for a new birth of the modern novel. But the true object 
of satire in Slow Man is the Manichean novel itself. There is no new birth to 
speak of, only childless old age as the novel yields its ground to popular fantasy 
from a different lineage altogether. As indicated, Slow Man offers genuine 
admiration for the Jokićs that has been left to stand, like the following 
articulation of Costello’s esteem for the family:  
[Marijana] is bursting because she is loved, loved as much as 
one can expect to be in this world… the reason why the 
children too make such an impression on you, the boy and the 
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little girl, is that they have grown up drenched in love. They are 
at home in the world. It is, to them, a good place.166 
If their lives are a fiction, it is at least a desirable one. Alternatively, Paul and 
Costello, who represent literary tropes that deal, respectively, in suffering and 
skepticism, are depicted as the unfortunate fictional beings. Not only are they not 
closer to the truth, fatally, they are also an unattractive vision for the mass: ‘We 
are both of us ugly, Paul, old and ugly,’ Costello comments, ‘As much as ever 
would we like to hold in our arms the beauty of all the world. It never wanes in 
us, that yearning. But the beauty of all the world does not want any of us. So we 
have to make do with less, a great deal less’ (236). 
The prime evidence of this yearning is, of course, Paul’s love for 
Marijana, but one finds this undying desire for beauty in Costello as well, like 
when she makes a proposition to Paul that they form an alternative ‘marriage of a 
kind’ (232), and that the two of them should embark on an epic adventure like 
Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. Costello suggests that if they can procure 
suitable vehicles, ‘[t]hen we will be ready to set out on our adventures, you and I. 
You already have your nice orange flag and I will get another for myself, with a 
design’ (263). And in the excitement of her vision, Costello exclaims ‘What a 
capital idea! Is this love, Paul? Have we found love at last?’ (263) But her 
metafictional words always come across to Paul and to us as unconvincing, as 
‘sincere, or half sincere’ (232)—they do not have the conviction of the real thing. 
Paul replies decidedly: ‘this is not love. This is something else. Something less’ 
(263). On his part, he is too idealistic in his morose and ‘tortoise’ way to settle 
for less. The quixotic/novelistic adventure is aging fast. Ultimately, Slow Man 
dramatises not the familiar crusade between literary realism and 
postmodernism—that tension is almost a subplot—but the sense of their mutual 
and fated decline. Their death will be neither tragic nor comic for, when it 
comes, no one will notice their disappearance. So despite the Jokićs’ brightness, 
Slow Man shows Coetzee in a distinctly pessimistic mood about his own legacy. 
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Conclusion 
From our discussion in this chapter, Coetzee’s novels may be said to 
discriminate between two manners of writing: a writing to and a writing of. The 
first is the communicative, undertaken to deliver content; while the other is 
imaginative and engaged in imagining different beings. Attridge rightly notes 
that ‘[t]here are no communicative breakthroughs in Coetzee’s fiction.’167 His 
soliloquies and dialogues are home to crippling doubts over the validity of 
linguistic expressions. Rather, it is in the sympathetic application of his prose—
the writing that conjures another being—that Coetzee’s narratives find their 
concrete foothold. In Age of Iron, Mrs. Curren’s embodied writing of herself and 
Vercueil gradually takes precedence over her writing to her daughter: ‘One must 
love what is nearest. One must love what is to hand, as a dog loves.’168 More 
explicitly, given its textual framework, Costello’s writing of Paul in Slow Man 
gradually edges out the drama that follows his confession of love to Marijana.  
These two novels are further evidence that the issues of the body-soul are 
never far away from the surface of Coetzee’s narratives. Even though death that 
is imminent in Age of Iron, and which brings together Mrs. Curren and Vercueil, 
grows faint in Slow Man, this slump is picked up by the ever more intense play 
of Paul Rayment’s erotic desires of for Marijana. Paul’s love for the amiable 
Croat is a testament to his irrational body-soul, and it supersedes the place of 
God in his worldview in the same fashion that Vercueil has been turned into Mrs. 
Curren’s angel of death. For Paul, ‘[h]e cannot imagine loving God more than he 
loves Marijana at this moment;’169 this love is ‘no different from his love of God’ 
in that it ‘fills what would otherwise be a vast, all-devouring hole’ (187). Of 
course, as we have seen, Paul’s novelistic and authentic love is waning along 
with the realist genre he inhabits, but the desire of the body-soul never 
disappears as long as the writing continues. It in turn gives way to another layer 
of metafictional love from Costello to Paul—another figuration of the same 
underlying desires. Uncertain of his own worth as an object of attention, Paul 
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wonders if the Australian author is ‘starved for love’ and, therefore, turns to him 
‘for relief’ (237)—he has earned his protagonist’s place, after all, by a literal 
accident rather than a heroic deed. But the answer for what connects him and 
Costello is shown to be unsayable: 
Almost at random [Costello] has lighted on him, as a bee might 
alight on a flower or a wasp on a worm; and somehow, in ways 
so obscure, so labyrinthine that the mind baulks at exploring 
them, the need to be loved and the storytelling, that is to say the 
mess of papers on the table, are connected. (238) 
The only knowable truths are the need to be loved felt in Paul’s breast and the 
mess of papers in which he is written. Alternatively, for us, the truth starts with 
these printed novels that we can hold in our hands. Coetzee’s novels are, in this 
sense, objects that testify to the desires of the body-soul. 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
The Confessions of John Coetzee: 
Boyhood, Youth and Summertime 
 
We have so far explored the non-rational truths that emerge from Coetzee’s 
fiction as he develops narratives that are as much a product of the body-soul’s 
vulnerabilities as they are of calculative constructions. From Costello’s ill-
defined idea of illimitable sympathy with other beings and her attachment to Paul 
Rayment in Slow Man to Mrs. Curren’s slightly desperate shadowing of 
Vercueil, we have come across author figures whose control over their own 
narratives is never securely established, but whose written truths become fuller 
than their intentional, rational expressions can hope to be. The name ‘J.M. 
Coetzee,’ on the other hand, seems to conjure up a very different persona. 
Beyond his fiction, Coetzee has penned a large body of esoteric critical writings 
under the same name and, combined with his reputation in the press of being a 
private person, Coetzee has a firm public image described by David Attwell as ‘a 
cerebral writer, a weaver of clever palimpsests.’170 So despite a body of fiction 
that pierces into the vulnerabilities of beings and despite the opening of the 
Coetzee archive that to Attwell reveals a man ‘more human or, at least, less 
Olympian’ (25), the name ‘J.M. Coetzee’ continues stubbornly to evoke an aloof 
mastermind behind an increasingly complex literary and critical oeuvre. The 
body-soul’s vulnerability is lodged in every Coetzean character but not in the 
man we think of with the name J.M. Coetzee.  
Within this context, we find Coetzee’s three fictional memoirs, Boyhood, 
Youth, and Summertime, unexpectedly slipping through the fortress of Coetzee’s 
reputation as rational and evaluating author, and releasing from it the sensitive 
truths that pertain to the given name ‘John Coetzee’ rather than to the self-
assigned textual presence of ‘J.M. Coetzee.’ Most of these three memoirs are 
autobiographical narratives of a clarity interestingly distinct from Coetzee’s other 
fiction, enabled by the autobiographical configuration in which the narrating 
voice, the character, and the author share the same full name. This arrangement, 
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however, unravels in Summertime, where John Coetzee is said to be dead, and 
the reader enters again into the territory of Coetzee’s fiction that provides a 
different kind of truth. 
I should clarify that I do not see the memoirs as providing exclusive inner 
truths of John Coetzee that cannot be found in his novels, since the memoirs are 
as biographically true, and as fictional, as some of Coetzee’s novels 
themselves. 171  Rather, their crucial difference lies in the memoirs’ firm 
evocations of Coetzee’s real name and the real places and people from his life; 
these correlations have never been as strong in his fiction. The use of real 
names—names that are not created by the author himself—with a third-person 
present tense narration in Boyhood and Youth crucially removes a layer of 
caution from our reading of the stories and lessens our sense of being under 
authorial control.172 While the memoirs do not actually deconstruct the persona 
of ‘J.M. Coetzee,’ they manage at least to get around it. There is a real sense in 
which J.M. Coetzee will always remain to his readers a separate textual being 
constructed out of his written works and public performances, untouched by the 
mortality of the body-soul that has given rise to it. Instead of this author figure, 
however, the memoirs’ attention is turned towards the living being that is John 
Coetzee—the one who knows death and, thus, is impelled to get his stories told. 
The ultimate test to any autobiographical attempt is whether it can relate 
the subject’s difficult truths fully and clearly, and this has generally been the 
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yardstick used to read and determine the success of Boyhood, Youth, and 
Summertime. In my own readings, however, I will alternatively begin with 
Coetzee’s acknowledgement that perfect autobiographical fullness and clarity 
may be an impossible ideal. In his early essay on the autobiographical trope, 
‘Confession and Double Thoughts,’ Coetzee articulates that the main stumbling 
block of autobiographical writing is that the self always stands in the way of the 
full truth: ‘Because of the nature of consciousness, … the self cannot tell the 
truth of itself to itself and come to rest without the possibility of self-
deception.’173 In a later article, ‘A Fiction of the Truth,’ Coetzee would come to 
espouse Freud’s quantitative view towards self-truth, which recognises the truth-
value of each incomplete self-revelation. Taking this view will enable us to better 
appreciate that the memoirs’ narrations of difficult or shameful episodes possess 
startling—sometimes even pitiless—forthrightness, even when what is said may 
not be the perfect truth. With closer readings, I further show that the narrations 
across the three volumes are not all uniform, but are performed with different 
levels of fictionalisation, self-reflection and tone, giving rise to varying 
perspectives of John Coetzee, from the incisive portrait of Boyhood to the 
sentimental fragments of Summertime.  
The fictionalisations of the memoirs represent an important part of 
Coetzee’s response to the congenital blindness of autobiographical writing. I 
shall trace how, by fictionalising various elements in the narration including the 
narrating voice, the self is no longer telling its own story in these memoirs. 
Within this larger strategy, Coetzee is additionally alert to the limits of any given 
viewpoint, even that which is fictional, and the three memoirs are written in 
different registers and levels of historical accuracy. Finally, with the Coetzee 
Archive in Austin, Texas, as a model, I propose that Coetzee does not discount 
the values of imperfect discourses or discriminate between them. Rather, he 
seems to invest in each according to the occasion at hand. His academic papers, 
letters, lectures, short stories, novels, memoirs, etc., are different elements of one 
archive that testifies to his existence. The true autobiography of John Coetzee 
may be said to be the expanding archive itself. 
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As indicated in the introduction, Coetzee’s memoirs are arguably a site of 
the greatest clarity within Coetzee’s oeuvre. The issue of truth in autobiography 
has been cropping up in Coetzee’s discursive works for most of his writing 
career, beginning with the influential article ‘Confession and Double Thoughts: 
Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky’ written during the years 1982-83. Then in 1984, 
Coetzee delivered the lecture ‘Truth in Autobiography,’ in which he looks again 
at Rousseau’s The Confessions from a slightly different angle. In 1986, he 
translated Marcellus Emants’s A Posthumous Confession from Dutch for 
publication174 and went on to write throughout the 1990s multiple reviews of life 
writings by a diverse group of novelists and poets such as Robert Musil, Breyten 
Breytenbach, Josef Brodsky, and Doris Lessing.175 In November of 1999, the 
year of Boyhood’s publication, Coetzee still found more to say on the topic in an 
article for the Sydney Morning Herald entitled ‘A Fiction of the Truth’ where he 
again revisits Rousseau’s The Confessions and the effects of autobiographical 
pact to the telling of the truth about oneself.176 
Such unconcealed, even perversely publicised, interest in an area of 
inquiry that would culminate in his subsequent ‘fictional’ works points to a fault 
within Coetzee’s public persona as an impenetrable writer. For along with his 
ardent refusal to elaborate on his fiction, one encounters revealing clarity in the 
fiction itself and a ready availability of its attendant texts. This discrepancy 
highlights the problem of trying to pin an identity—for example, of an 
inscrutable recluse—onto Coetzee as an author, which seems inseparable from 
the critical desire to uncover a final interpretation from his works. The Coetzee 
Archive at the Harry Ransom Center, the University of Texas at Austin, offers an 
alternative model to this search for the one ideal truth. The archive, whose vast 
content stretches from Coetzee’s family albums and personal correspondence to 
lecture scripts and the novels’ manuscripts—collected by Coetzee and acquired 
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by the Center177—shapes the name ‘J.M. Coetzee’ into a site of constant 
evolution. By accepting Coetzee’s works in all their stages, the ever growing 
archive adds complications to Coetzee’s oeuvre of finished works; for in light of 
it, nothing that pertains Coetzee can appear truly finished or complete. As 
Derrida suggests in Archive Fever, the archive is the house of ‘transgenerational 
memory’ that positions the subject within a line of ancestry and passes the 
collection on to the new generation to interpret and make their mark.178 By the 
archive, Coetzee perhaps hopes that he can live on. 
 Even J.C. Kannemeyer’s biography can be seen as an adjunct to 
Coetzee’s autobiographical project. Kannemeyer is known from his biographical 
works on Afrikaans writers for his solid and traditional approach, and he 
provides an external perspective that does not threaten to supersede Coetzee’s 
own texts. Kannemeyer reveals that Coetzee’s main concern about his project is 
that the biography ‘should be factually correct,’ beside which ‘[Coetzee] would 
in no way interfere with my interpretation of the data.’179 The fictionalisation of 
Coetzee’s life interestingly remains the proprietory right of Coetzee himself. 
In contrast to single volume autobiographies as written by Barthes or 
Rousseau, this sprawling archived information does not direct us towards a 
single impression of the author. The figure is neither an unknowable subject nor 
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its opposite. Coetzee writes of the content of the archive as ‘the work of my 
hands’180 and which suggests that the archive’s principle of selection is simply 
whatever John Coetzee, a person in history, has produced. An archive that 
collects all of Coetzee’s writing is, of course, necessarily autobiographical since, 
to quote it once again, ‘all writing is autobiography.’ The constant expansion of 
an archive is further a great metaphor for autobiography. Coetzee touches on 
autobiography’s essential lack of an ending in ‘A Fiction of the Truth,’ writing 
that ‘A story, says Aristotle, has a beginning, a middle and an end. An 
autobiography, by definition, does not have an end.’181  
There is no question that the vastness and clarity of Coetzee’s current 
oeuvre can feel like an overbearing patriarchal presence to literary critics; yet, as 
Coetzee reminds us, this sense may have more to do with criticism’s anxiety at 
the loss of its privilege to disclose the truth of literature than with any menace 
meant by the oeuvre itself. The reciprocal economy between literature and 
criticism that has been based on their founding secrets is necessarily disrupted by 
genuine achievement of clarity. Coetzee’s protagonists have already performed 
their own unrelenting self-interrogations. As Coetzee himself suggests, there is 
rarely a deeper level or plane to get to in his fiction than what is already written. 
Certainly, there is endlessly more to know and references to follow; but it does 
not seem possible for any authority to enjoy a special right to the deeper truth 
within the oeuvre of J.M. Coetzee. I find that, as discussed in the introduction, it 
is only fair to acknowledge that the ideal condition for truth—which Coetzee in 
Doubling the Point calls the ideal condition of grace ‘in which the truth can be 
told clearly without blindness’182—feels quietly possible in his fiction thanks to 
the evolving viewpoint afforded by the fictional narratives.  
In his Cape Town lecture on autobiography, Coetzee draws attention to 
Freud’s moderate stance on the possibility of self-knowledge expressed in one of 
his last papers on the subject of psychoanalysis, ‘Analysis Terminable and 
                                                
180 ‘J. M. Coetzee’s Association with The University of Texas at Austin.’ 
181 Coetzee, ‘A Fiction of the Truth.’ 
182 Coetzee and Attwell, Doubling the Point, 392. 
112 
Interminable.’183 Reflecting on his life’s work, Freud confronts the possibility 
that psychoanalysis may not possess the power to achieve complete self-
knowledge since the time required for the task appears to him to be longer than a 
lifetime. Despite Freud’s confidence in psychoanalytic progress grounded upon 
his extensive clinical practice, Freud admits that overall the breakthroughs have 
occurred only by degrees. Based on this paper, Coetzee suggests that this ‘spirit’ 
of Freud, which Freud himself identifies as a quantitative approach, may be 
better for consideration of autobiographies: 
 I think it may sometimes be necessary to approach an 
autobiographical project in some such spirit as Freud’s: that 
getting to the core of yourself may not be feasible, that perhaps 
the best you can hope for will not be the history of yourself but 
a story about yourself, a story that will not be the truth but may 
have some truth-value, probably of a mixed kind—some 
historical truth, some poetic truth. A fiction of the truth in other 
words.184  
This achievement of fictional truth is not closure, which would spell the demise 
of both narratives and criticisms. Instead, it represents a more integrated account 
of a life that remains active. That Coetzee has not laid down the whole truth in 
his fictions and memoirs should be considered as self-evident because there will 
always be too much living truth for a book, or a lifetime of writing, to hold.  
 
I. Fictionalising autobiographical writing 
The lessons from Roland Barthes 
David Attwell reports from Coetzee’s notebook that Coetzee considers 
Roland Barthes’s postmodern autobiography Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes 
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to be the father text that he needs to overcome in order to write his own.185 
Interestingly, of all the autobiographical works we know Coetzee has engaged 
with, Barthes’s is the only one whose workaround for autobiographical self-
deception has been to consider itself pure fiction rather than to insist on its own 
truthfulness, while still using the real name of ‘Roland Barthes.’ Barthes’s book 
opens with a disclaimer that ‘It must all be considered as if spoken by a character 
in a novel,’186 which is reiterated again inside the text: ‘The substance of this 
book, ultimately, is therefore totally fictive… let the essay avow itself almost a 
novel: a novel without proper names.’187 From his experience as a novelist, 
Coetzee must have found in Barthes’s radical approach at least the theoretical 
affirmation of his own sense about writing and the self. A brief survey of 
Barthes’s strategies will help prepare us for Coetzee’s less conceptualised 
construction of his own memoirs. 
For Barthes, to be fictive means specifically to yield to inconsistency. His 
autobiography can be described a series of images and brief passages on 
disparate topics that refuse to serve up one single image of the self. Barthes 
writes in it that ‘if we find consistency insupportable we cut ourselves off from 
an ethics of truth’ (58), and become finally fictional. To this end, the writing self 
and the written self of the autobiography are treated as ephemeral constructions 
that are being made in each instant of the text. The speaking voice in each of his 
topics alternates without pattern between the first person, the third person, and a 
disinterested discursive voice, and it is set free to roam where it pleases.  
Barthes’s method of fictionalisation through radical inconstancy 
nevertheless still receives criticisms for failing to shed the confines of the self as 
it proposes to do. For Phillipe Lejeune, Barthes ‘remains locked in his identity’ 
in the text,188 for while he may have destabilised his writing voice and the written 
self, his text still demands that the reader views it in a certain way. The reader is 
                                                
185 Attwell, The Life of Writing, 28. 
186  Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1977), 1. 
187 Barthes, Roland Barthes, 120. 
188 Philippe Lejeune, On Autobiography, trans. Katherine Leary (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 44. 
114 
directly reminded of the self’s fluidity in many of the book’s entries, not to 
mention the opening page disclaimer that it must all be read as spoken by a 
character. This coercion becomes self-determination—the fluid self becomes a 
new identity that defines Barthes and his project. As Lejeune writes, ‘this game 
of flight from [Barthes’s] “imaginary” turns out simply to become in our eyes his 
imaginary’s essential characteristic.’189 We are asked to judge his identity by its 
inconstancy, only to then find that it is still very much a fixed one. 
Taking Barthes as an example, Coetzee does it differently, and we will be 
considering if he manages to escape the same charge. Fictionalisation that is a 
matter of formal shifts in Barthes becomes John Coetzee’s literal mode of being 
in Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime. The character’s story gradually departs 
from the real personal history of his author, and becomes fiction told in the third 
person and present tense by an implied author. In the previous chapter, we have 
seen how the implied author of Coetzee’s fiction sympathetically ‘follows’ the 
fictional character and, through the mutually non-objectifying process, allows a 
greater quantity of both their embodied truths to surface. In this autobiographical 
project, fictionalisation and characterisation remain crucial in allowing Coetzee 
to release the speaking voice of the author from itself and from some of its 
inherent blindness. They seem to enable piercing self-revelations that Coetzee 
would not otherwise be willing to divulge. We shall see in our discussion that 
follows how Coetzee’s use of the third-person, present tense narration in 
Boyhood and Youth, enables him to fulfill Barthes’s thesis and preserve the 
immediacy of the fictive self as it is being constructed in the writing. 
 
Coetzee’s fictional memoirs 
With his three fictional memoirs, Coetzee is ostensibly working in 
relation to the Christian-derived trope of autobiography properly begun with 
Augustine’s Confessions. The autobiographical goal is to uncover the essential 
truth about the subject via the retelling of the life. Coetzee expounds in ‘A 
Fiction of the Truth’ that it is a genre whose ‘intellectual roots…, at least in the 
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West, are bound up with soul-searching and the confession of sins.’ 190 
Traditionally, autobiography is a result of the negotiation between the past and 
the present moment of writing in which the writing subject provides a 
perspectival look into his/her past, and illuminates it with the ‘advantage’ of the 
present knowledge. Compromises are an inevitable part of any autobiography on 
account of its being pulled between two temporalities. In a book-length study on 
this trope, Roy Pascal comments that autobiography’s original sin is its 
predilection to distort the truth of past moments via the application of the present 
knowledge of writing.191 The more the writing subject tries to draw a clean 
causal line from his past self to the present self, the more the past is subjugated 
and reshaped from its full experience.192  
With respect to its affiliation with confessional discourse, autobiography 
enters into a contract with the reader to convey the truth in return for absolution. 
As Coetzee iterates in ‘Confession and Double Thoughts,’ the ‘indispensible 
goal’ of any confession is absolution. 193  The confessional text invites the 
reader/interlocutor to judge the perfect truth of the writing. Therefore, the 
reader’s relationship with it differs greatly from one with fiction, which in most 
cases leans towards identification and sympathy. As Lejeune observes, 
‘[c]onfronted with what looks like an autobiographical narrative, the reader often 
tends to think of himself as a detective, that is to say, to look for breaches of 
contract.’ For Lejeune, the presence of this contract is the cause of the myth that 
fiction is ‘truer’ than autobiography,194 when in fact the difference may largely 
be down to the reader’s shifting standards of evaluation. 
From these observations, one could imagine how fictionalisation can 
unlock for Coetzee a means of writing a richer account of his younger selves. As 
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Michelle Kelly notes, Boyhood and Youth are fictional ‘closed worlds’ that 
renounce ‘obvious connection to the author and even to the protagonist of the 
other volume.’195 They are not entirely subjugated to the author’s historical facts 
or to any objective besides the following of its chosen subject. Through 
fictionalisation, his memoirs do not fully invoke what Lejeune terms ‘the 
autobiographical pact’196 with the readers—in fact, they seem to demand nothing 
from the readers beyond their reading. So fiction allows for a self-forgetting and 
a singularity of focus that would have been unachievable under the conditions 
called up by the genre of autobiography or confession. But to say that Coetzee’s 
autobiographical project is a work of fiction would be an oversimplification. 
Pure fictional discourse is not without a measure of intentional blindness, 
particularly with regards to the hidden truths of its real-life author. Ever since his 
first novel, Dusklands, 197 which relates the colonial exploits in eighteen-century 
South Africa by a possible ancestor of Coetzee, Jacobus Coetzee, Coetzee has 
shown a propensity to conflate his own reality with his fiction. In the fictional 
memoirs, as in most of his other ‘fictions,’ Coetzee resorts to moving his 
narrative across different generic terrains; a decision that troubles our critical 
attempts at its classification, but is central to the narratives’ claim to their living 
truths.  
Boyhood, Youth and Summertime involve varying degrees of 
fictionalisation. Boyhood is the only book in the series that does not present any 
obvious contradictions of what we know of Coetzee’s life. It can, in a sense, be 
read as a regular memoir except for the fact that it has an unrealistic mode of 
address: the third person and present tense. In the aspect of address, the book 
reads like fiction. Consider, for example, the following sentences that describe 
the scene of the boy trying to swim across a river at a Boy Scout camp: ‘By 
midstream he is exhausted. He gives up swimming and tries to stand, but the 
river is too deep. His head goes under. He tries to lift himself, to swim again, but 
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he has not the strength.’198 If we think of the author, narrator and the character as 
being the same person and replace the pronoun ‘he’ with ‘I,’ this present tense 
becomes false; for if the subject is drowning at the moment of the utterance, then 
how can he be relating the story? Additionally, commenting on Boyhood, critics 
such as Collingwood-Whittick199 and Lenta200 detect word choices and sentence 
arrangements that are unlikely to have come from a ten-year-old boy.201 One is 
forced to deem the narrator to be a distinct consciousness from the boy and from 
the mature Coetzee, who should actually write of his past self in the past tense. 
More accurately put, Boyhood’s narrative voice is a fiction. It is a non-referential 
voice with no real world presence, created entirely to house the boy’s story. 
Youth sticks with the same mode of address while adding the 
fictionalisation of certain facts, mainly portraying a single John Coetzee at the 
time when he was in fact married. Then, by Summertime, the fiction spreads 
everywhere. This final instalment abandons the familiar narrating voice as it 
breaks out of the autobiographical mould by going beyond the author’s death. In 
it, we learn that John Coetzee has passed away, and without the unity provided 
by the autobiographical impulse of the author, Summertime fragments into 
excerpts from John Coetzee’s notebook from 1972-1975 and a series of 
interviews conducted after the author’s death with five people who knew him. 
By calling the three works fictional autobiographies, I am only loosely 
invoking the characteristics of autobiography and fiction, as these should be 
understood as changing within and with each new work. The first two retain the 
characteristic of the autobiographical genre principally via the shared name and 
family history of the author and the principal character. In Boyhood, the boy is 
referred to as ‘John’ and he belongs to a family of ‘the Coetzees,’ and we can 
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easily identify the historical circumstances of the boy with what we know of 
Coetzee himself. In other respects such as pronoun choice, tense, and mode of 
address, Coetzee seems devoted to his familiar fictional method of imaginative 
following that is here applied to his younger self. Boyhood thus carves out a 
deeply private and tight scene of address—perhaps only possible in a hybrid 
between fiction and autobiography—that anticipates little response from its 
readers and allows no room for self-doubt, giving just enough space for the self 
to continue to evolve as it speaks of itself to itself. The effect is that Coetzee is 
able to condense split consciousness, temporalities and identities onto a ‘single 
plane’ within the sphere of the autobiographical. 
In Doubling the Point, Coetzee plays with the idea of writing a particular 
kind of autobiography: ‘a kind of self-writing in which you are constrained to 
respect the facts of your history,’ where ‘You choose the facts insofar as they fall 
in with your evolving purpose.’ 202 The idea has a lot in common with Boyhood, 
which appears to collect vivid memories from Coetzee’s childhood, from his 
sense of alienation from the social groups of South Africa, his deep love for the 
Coetzee family farm, his mother’s brief spell on her bicycle and her smothering 
love, etc. With the present tense narration, the moment of memory selection, the 
present moment of the narrative, and the present moment for the boy, all fall 
within the same narrow temporal confine. Attridge succinctly describes the 
narrative as having a ‘singular immediacy, one might almost say a 
depthlessness,’203 which is distinct from the feeling one gets with the past tense 
that conjures a mature author selecting what memory goes in his 
autobiographical chest.  
By the end, however, Boyhood acquires the thickness of a small 
collection. Certain passages in the book give us a glimpse into the unique 
purpose of this most autobiographical volume in the series, which is to become a 
secure home for a selection of John Coetzee’s memories. One section in 
particular narrates what the boy considers to be his secret first memory, one that 
he refuses to reveal to his friends ‘who would trumpet it around the school and 
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turn him into a laughing-stock.’204 The memory is of a cold bus ride he takes 
with his mother through ‘the wild and desolate Swartberg Pass.’ During the ride, 
the boy lets a sweet-wrapper go into the wind: ‘The scrap of paper flies up into 
the sky. Below there is nothing but the grim abyss of the pass. Ringed with cold 
mountain-peaks… “What will happen to it?” he asks his mother; but she does not 
comprehend’: 
 That is the other first memory, the secret one. He thinks 
all the time of the scrap of paper, alone in all that vastness, that 
he abandoned when he should not have abandoned it. One day 
he must go back to the Swartberg Pass and find it and rescue it. 
That is his duty: he may not die until he has done it. (31) 
As we read this passage, the wrapping paper is in a sense being saved from the 
abyss of oblivion by the narrative. The boy’s desire is laid down in the passage, 
and then fulfilled within the same instance. As readers, we need not acknowledge 
its completion, for even in our oblivious reading, the desired effect has already 
been achieved. The Swartberg mountain range seems additionally to occupy an 
important place in Coetzee’s memory. Fourteen years before Boyhood in Life & 
Times of Michael K, Michael K sneaks away from the Visagie grandson and tries 
to lose himself in the Swartberg, hiking ‘in dark shadow wearing his mother’s 
coat against the chill.’205 But the mountain’s formidable image can be traced 
backward (or forward) to this childhood memory where it sits beside Coetzee’s 
desire to save things in his writing.  
Boyhood’s final scene—which is set at the funeral of the boy’s elderly 
maternal aunt, Aunt Annie—would strengthen the desire in the boy to preserve 
things and foreground his writing career. Prior to her death, Aunt Annie has 
devoted herself to the distribution of a book written by her father Balthazar du 
Biel. She has personally translated the book from German to Afrikaans and paid 
for its printing, but has failed to get it accepted into bookshops. The boy has also 
                                                
204 Coetzee, Boyhood, 30. 
205 Coetzee, Michael K, 65. 
120 
read the book and found it ‘too boring’206 and its unwanted copies fill the shelves 
and boxes in Aunt Annie’s storeroom. At her death, the book is about to lose its 
last connection to the world. When the boy asks his mother at the funeral ‘What 
has happened to Aunt Annie’s books?,’ he does not get a satisfactory answer:  
His mother does not know or will not say. From the flat where 
[Aunt Annie] broke her hip to the hospital to the old age home 
in Stikland to Woltemade no. 3 no one has given a thought to 
the books except perhaps Aunt Annie herself, the books that no 
one will ever read; and now Aunt Annie is lying in the rain 
waiting for someone to find the time to bury her. He alone is 
left to do the thinking. How will he keep them all in his head, 
all the books, all the people, all the stories? And if he does not 
remember them, who will? (166) 
The books, the people, the stories are here kept in the narrative. If his head is not 
enough, the boy will have to resort to writing—which, again, is precisely what 
the memoir is doing.  
But this scene also has a shadow cast over it. From the lost copies of 
Balthazar du Biel, it is possible to sense a worry that even writing may not be 
enough. A day will come when books like Boyhood, Youth and Summertime will 
also be lost, or the world will lose interest in them. This possibility of eventual 
distinction is a loose end that Boyhood cannot tie up, a fear that it has not fully 
confessed to. If there is one sure sign of the discourse’s incompleteness—an 
unspoken secret that can disturb its illusion of clarity—this fear of not being read 
is it. But the secret of the discourse is of no particular interest beyond that it is 
what is required for the discourse to keep going and keep devising ways of 
engaging the reader. Rather than dwelling on the omissions made, it is equally 
valid to attend to the rest of the boy’s truths that have been so lucidly conveyed 
by the narrative. Boyhood brings to light the things that have existed only in one 
person’s memory and safeguards them against time’s ravages in the manner of an 
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archive. By this account, it is possible to perceive the limit of Boyhood as a 
merely quantitative one, and there are rooms left in the house of writing for 
Coetzee’s other works, written in other discursive registers, to eventually take up 
the loose ends. 
The fear of oblivion appears in fuller form in the chapter ‘Realism’ of 
Elizabeth Costello, which looks to have been written alongside Boyhood, as it 
was first published as a journal article in 1997, the same year that Coetzee 
finished his first fictional memoir. The chapter relays Costello’s acceptance 
speech for an award ‘made biennially to a major world writer’ (2). In it, Costello 
speaks at length about the various misfortunes that can befall the published 
books, and reveals her inquiry with her publishers to make certain that her first 
novel has been safely deposited into the British Museum: 
What lay behind my concern about deposit copies was the wish 
that, even if I myself should be knocked over by a bus the next 
day, this first-born of mine would have a home where it could 
snooze, if fate so decreed, for the next hundred years, and no 
one would come poking with a stick to see if it was still alive. 
(17) 
But this relief is only temporary, for Costello knows that ‘the British Museum or 
(now) the British Library is not going to last forever… as the demand for space 
grows, the ugly and unread and unwanted will be carted off to some facility or 
other and tossed into a furnace, and all trace of them will be liquidated from the 
master catalogue. After which it will be as if they had never existed’ (17). This is 
the alternative vision that Boyhood as a text refuses to imagine. J.M. Coetzee, on 
the other hand, is still left to acknowledge the fear in this other work of another 
discursive register. 
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II. Truth-telling in confessions 
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Paul de Man 
In turning our attention to the truth-telling of the memoirs, a closer look 
at Rousseau’s The Confessions207 and Paul de Man’s critique of it in Allegories 
of Reading208 will provide the general context to understand Coetzee’s use of 
different narrative styles from Boyhood to Summertime. Coetzee’s memoirs 
incorporate both the raw and unreflexive intensity of Rousseau’s autobiography 
and de Man’s sharp awareness of the effect of style on truth. One must begin by 
establishing that, as far as truthfulness is concerned, Rousseau’s autobiography is 
a highly questionable text to anyone who reads it. Its first page declares 
hyperbolically: ‘I have resolved on an enterprise which has no precedent, and 
which, once complete, will have no imitator. My purpose is to display to my kind 
a portrait in every way true to nature.’209 Coetzee observes that this first 
statement is clearly untrue, for Augustine’s Confessions is its precedent and 
Rousseau has since had scores of imitators.210 Paul de Man considers Rousseau’s 
The Confessions not to be a confession at all because of its extravagant style, its 
author’s penchant for over-decorating his truth.211 Coetzee himself has conducted 
various deconstructive readings of the text in his lecture ‘Truth in 
Autobiography,’ the essay ‘Confession and Double Thoughts’ and ‘A Fiction of 
the Truth.’ Yet somehow, Rousseau’s text endures all these beatings and 
continues to have a hold on Coetzee’s interest. 
Rousseau’s famous stolen ribbon episode, in particular, is obliquely 
rewritten in the ‘confessions’ made in Boyhood and Summertime. Rousseau’s 
version of the story concerns the end of his time as a valet at an aristocratic 
house. In the confusion that ensued after the lady of the house passed away, 
Rousseau stole ‘a little pink and silver ribbon’ and, when caught, accused an 
innocent girl servant named Marion of giving it to him. Faced with the 
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accusation, the girl is described as remaining calm and defending herself 
sincerely without turning to condemn Rousseau, while Rousseau adamantly 
repeated his false accusation and persuaded the audience in his favour. The petty 
theft was however not pursued further and the matter ended with both of them 
being dismissed. The guilt from this crime is emphasised by Rousseau in his 
usual embellished language: ‘This cruel memory troubles me at times and so 
disturbs me that in my sleepless hours I see this poor girl coming to reproach me 
for my crime, as if I had committed it only yesterday.’212 He attributes to it his 
resolution to write The Confessions, where he claims to unburden the memory 
from his conscience for the first time. Not satisfied with simply telling the story, 
Rousseau also gives an excuse for his action and famously attempts to reveal his 
‘inner feelings’: ‘Never was deliberate wickedness further from my intention 
than at that cruel moment’ (88). He claims that he had intended to give the 
ribbon to Marion as a token of affection and, with her being already on his mind, 
hers was the first name that came to him. He then rounds off his confession with 
an affirmation that the incident ‘has secured me for the rest of my life against any 
act that might prove criminal in its results’ and ‘May I never have to speak of it 
again’ (89). 
Paul de Man expresses many reservations about this particular confession 
of Rousseau. He finds that Rousseau’s combining of confession and excuse into 
one account causes confusion between referential truth of the crime (confession) 
and the ‘inner feeling’ (excuse) for which we depend entirely upon Rousseau’s 
words.213 In swinging from one mode to the other, de Man sees Rousseau as 
‘[ruining] the seriousness of any confessional discourse by making it self-
destructive’ (280) for if the excuse section is successful in exonerating him, then 
the preceding confession will not have been needed. Second, de Man also takes 
issue with The Confessions’s style: ‘The obvious satisfaction in the tone and the 
eloquence,’ its ‘easy flow of hyperboles,’ in which he senses Rousseau’s 
unconfessed desire for a ‘public scene of exposure’ that may be behind his lies 
and petty larcenies (285). The ideal confession for de Man should be directed at 
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the overcoming of ‘guilt and shame in the name of truth’ (279) and it is 
successful—that is, able to absolve the confessor’s conscience—when it 
manages to state the truths, no matter how ugly, purely as they are. De Man, 
therefore, argues that the retelling of the ribbon theft ten years later in 
Rousseau’s Reveries of the Solitary Walker confirms that this writing has failed 
to achieve what it is meant to do as a confession.  
While in ‘Confession and Double Thoughts,’ Coetzee has considered de 
Man’s method of analysing Rousseau’s text through its hyperbolic style to be 
‘incautious,’214 he does concede to the Romantic ideology behind de Man that 
closely associates truth with beauty and hence believes that the style of a 
confession will be made more beautiful by its truthfulness. De Man and 
Rousseau can be taken to represent two different sets of autobiographical ideals 
that inform Coetzee as he writes the memoirs. The former demands the full truth 
in an elegant articulation, while the latter commands a beguiling intensity that is 
neither truthful nor beautiful. 
 
Boyhood: stating the truths 
Boyhood is an anti-Rousseau text in its pursuit of the truth. Coetzee states 
in ‘Confession and Double Thoughts’ that the goal of secular confession is ‘to 
tell the truth to and for oneself’ (291). It follows that to secure the ideal condition 
for confession, the narrative’s mode of address needs to be reworked to make 
sure that, at each moment, it is addressed to and written for oneself and avoids 
the excuses and exhibitionism of Rousseau. The account of the memory at 
Swartberg Pass does approximately achieve this tightness in which the readers 
find themselves outside the mode of address and assigned to no other role 
besides their reading. Coetzee’s autobiographical tales are able to strike Attridge 
as showing ‘no interest in making a case, in convincing the reader of the 
unimpeachability of his motives or the fullness of his repentance.’215  
However, if we strove to judge Coetzee’s fictional autobiographies under 
the standard of confession, we would need to acknowledge that alongside 
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Coetzee’s pursuit of self-truth lies a rival desire to be read and be remembered. 
While this is a minimal version of Rousseau’s wish to be recognised as 
extraordinary, it nevertheless similarly competes with the narrative’s claim to 
self-truth. To become interesting enough to be read, the writing arguably needs 
to be stylised beyond what truth requires. Maybe it has helped the cause of 
Boyhood that it displays some of the provincial charm and local colouring 
expected of a book from South Africa in vivid descriptions of scenes from the 
small town Worcester. This charm is turned on early in the memoir, for instance, 
in a passage describing the ochre dust that ‘whirls in under the door, seeps 
through the cracks in the window-frames, under the eaves, through the joints of 
the ceiling’216 and later in the account of boy’s early morning bicycle ride to 
school where ‘[w]ater murmurs in the roadside furrows, doves coo in the 
bluegum trees’ with the wind again ‘chasing gusts of fine red clay-dust before it’ 
(55). These picturesque scene settings are not one of Coetzee’s usual tricks and 
they seem to have been placed strategically to satisfy the readers’ expectation of 
a memoir. Perhaps the subtitle of the series, ‘Scenes from Provincial Life,’ also 
serves partially as a clever marketing ploy. Coetzee’s autobiographical series 
knows it cannot afford to be ‘too boring’ like du Biel’s forgotten work. 
To Collingwood-Whittick, though the sophisticated language of Boyhood 
commands ‘intense vividness, realism and emotional authenticity,’ its 
consummation betrays the involvement of the adult author and proves that ‘the 
measures taken by Coetzee to guarantee the inviolability of the narrated self’s 
truth have not been successful.’217 Collingwood-Whittick’s position would not 
come as a surprise to Coetzee as it is based on the assumption he identifies in 
Paul de Man’s criticism of Rousseau’s ‘panache’218: ‘that confession betrays 
inauthenticity when the confessant lapses into the language of the Other.’219 
Coetzee has reasoned subsequently in ‘Confession and Double Thoughts’ that 
ultimately in the confessional discourse, ‘[t]he only truth is silence’ (286). In our 
capacity as readers, we have to acknowledge that, without the narrative’s 
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minimal desire to be read and an assured narration, there would be no narratives 
worth reading. One can hardly read and enjoy Boyhood without making 
allowance for the involvement of this vital desire. In fact, if we shift into the 
reading mode of fiction instead of autobiography, this allowance becomes our 
most natural mode of reading.  
The construction of Boyhood and Youth may be better described as a 
realisation of the middle voice, a mode of address that Coetzee takes from 
Barthes and alludes to in his short essay ‘A Note on Writing.’ 220 Neither the 
active nor the passive voice, the middle voice occurs when the subject of the verb 
is affected by the action signified by that verb. As Coetzee explains, ‘To write 
(middle) is to carry out the action (or better, to do writing) with reference to the 
self.’221 But the middle voice of these two autobiographical volumes is not based 
on the narrative’s grammatical structure, but is a result of their autobiographical 
mode and the use of third person pronoun. Most ‘he’s in Boyhood and Youth 
occur in active sentences, but the ‘he’ is always simultaneously the object of the 
imaginative writing. Given the fact this ‘he’ further has the same name as the real 
author, there is a triangle of relationship that repeats itself throughout the 
narratives. That is to say, the author creates a narrator, who follows the ‘he’ of 
the narrative, who is (or was) the author himself. This arrangement solves a 
central problem in autobiographical writing, where if the ‘I’ were used, the 
author, narrator, and the main actor would be falsely signified as one entity. The 
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mature author’s presence that Collingwood-Whittick finds inauthentic may in 
fact be a mark of Boyhood’s sincerity. 
In the readers’ perception, the image of each participant in this triangle 
changes in the present of the narrative as more stories are revealed. The character 
is lodged in the fictional force field of the narrative along with the author; both 
acting and being acted upon in the writing. The pairing of third-person pronoun 
and autobiographical concern enables Coetzee’s writing to create the undecidable 
subject position of the middle voice on a larger scale. 
In this dynamic and internal voice, the revelation of personal secrets has a 
markedly less dramatic overtone than in a scene of confession. The voice already 
half-knows the secrets it is revealing to itself as the author, though the writing 
then plays the indispensible role of giving them a public platform. For example, 
chapter four of Boyhood tells of the boy’s unintentional conversion to 
Catholicism because his teacher has only given him three choices, between being 
a Christian, a Roman Catholic or a Jew when his family is agnostic. The chapter 
opens unceremoniously as follows: ‘The great secret of his school life, the secret 
he tells no one at home, is that he has become a Roman Catholic, that for all 
practical purposes he ‘is’ a Roman Catholic.’222 Despite the repetition of the 
word ‘secret,’ this sentence reads almost as if it is not unveiling anything. The 
suspense before the secret is learned lasts only for one—albeit quite long—
sentence. At other times, the secrets of the boy are told even before they are 
identified as secrets, like his erotic feeling for the beautiful legs of the Afrikaans 
boys at school, which is described before the voice declares hyperbolically: ‘Of 
all the secrets that set him apart, this may in the end be the worst’ (57). 
Cumulatively, reading Boyhood gives the sense that all the untold stories from 
Coetzee’s life have been accessible to us all along and the narrative is merely 
arranging them into temporary displays one by one. This feeling originates, of 
course, because the voice simulates the position of the insider John Coetzee. 
The boy’s secret Roman Catholicism may not seriously challenge the 
self’s resistance to revealing its truth. For a more difficult revelation, we can take 
as a close look at the mealie grinder incident in Boyhood when, at the family 
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farm, the young John Coetzee hurts his brother David while playing around with 
a mealie-grinding machine. John convinces his younger brother to stick a hand in 
and proceeds to turn the handle until a finger of his brother is crushed. Judging 
by the serious consequence of this action and the boy’s callousness that is 
displayed, the event is arguably the most shameful one relayed in Boyhood. 
While the other secrets fall out almost effortlessly, the mealie-grinder incident is 
told in retrospect and past tense, wedged into the ongoing narrative of the 
brothers’ play at their aunt’s book press in Cape Town. In its present tense, the 
narrative describes how the brothers alternately place their hand inside the press 
while the other turns the screw to pin it down: ‘One or two more turns, he thinks, 
and the bones will be crushed. What is it that makes them forbear, both of 
them?’223 Then, the narrative suddenly reverts to the previous time when John 
did not forbear. 
The mealie-grinder episode suggests a considered response by Coetzee to 
Paul de Man’s critique of Rousseau’s confessions; that is, it addresses how to 
confess one’s crime simply and in full without overstepping into the role of the 
confessor via excuses and bring the confession to an end without relapse. There 
is some sign of resistance in the fact that the incident could have been told much 
earlier—chronologically it must have happened shortly after narrative begins—
yet it was withheld until three-quarters of the way into the book when another 
event occurs that softens its terror. The language that tells of the boy’s action is 
notably reserved in comparison with what has gone before it. Whereas we were 
earlier afforded plenty of insights into the boy’s mind, this bracketed past sticks 
to the referential and verifiable truth: 
While the grown-ups drank tea, he and his brother roamed 
around the farmyard. There they came upon a mealie-grinding 
machine. He persuaded his brother to put his hand down the 
funnel where the mealie-pits were thrown in; then he turned the 
handle. For an instant, before he stopped, he could feel the fine 
bones of the fingers being crushed. His brother stood with his 
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hand trapped in the machine, ashen with pain, a puzzled, 
inquiring look on his face. (119) 
Besides a brief account of a sensory experience—‘he could feel the fine bones of 
the fingers being crushed’ (119)—there is no mentioning of the boy’s interior 
thoughts and feelings. It is clear who did what and what happened with little else 
available. The only interpretation indulged by the narrative is the reading of the 
brother’s face, his ‘puzzled’ and ‘inquiring look’ that already asks obliquely for 
us: Why? I trusted you. 
 Much like Marion, the victim of Rousseau’s false accusation, John’s 
brother did not complain of being mistreated and has never been apologised to. 
Thus, the blaming could easily have been internalised by the boy into guilt and 
shame. However, Boyhood does not furnish us with that interpretation. Its 
language stubbornly stays on a relatively factual level despite several 
opportunities to become verbose: ‘He has never apologized to his brother,’ the 
narrative continues, ‘nor has he ever been reproached with what he did. 
Nevertheless, the memory lies like a weight upon him, the memory of the soft 
resistance of flesh and bone, and then the grinding’ (119). ‘Memory’ is an 
important word for Boyhood, referring to an experiential fact with no 
interpretative content in the way of ‘shame’ or ‘guilt.’ As no additional 
comments are offered, one is left guessing at the boy’s inner emotions while the 
narrative switches back to the present tense and pursue other avenues. Again 
Rousseau’s profuse confession offers an apt contrast of a language that cannot 
stop interpreting. Rousseau writes of the memory of his crime with plenty of 
inner feelings: ‘This cruel memory troubles me at times and so disturbs me that 
in my sleepless hours I see this poor girl coming to reproach me for my crime, as 
if I had committed it only yesterday.’224 
 There is an opportunity here to give a deconstructive reading of the fact 
that this mealie-grinder incident has been retrospectively inserted. One could 
argue that an excuse is being made for the offense—though who is making it is 
clearly problematic since the fictional narrating voice is neither Coetzee’s nor the 
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boy’s—by first relaying the book press event that shows how John and his 
brother have since moved on from that mistake and have established enough trust 
in each other to alternately entrust the other with the absolute power to crush 
another’s limb at the book press. In other words, the event is insinuated as being 
excusable because, from the memory of the grinding of bones, a lesson has been 
learned against physical cruelty. In essence, the juxtaposition of the two episodes 
can be deduced as the same excuse as one that Rousseau puts forward in his 
account of the ribbon theft, that the offense ‘has secured me for the rest of my 
life against any act that might prove criminal in its results. I think also that my 
loathing of untruth derives to a large extent from my having told that one wicked 
lie.’225 But as strictly descriptive accounts of two events, Coetzee’s version 
makes no claim towards the future since the narrative voice is still in the present. 
No promise is made or can be made of ‘I will never do or have never done this 
again,’ which more or less means that the interpretation that an excuse is being 
made has no foothold beyond these two specific events. The episode—as I am 
reluctant to call it a confession—ends, while, on the other hand, Rousseau’s 
expiating claim allows his confession to prolong itself endlessly. The latter 
unsurprisingly receives a revision in the ‘Fourth Walk’ of Reveries of the 
Solitary Walker, 226  where Rousseau confesses to having embellished many 
stories in The Confessions and offers yet another excuse for the falsehood. 
Outside the confessional mode, the narrative voice of Boyhood, which is 
realised as fundamentally tied to the sensibility of a young child yet without 
becoming his voice, has found a strategy that makes it possible to state the boy’s 
‘truth’ and observe a high level of unimpeachability. The distance afforded by 
the third-person narration means that, even when one does not agree with the 
boy’s perception of things, one cannot argue against the truth of his personal 
views. Sometimes the effect of the distance is irony, such as when the boy’s 
opinion on love is relayed: ‘He sees no sense in love. When men and women kiss 
in films and violins play low and lush in the background, he squirms in his seat. 
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He vows he will never be like that: soft, soppy.’227 At other times, the distance 
disappears into novelistic identification that momentarily collapses the separation 
of the selves, like the scene when the boy thinks of his mother dying: ‘He cannot 
imagine her dying. She is the firmest thing in his life. She is the rock on which 
he stands. Without her he would be nothing’ (35). This identification replaces the 
sense one usually finds in autobiographies of being taken into the author’s 
confidence. The boy/protagonist is no longer simply historical but is felt to be a 
symbolic figure, embodying a wider significance of a child’s relationship to the 
mother. 
What does the selection of Boyhood tell us about Coetzee’s ‘evolving 
purpose’ and about the kind of person he wishes to portray himself as? In fact, 
this question has already been given a satisfactory explanation by Coetzee within 
the text, an explanation which we can briefly retrace here. The first obvious 
choice Boyhood makes is that it chooses to depict a brief spell of about 3 years in 
Coetzee’s life when his family lived first in Worcester, according to Kannemeyer 
‘a sizable town… about 110 kilometres from Cape Town’228 where Coetzee’s 
father had secured a job with a successful canning company, Standard Canners. 
Then, near the end of the memoir, they move to Cape Town. The choice of this 
specific period is significant because, even though the Coetzee family often 
moved around during Coetzee’s earlier years while his father was enlisted in the 
war, the majority of Coetzee’s life up until his university graduation in 1961 was 
spent in the South African metropolis of Cape Town. The focus on Worcester 
thus becomes a deliberate brushstroke to convey Coetzee’s sense of himself as a 
permanent bystander of the dominant cultures, which is supplemented by the 
subtitle of the book ‘Scenes from Provincial Life.’ Coetzee has practised 
imagining his life story as ruled by a sense of ‘alienness’ since Doubling the 
Point, where he rehearses autobiographical writing in the third person:  
A sense of being alien goes back far in his memories. But to 
certain intensifications of that sense I, writing in 1991, can put 
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a date. His years in rural Worcester (1948-1951) as a child 
from an Afrikaans background attending English-medium 
classes, at a time of raging Afrikaner nationalism… by the age 
of twelve he has a well-developed sense of social 
marginality.229  
The boy’s estrangement is driven home through nearly all areas of his life in 
Boyhood. There is also Coetzee’s ‘provincial’ position largely in relation to the 
Western literary world, of which he feels he is a brainchild. For the Western 
world, South Africa occupies a provincial outpost. 
v 
 Considering that Coetzee’s novels attain a remarkable level of 
transparency through various means of self-interrogation, his first two fictional 
memoirs—Boyhood and Youth—stick out for their lack of self-questioning 
within the narratives. The autobiographical texts bear no trace of the self-
interrogating mechanism that pervades the rest of the Coetzean oeuvre. In the 
two fictional memoirs, the driving conflict is between what the external world 
sees and the shameful ‘truth’ felt by the self, and both are uncharacteristically 
stable by Coetzee’s standard. In Boyhood, in particular, the narrating voice 
mimics the confident manner of speaking of a self-important child whose 
judgements within his limited experience appear the only possible ones. 
Unequivocal declarations about the self abound. Take, for example, the 
following passage in which the narrative of Boyhood confidently describes the 
contrast between the boy’s home life and school life, a contrast that is then 
reasoned to be the source of his emotional predicament: 
At home he is an irascible despot, at school a lamb, meek and 
mild, who sits in the second row from the back, the most 
obscure row, so that he will not be noticed, and goes rigid with 
fear when the beating starts. By living this double life he has 
created for himself a burden of imposture. No one else has to 
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bear anything like it… From no quarter can he expect support. 
It is up to him to somehow get beyond childhood, beyond 
family and school, to a new life where he will not need to 
pretend any more.230 
Such causal language is common in autobiographies, but generally the link 
would stretch all the way to the moment of writing rather than, as in this case, 
residing in the thinness of the moment that is being related in the present tense. 
‘No one else has to bear anything like it’ is Rousseau-like in its self-importance, 
but here it is not a claim that goes beyond this boy of that time. In Rousseau’s 
The Confessions, one often finds such passages about childhood as the following: 
‘Who could have supposed that this childish punishment, received at the age of 
eight at the hands of a woman of thirty, would determine my tastes and desires, 
my passions, my very self for the rest of my life.’231 In Rousseau’s work, the 
future self always bears a definite outline that is connected to its past, but 
Boyhood’s choices of the present tense and limited perspective keep its future 
open. Youth and Summertime would carry this implication of openness to their 
final conclusions as they diverge greatly from the historical version of Coetzee’s 
life of the same period. 
It is curious that Coetzee does not bring over from his fiction the 
openness that results from the subject’s ability to question itself. It would be 
difficult to imagine any other characters of Coetzee—Mrs. Curren, Michael K or 
David Lurie, to name a few—as speaking in the unequivocal way of the young 
John Coetzee. But the result of its unreflexive stance is that Boyhood sheds all 
self-consciousness and devotes itself single-mindedly to the descriptive function 
of the prose, to the recording of the boy’s inner life with an intensity only 
available to a child. He is the living being that the narrative follows. It may be 
noted that the young John Coetzee is also the only child who has ever been the 
focaliser of Coetzee’s fiction and this unreflexive quality could be attributed to a 
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child’s naïve sensibility as much as to Coetzee’s meditation on the trope of 
autobiography.  
Near the end of Boyhood, the Coetzee family moves to the city of Cape 
Town. In the penultimate chapter, we are given a rapid-fire account of the rise 
and fall of Coetzee’s father’s new law practice in the city, delivered in a montage 
that reflects the way the boy has to piece together the events of the adult’s world 
from the names and words he overhears. The change of pace signals the end, in a 
sense, of his child-like—impetuous, innocent, fantastical—perception of the 
world. This end is cued by a scene of phantasmic parricide of the boy’s father, 
now disgraced and without a job, lying on his bed as his older son looks in to see 
his defeated old rival. Between the two, a war has been waged in the boy’s mind: 
‘For seven years that war has ground on; today he has triumphed.’ Yet the sight 
fills the boy with dread as it forces on him the closing of his childhood: ‘Unfair! 
he wants to cry: I am just a child!’232  
This event is followed by a remarkable passage that describes the boy’s 
growing sensitivity. The enclosed world of childhood opens a crack and allows 
him intermittent moments of clarity during which his personal dramas subside 
and, in a sentence that reminds us of Coetzee’s definition of grace, ‘he can see 
the world as it really is’ (160): 
In a moment like this he can see his father and his mother too, 
from above, without anger: not as two grey and formless 
weights seating themselves on his shoulders, plotting his 
misery day and night, but as a man and a woman living dull 
and trouble-filled lives of their own. The sky opens, he sees the 
world as it is, then the sky closes and he is himself again, living 
the only story he will admit, the story of himself. (161) 
This transition into adulthood, which is seen as concurrent with the ever-slipping 
attainment of self-truth, is never completed for Coetzee. To be an adult equals to 
know oneself, which is a journey he sees as longer than a lifetime. Later in 
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Youth, when the twenty-something John receives an unexpected news that a 
woman is pregnant with his child, the narrative registers a lingering juvenility: 
‘In his heart he does not feel himself to be more than eight years old, ten at the 
most. How can a child be a father?’233 Nevertheless, such moments of clarity are 
an ideal that Coetzee’s writings consistently push for through the limits of their 
embodied perspective—through ‘the only story he will admit.’  
 
III. Between truth and fiction: Youth 
As previously mentioned, there have been as yet no reports that Boyhood 
diverges from the truth—that is, apart from its commitment to the blinkered 
perception of a young boy.234 JC Kannemeyer’s biography of Coetzee also 
appears satisfied with the historical accuracy of this first autobiographical 
instalment judging from its reliance on Boyhood to supply the details of 
Coetzee’s early life, though it remains to be seen how stringent Kannemeyer’s 
standards are. Youth continues to include a selection of details lifted directly 
from its author’s life. For example, Coetzee’s jobs in England with IBM and ICL 
and his working conditions there are true according to Kannemeyer. On the other 
hand, Coetzee’s trip back to South Africa in 1963 where he rekindled an old 
friendship with Mauna Philippa Jubber and married her on 11 July 1963 is 
conspicuously left out, replaced by a fiction of his single life.235 
  It would take a degree of gullibility to believe the suggestion that in 
making this omission Coetzee is simply adhering to an intellectual experiment, 
expressed in his interview with David Attwell, to write an autobiographical 
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account where one is ‘constrained to respect’ a selection of facts. Surely a 
measure of guardedness—a resistance to full revelation—is involved in 
Coetzee’s decision to remove this chunk of his personal life while leaving the 
rest intact. Nevertheless, with that acknowledged, let me for the moment attempt 
to do justice to Coetzee’s design and address this problem from within the logic 
of his work. The omission can be explained through Coetzee’s above statement 
as well as his commitment to the ‘evolving purpose’ of autobiographical writing. 
Youth is ostensibly made of a different commanding passion than Boyhood. Its 
trajectory recalls the genre of Künstlerroman, the life story of artist, as it depicts 
John Coetzee’s solitary life in London from 1962 to 1964 as he goes from one 
mundane job to another while clandestinely harbouring a desire to become a 
major poet.  
As in Boyhood, Youth maintains the formula of the third-person, present 
tense and free indirect style that limits the narrative within the thin unreflexivity 
of John’s perception of the world, neither openly ironising nor validating his 
passions. Coetzee’s ‘evolving purpose’ and facts selection have naturally 
changed from the first book. Whereas Boyhood may be said to depict the boy 
John’s preoccupation with his various secrets, John of Youth is preoccupied with 
the search for passionate love, for the girl who will be ‘[t]he beloved, the 
destined one,’ and who he believes will help unlock his artistic creation: ‘being 
dull and odd-looking are part of a purgatory he must pass through in order to 
emerge, one day, into the light: the light of love, the light of art.’236 From the 
twentieth century on, the Künstlerroman’s imperative has often been to establish 
a poetic identity that stands out from the rest of humanity.237 The genre’s 
definition of an artist’s development is one in which the artist realises his 
individual destiny of greatness in defiance of the mass. This seems to be the 
belief espoused by John in Youth: ‘it is the lot of the artist to suffer obscurity and 
ridicule until the day when he is revealed in his true powers and the scoffers and 
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mockers fall silent.’238 This desire to become one day an artist provides Youth’s 
specific focus and dictates its coloured perspective.  
By taking the artistic ambition as its overt guiding sentiment, Youth 
makes it a mission to construct a self that is self-actualised, that is fulfilling a 
unique destiny utterly independent of its historical position and of its familial 
connections. For María López and Kai Easton, John can be seen retracing the 
path of his modernist masters who have found in exile the intellectual freedom 
with which to create.239 Youth announces that ‘[h]e is proving something: that 
each man is an island; that you don’t need parents.’240 In fact, the last name 
‘Coetzee’ never occurs once in the story apart from its appearance on the cover. 
The protagonist is only referred to as ‘John.’ Conveniently, this also provides an 
excuse with which Coetzee can elide the more un-poetic and ordinary part of his 
life that does not fall in line with the image of the alienated artist—and, one 
imagines, also a part that is too close to the bone to be publicised. With the help 
of Kannemeyer’s biography, it can be observed that most of the glaring 
omissions made in Youth concern John’s more meaningful relationships such as 
his visit to South Africa, his marriage and family. The relationships that are left 
in Youth are fleeting and misjudged, but they also leave John the artist as the 
unchallenged central figure. Additionally, the narrative closes itself off in the 
summer of 1964 when Coetzee is twenty-four years old, not long before his 
brother David’s move to London in 1965 and their mother’s subsequent visit to 
the UK in the same year. Conveniently, this ending also cut out Coetzee’s 
successful bid for various doctorate scholarships at American universities in 
1965, including the University of Texas at Austin where he finally went.241 
Within this small window, Youth presents a familiar story of a young man 
in revolt against his socially-inscribed yet undeniable identity. However, through 
Coetzee’s use of the third person singular and nothing less than conscious, 
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mindful writing, the book manages to depict this youthful denial levelly and with 
barely any trace of qualifying judgements. The text maintains a singular fidelity 
to the fever of that pocket of time and, in the process, manages not to descend 
into the self-perpetuating cycle of concealment and revelation that plagues 
autobiographical writings that are driven by shame.  
John of Youth appears to be chasing after a life away from the world’s 
turmoil—the idealistic life of a poet. With self-admitted abhorrence for things 
South African, he flits along the Anglo-European literary heritage of Ezra Pound, 
T.S. Eliot, Ford Madox Ford, Henry James and various other writers, yet an 
incongruity lingers between his sensibility and theirs. The reason he gives for his 
preference of poetry over prose makes clear the ongoing suppression of his own 
immediate context: ‘In poetry the action can take place everywhere and 
nowhere… Prose, on the other hand, seems naggingly to demand a specific 
setting.’ 242 When John’s first experiment with prose yields a story sets in South 
Africa, he is ‘disquiet[ed]’ and dismisses its chance of success:  
[H]e sees no point in trying to publish it. The English will not 
understand it. For the beach in the story they will summon up 
an English idea of a beach, a few pebbles lapped by wavelets. 
They will not see a dazzling space of sand at the foot of rocky 
cliffs pounded by breakers, with gulls and cormorants 
screaming overhead as they battle the wind.243 
At the time of Youth’s publication in 2002, Coetzee was already a 
household name in the Western literary world. His best-known works such as 
Waiting for the Barbarians, Life & Times of Michael K, Foe and Disgrace had 
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already enjoyed immense success and accolades ‘despite’ their engagements with 
distinctly South African and colonial themes. Certain versions of Youth contain 
the blurb ‘Booker Prize-winning author of Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello’ and 
some bookstores even put an additional ‘Winner of the Nobel Prize’ sticker on 
their copies. This above quoted passage, then, can be easily recognised by 
readers who know even a basic background of the author as, if not quite ironic, 
then true only to a strictly limited sense. This provisionality of truth is, of course, 
the very condition of a Coetzean truth.  
 In the process of being faithful to its subject, the texts of Boyhood and 
Youth seem never about to get somewhere, never employing their truths in the 
service of one improvement or another. John’s constant talk of ‘rebirth’ and of 
his true talent being ‘revealed’ does not lead out of itself. Youth ends instead on a 
sombre note whose inevitability is rather reminiscent of Boyhood’s ‘the only 
story he will admit.’ The adult John feels that ‘he [is] locked into an attenuating 
endgame, playing himself, with each move, further into a corner and into defeat’ 
(169), unable to overcome the trappings of the self. López also identifies 
moments of Joycean epiphany in Youth that fail to develop into a transformative 
experience. In one, John experiences ‘ecstatic unity with the All’ and from which 
he emerges ‘refreshed, renewed’: ‘If he has not utterly been transfigured, then at 
least he has been blessed with a hint that he belongs on this earth.’244 López 
keenly notes that the passage contains ‘no irony or mockery,’ yet ‘its value and 
significance are so brief and evanescent as to have no effect whatsoever on 
John’s subsequent development,’245 and indeed the next chapter returns to the 
mundane with John advertising himself as a temporary house-sitter in order to 
save money on his accommodation.  
 The memoirs’ provisionality is consistent with what we find in Coetzee’s 
fiction, yet certain elementary differences can be identified between Coetzee’s 
autobiographical project and his other fictions. It would appear that 
autobiography and fiction are, for Coetzee, different interpretative approaches he 
can take towards the same core material, neither one necessarily more truthful 
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than the other. In Coetzee’s recently published discussion with the psychoanalyst 
Arabella Kurtz, he attests to a writerly sense of his memories’ malleability, that 
‘[t]o think of a life-story as a compendium of memories which one is free to 
interpret in the present according to the demands (and desires) of the present 
seems to me characteristic of a writer’s way of thinking.’246 Coetzee opposes this 
view to the belief that one’s past is fixed and immutable and to the idea of the 
one true story of ourselves that, sooner or later, will become obsolete with the 
changing time. Coetzee’s fictional memoirs offer a different product of his 
creative interpretations and we read in them moments that may have been visited 
by his previous novels, but with markedly different yields.  
Chapter twelve of Youth, for example, appears to paint the reversed 
perspective of Coetzee’s 1990 novel Age of Iron, which, as detailed in the 
previous chapter, is a letter lovingly written by a dying mother, Mrs. Curren, to 
her daughter who has permanently emigrated to America in defiance of South 
African apartheid rule. ‘She is like iron’, Mrs. Curren says, and ‘has made a 
vow’ never to return.247 From its first sentence, Youth’s chapter twelve recalls the 
tragic tension that provides the premise for Age of Iron between the blinding love 
of a mother and the idealism of her headstrong child. The chapter begins: ‘Each 
week a letter arrives from his mother, a pale blue aerogramme addressed in neat 
block capitals… Will his mother not understand that when he departed Cape 
Town he cut all bonds with the past?’248 As is the rest of Youth, this episode is 
told within the vehemence of John’s rejection of his past without either 
validating or invalidating it. The letters, ‘evidences of her unchanging love for 
him,’ are said to cause John ‘exasperation’ (98). Rather harshly, it is stated: 
‘What does she hope to achieve by her letters, this obstinate, graceless woman?,’ 
but she also affects him greatly as, fearing of his mother’s boundless grief, John 
resolves that ‘[a]s long as she is alive he dare not die. As long as she is alive, 
therefore, his life is not his own’ (99). 
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It is in a way startling to place John’s cold-hearted rejection in the context 
of Age of Iron’s many longing passages of a dying mother left behind in South 
Africa. Of these, the following are particularly heart-rending words from the pen 
of Mrs. Curren: 
[H]ow I longed for you! How I long to be able to go upstairs to 
you, to sit on your bed, run my fingers through your hair, 
whisper in your ear as I did on school mornings, “Time to get 
up!” And then, when you turned over, your body blood-warm, 
your breath milky, to take you in my arms in what we called 
“giving Mommy a big hug,” the secret meaning of which, the 
meaning never spoken, was that Mommy should not be sad, for 
she would not die but live on in you.249 
It is a startling connection because the two positions stem from the same 
imagination and memory bank in equally sympathetic a fashion. Each occupies 
its own textual space without yearning to be compared, contrasted, or reconciled 
into one ideal text. 
The autobiographical approach seems to be employed by Coetzee as a 
position utterly ensconced in the confines of the self, while his fictional 
endeavours begin with a promise of freedom to imagine an alternative position, 
which is not without eventual confines of its own. It would be presumptuous to 
read the two narratives together as advocating the moral efficacy of sympathising 
with another being since, as both Boyhood and Youth admit, the moments in 
which things are revealed as they are, can only be sustained momentarily, before 
one is forced back into ‘the only story one will admit.’ The fiction that housed 
Mrs. Curren inevitably ends. Additionally, Coetzee’s novels are in general highly 
cautious of laying claims to the representations of actual others, relying instead 
on creating fictional beings. In fact, apart from her letter writing, Mrs. Curren 
cannot be said to resemble Coetzee’s mother at all. They hold vastly different 
political opinions. Mrs. Coetzee as described in Youth appears to be relatively 
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sympathetic to the Afrikaners’ government: ‘She thinks South Africa is 
misunderstood by the world. Blacks in South Africa are better off than anywhere 
else in Africa. The strikes and protests are fomented by communist agitators.’250 
Mrs. Curren, contrarily, is unequivocally full of disgust for the regime. 
How does this specific discovery of recurring autobiographical motifs 
affect our experience of Coetzee’s works in a larger sense? For me, its value lies 
in the affirmation we get that the irrational, unintentional, uncontrollable element 
has been a part of Coetzee’s work from its conception. While Coetzee has often 
been lauded for accommodating the irrational forces of alterity in his fiction,251 
one harbours a suspicion that these insights may have been reached by means of 
the rational, that Coetzee’s well-formed novels are ultimately a triumph of 
thought and reason to grasp even their antithesis, and that the only reason why 
we cannot easily get behind them is because they have managed to out-think us 
most of the time. At times, it feels well nigh impossible to get beyond the 
intentionality of the Coetzean oeuvre, to find a truth that—to borrow a phrase 
from Michael K—comes ‘unbidden, in the course of events, when you least 
expect them.’252 Coetzee’s autobiographies are revealing yet exceedingly crafted, 
and this extends even to the J.M. Coetzee Archive at the University of Texas and 
to J.C. Kannemeyer’s biography, on which Coetzee still leaves his mark by 
personally providing access to his papers and then putting Kannemeyer in touch 
with people to interview.253 I should add that the phrase quoted from Michael K 
belongs to a passage in which K compellingly asks if one can tell the truth by the 
manner of its arrival—that is, is an effortless truth necessarily truer than the ones 
that have large amounts of work behind them? Yet this pointed question seems 
not enough to quell the suspicion of the reader, as well as of the self-conscious 
Coetzee himself, that his oeuvre may be too overwrought for truth. 
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Against this backdrop, the recurrence of certain autobiographical details 
in Coetzee’s writing reveals the decisive influence of the irrational and 
unintentional in his work. As in his novels, Coetzee’s fictional memoirs contain 
multiple passages in which one senses the author’s intellectual and linguistic 
interpretations circling around traumatic experiences that lie outside the closed 
systems of his medium. By an inner imperative, it seems, he is impelled to keep 
attempting to capture them. When autobiographical references crop up in the 
novels, one can still optimistically assume that ‘J.M. Coetzee’ is making use of 
his experience for art; but here in the openly autobiographical writing, his own 
figure is trapped inside the text along with his given name, lapped around by the 
family and places from his life, and by the contingencies from the past that he 
has no command over. In essence, the irrepressible return of Coetzee’s personal 
experiences in his writing may be said to be his saving grace from self-
consciousness. It is finally what he does not create or intend, the body-soul from 
which he seems unable to escape. 
South Africa is one of the main presences that challenge the authority of 
J.M. Coetzee. Following Youth’s relating of his mother’s letters, a small 
paragraph reads: ‘South Africa is like an albatross around his neck. He wants it 
removed, he does not care how, so he can begin to breathe.’ But immediately 
after comparing the country to his albatross, we find out that John regularly 
follows the Manchester Guardian, a British newspaper that, he says, never fails 
to report on the atrocities in South Africa: ‘Reading the Manchester Guardian, 
he can at least be sure he knows the worst.’254 A little later on still, we read that 
while researching for his Master’s dissertation, John takes pleasure in ‘dipping 
into books about the South Africa of the old days… it is his country, the country 
of his heart, that he is reading about’ (137).  
v 
The irrational side of John Coetzee is brought out with remarkable clarity 
in the memoirs, which allows me to thematise it more directly than with the 
novels. The contradiction of John’s reading what he wishes to forget requires no 
digging to discern. John’s illogical action is casually displayed without any 
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resistance or panache. As with the confessions, no self-conscious explanation or 
analysis accompanies the contradiction. Throughout the volume, no neurotic tics 
are allowed to muddy the current of the telling, which admirably strains to 
remain as empty and impersonal as possible no matter how embarrassing certain 
memories in Youth may be. We see John’s loss of control clearly and often, and 
given the autobiographical catch, we also perceive the part of the author that is 
not an unaffected and enlightened entity.  
Both Boyhood and Youth can be said to devote themselves to the truths of 
the evolving self—to the task of facing them squarely, that is, without wincing 
and even with occasional humour. While I have been focusing on the memoirs’ 
articulation of resistant truths that marks the confessional, the memoirs also 
contain many lighter moments. Attridge rightly notes that certain episodes of 
Boyhood and Youth are ‘extremely funny,’255 while at other times the stories of 
John’s embarrassments can be ‘painful to read,’ which are where ‘the protocols 
of confession are most severely tested’ (160). What produces the comic effect is 
not always easy to pinpoint, but it would not have been possible without the 
equable narrative voice. The comic in Coetzee is not marked by a lighter tone, 
for its delivery is always deadpan, but by some absurd contradictions with what 
we know beyond the characters’ blinkered perspectives, certain passages tickle, 
while the others come across as troublingly real.  
In Boyhood, the boy’s allegiance to the Russians during the Cold War is 
thoroughly funny. The particular chapter states early on: ‘Preferring the Russians 
to the Americans is a secret so dark that he can reveal it to no one. Liking the 
Russians is a serious matter. It can have you ostracized.’256 These hyperbolic 
statements must have felt true in the boy’s mind—we all have ridiculous 
convictions in our childhood—but to adults’ eyes, they are humourous. As the 
chapter draws on, the matter’s seriousness does become more understandable, 
since this unusual opinion alienates the boy from his immediate society: ‘Then 
came the realization, from the disapproval of his parents, from the puzzlement of 
his friends, from what they reported when they told their own parents about him: 
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liking the Russians was not part of a game, it was not allowed’ (28). But the 
impression made by that pure comic beginning remains indelible and it troubles 
one’s attempt to define the memoir by its confessional impulse. 
Arguably, the narrative work to maintain an untroubled surface may exist 
in some of Coetzee’s novels as well, but, there, it is much less conspicuous since 
the author and his character are separate people; David Lurie, for instance, can 
only be distinct from J.M. Coetzee. If any commonality happens to exist, the 
separation will still triumph by, among other things, the book’s belonging to the 
bracketed-off genre of fiction. What is remarkable about the autobiographical 
undertaking is that, unlike what we find in his novels, the experience implicates 
the author of the writing much more directly and, thus, it imparts a materiality 
simply unavailable within the myth of free-floating fiction or the allegories of 
political fiction. This elemental force provided by a referent in reality is 
especially palpable in such episodes as the ones concerning the memory of 
Coetzee’s mother, in which we are faced with raw emotions that no amount of 
thinking has been able to resolve, and of which interpretations can be thrown at 
tirelessly in different works, without any of them mastering the primitive 
experience. Through his family line and his heartland, as figures in writing as 
well as living truths, Coetzee can be said to experience most profoundly the limit 
of himself and his intellectual prowess.  
In the end, however, the rational, unclouded voice of both Boyhood and 
Youth is one of the fictions that eventually cease to be. A scene towards the end 
of Boyhood powerfully captures the embodied finitude of this clear vision. It 
depicts John’s mother’s levelled, unsympathetic gaze at her son. The mother is 
described as washing the dishes when 
[s]he turns from her chore; her gaze flickers over him. It is a 
considered look, and without any fondness. She is not seeing 
him for the first time. Rather, she is seeing him as he has 
always been and as she has always known him to be when she 
146 
is not wrapped up in illusion. She sees him, sums him up, and 
is not pleased. She is even bored with him.257 
Whether or not the boy is correct about his mother’s thought at that moment, the 
unceremonious unmasking of self-truth by another’s gaze is what the boy 
particularly dreads. The thought that the clarity and totality of understanding 
which is sometimes granted to him can also occur in another, especially in his 
mother who loves him unconditionally, gives him a terrible fright: ‘He fears her 
judgement. He fears the cool thoughts that must be passing through her mind at 
moments like this, when there is no passion to colour them’ (161). 
The rational gaze exposes his bare and imperfect self that is in every 
sense outside his control; it strips him down without coaxing and without mercy. 
His mother has seen his vulnerable beginning, has ‘had a life before he came into 
being’ (162) so the ‘enlightened’ version of her verdict will surely be more than 
he can withstand: ‘This is what he fears from her, from the person in all the 
world who knows him best, who has the huge advantage over him of knowing all 
about his first, most helpless, most intimate years’ (161). Much more deeply felt 
than the mealie grinder episode, this scene is Coetzee’s confession of his fear of 
cold judgement and, thus, of losing narrative control in no uncertain terms. One 
can rewrite this confession in the hyperbolic and autobiographical style of 
Rousseau that: this fear has secured Coetzee for the rest of his life against any 
writing that might prove uncharitable in its portrayals. But in a Coetzean 
universe, it may be better to say that the fear provides embodied meaning to his 
fiction’s deep sympathy for imperfect protagonists as it connects his narrative’s 
sympathy to the person of John Coetzee. 
 Would that judgement by Vera Coetzee, if it had been expressed, really 
be the truest truth about John that is unobstructed by the blindness of the self? If 
we take to heart our preceding discussion of Coetzee’s oeuvre, the answer would 
most likely be no, since the cold light of rationality always reveals a partial truth, 
not the embodied truth, and Mrs. Coetzee is bound to have a blindness of her 
own. But coming from Coetzee himself, can that formulation be trusted when its 
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alternative—the rational judgement—is professed here to constitute young 
Coetzee’s greatest fear? In one sense, Boyhood and Youth can be seen as another 
attempt by Coetzee to ensure control over the story of his own life, a way of 
protecting it from the cold gaze of unknown biographers who have no reasons to 
be charitable in their accounts. Replacing others’ cold gaze with his own, 
Coetzee gives us truths that do not have the softness of his fiction, but have the 
definition and clarity that make possible the confession of his life’s 
vulnerabilities. 
 
IV. A return to Rousseau: Summertime 
 Summertime turns against the first two memoirs’ lucid voice. If it had 
continued the work of its predecessors and found a way to bring the truth-telling 
to an end, one could say that the objective view of oneself at a point in time is the 
goal of Coetzee’s fictional autobiographies. But instead, the truth-telling act of 
the self ends with Youth. In direct contrast to the neatness of the voice in 
Boyhood and Youth, Summertime offers a confusing polyphony of voices that 
appears to have been assembled after John’s death, though by whom it is not 
made clear. The book is made up of a selection of John’s notebook sketches for 
the third memoir and the transcriptions of five interviews with people who knew 
him—lovers, friends, colleagues and a cousin—conducted after his death by a 
British biographer named Mr. Vincent. In the background of each section is the 
figure of John’s widower father, strangely featureless in comparison to the other 
characters. From the interview with Martin, John’s former colleague at the 
University of Cape Town, we get the confirmation that John had in fact meant to 
compose a third memoir in the same third-person singular format as Boyhood 
and Youth, but did not finish it. So with Summertime, Coetzee has devised a 
situation where mortality—the true limit of the body-soul—has interrupted the 
work of truth-telling by the self. 
 Attwell keenly observes that the impersonal voice found in Boyhood and 
Youth is ‘not an a priori quality inherent in a work of art, nor is it simply a 
function of the aesthetic. It is an achievement, an effect of labour in which the 
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self is partially but not wholly buried beneath the superstructure.’258 By contrast, 
the disorganised narration of Summertime can be viewed as Coetzee’s 
alternatively imagining the disintegration of the self-control that had been 
holding up the crystallised narratives of Boyhood and Youth. Instead of control, 
Summertime exhibits a crafted haphazardness. Instead of royalty to truth, it is 
driven by the inventiveness of a fictioneer. One finds that biographical details of 
the characters and their dramatic scenes together are mostly made up, even when 
this does not feel necessary. For example, the third ‘memoir’ contains an 
interview with Coetzee’s female cousin who is obviously the same person as the 
young cousin Agnes in Boyhood, but here her named is inexplicably changed to 
the untrue ‘Margot.’ The most glaring changes again concern Coetzee’s family. 
Coetzee’s mother was actually still alive all through the 1970s while Coetzee 
himself was married with children. Kannemeyer sums up the situation succintly: 
‘anybody who reads Summertime as “truth” will have been gulled.’259  
Given the extensive fictionalisation, one suspects that Coetzee is 
exploring in fictional form a question he raises at length in his exchange with the 
psychoanalyst Arabella Kurtz in The Good Story, 260  whether the Freudian 
conviction that the truth can set the patient free, is accurate. In the 
correspondence, carried out around the time of Summertime’s publication, 
Coetzee asks: ‘is the truth the only avenue to freedom? Will a version of the 
truth… not do equally well, if the goal is to get the patient back on the rails’261 
He contrasts this psychoanalytic goal with the notion of poetic truth which is ‘in 
part a matter of internal consistency, elegance, and so forth – in other words, a 
matter of satisfying autonomous aesthetic criteria’ (7-8). By these definitions, 
Summertime interestingly belongs to neither camp, being neither truthful nor 
elegant. It challenges both Freud’s truth-as-freedom and the poets’ truth-as-
beauty with a life’s death, at which point the question of truth in autobiography 
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that so preoccupied J.M. Coetzee ceases to be meaningful. In other words, the 
third memoir imagines the limited shelf life of the autobiographical enterprise 
that has ruled the Coetzee’s oeuvre for so long. It shows the stories of John 
Coetzee gradually becoming instead the prerogative of other living body-souls 
and their access to his unfinished, fragmentary works; and allows us to ask a 
non-autobiographical question about whether these non-autobiographical texts 
also contain some truth-value, and, if so, of whom. 
Like its precursors but in an even more striking way, the narrative of 
Summertime invokes no single author figure. According to its premise, its 
revelations are made possible by the author’s death—Barthes’s famous death of 
the author perversely made real. While some critics have construed that the 
biographer Vincent is responsible for putting together Summertime,262 several 
details in the book problematise this attribution. For one, Vincent’s full name is 
not provided to compete for authorship with ‘J.M. Coetzee’ on the book’s cover. 
When Vincent gives an extended narrative portrayal in his interview with John’s 
cousin Margot, it is shown in an unfinished state. The authority of this particular 
writing is further diminished by his interview repartee with Margot, who 
expresses strong reservations about the piece: ‘You can’t write that. You can’t. 
You are just making things up.’263 In addition, Summertime opens with a page 
titled ‘Author’s note’ that precedes all the chapters and is presumably written in 
Coetzee’s own voice, thanking the people who have helped him with the book.264 
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This is an unusual set-up for Coetzee, since in his other works of similar 
experimental nature such as Diary of a Bad Year and Elizabeth Costello, the 
appreciations have always been expressed at the end under the more 
conventional heading of ‘Acknowledgements.’ Therefore, the appearance of 
‘Author’s note’ at the beginning can arguably be perceived as a gambit to 
immediately cast doubt over Vincent’s authorship status. In fact, the person 
behind Summertime’s arrangement and presentation is closer to the fictional one 
we find in Age of Iron—that is, a completely featureless and discreet messenger. 
And like that novel, this collection of writings feels hardly meant for our eyes. 
Despite the role of Vincent the biographer being kept in check, he 
nevertheless represents a strong oppositional position to the fictional principle 
that underpins Boyhood and Youth. Vincent believes that the extensive fictional 
writings by J.M. Coetzee obstruct our view of his personal truth. He points to the 
fictionalisations that pervade even the personal documents that John Coetzee 
leaves behind265 and contends that ‘if you want the truth you have to go behind 
the fictions [the documents] elaborate and hear from people who knew him 
directly, in the flesh.’266 That truth for Vincent has to be accessed in the real 
world outside of writing in order to touch on actual emotions rather than fictional 
ones. His biography is meant to ‘reveal a very different person’ from John’s 
public image of ‘a cold and supercilious intellectual’: ‘not necessarily a warmer 
person, but someone more uncertain of himself, more confused, more human’ 
(235). Vincent also describes the sum of Coetzee’s oeuvre as one ‘massive, 
unitary self-projection’ (226), which he hopes to provide an alternative to. 
But Vincent is only one part of Coetzee’s posthumous picture. 
Summertime, in fact, deconstructs Boyhood and Youth not with the figure of 
Vincent, but with the body-soul’s death. The book gives death the credit of being 
the eventual deconstructor, with the true power to dissolve the authoritative voice 
                                                
265 Vincent contends that ‘[w]hat Coetzee writes [in his letters and diaries] 
cannot be trusted, not as a factual record—not because he was a liar but because 
he was a fictioneer. In his letters he is making up a fiction of himself for his 
correspondents; in his diaries he is doing much the same for his own eyes, or 
perhaps for posterity’ in Coetzee, Summertime, 225. 
266 Coetzee, Summertime, 226. 
151 
of the preceding volumes. In this final instalment, John’s life sprawls out without 
a unifying narrative voice to give it an appearance of clarity. The various voices 
that replace the author’s are made to appear more haphazard than usual. 
Questioned as to how he settled on his five interviewees, the biographer Vincent 
gives an answer that reveals a mixture of John’s lingering control and 
happenstance:  
Basically I let Coetzee himself do the choosing. I simply 
followed up on clues he dropped in his notebooks – clues as to 
who was important to him at the time. The other criterion you 
had to meet was to be alive. Most of the people who knew him 
well are, as you must know, dead by now. (217) 
The foregoing clarity of Boyhood and Youth appears in the new context provided 
by Summertime to have been relying on a vitality that has now run its natural 
course. Of the third memoir, only the unfinished sketches are left, and these are 
further diluted by interview transcriptions of people who are not John Coetzee. 
Both the sketches and the interviews, we are asked to believe, have not been 
fully stylised. One effect of this immediacy is that it highlights the prior 
autobiographical writing’s deliberateness. At the close of most notebook 
sketches, the late John Coetzee has written notes to himself suggesting how to 
later edit them, such as ‘To be expanded on: his father’s response to the times as 
compared to his own; their differences, their (overriding) similarities’267 or 
‘Caution: Avoid pushing his interest in Jesus too far and turning this into a 
conversion narrative’ (13), which hints at the work that went into creating the 
transparency of the first two volumes. 
A comparison between the accounts of John’s notebook sketches and the 
interviews shows the omissions Coetzee might have made in his 
autobiographical writing even before the fact of its distortion of history. The 
drafts for the third memoir in Summertime cover a period of time that overlaps 
with the interviews, that is, between 1972 and 1975. However, the sketches 
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completely fail to mention the four female interviewees with whom John has 
been romantically connected, while including only Martin, the male colleague, 
referred to by his initial MJ. Most of the notebook excerpts concern John’s 
lukewarm relationship with his father, Jack Coetzee. We can surmise that the 
third memoir is meant to have the father-son relationship at its centre, and as its 
final evolving purpose.  
From the interviews, we find out that John in South Africa continues to 
be awkward in his relationships with women as he was in the England of Youth. 
There is a deeply embarrassing episode when John asks Julia to make love with 
him in time to a Schubert string quintet so that they will learn ‘what it had felt 
like to make love in post-Bonaparte Austria’ (69). The episode ends with the 
frustrated Julia throwing a plate at John. John also doggedly pursues the 
Brazilian ballerina Adriana, registering for her dance class only to cause a scene 
when he touches her on the cheek.268 Yet none of these scenes, which could 
easily have been included in the brutally honest Youth, manages to leave a trace 
on the notebook sketches for the third memoir.269 
The most significant absence overall in Summertime is John’s father, 
whose shadowy presence haunts nearly all the interviews and drafts, yet whose 
inner life remains inscrutable to the end. He comes and goes without leaving any 
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impression. John of Summertime notes that he ‘finds it hard to detect what his 
father cares about… If he could solve the mystery of what in the world his father 
wants, he might perhaps be a better son.’270 Through the unknown figure of the 
father, Summertime is ruled over by a gap in knowledge that contradicts the 
distilled confidence of the preceding two memoirs. That the father is the 
unknown here also prompts one to wonder if Jack Coetzee has ever made it into 
Coetzee’s novels in the way that Vera Coetzee did at least in Age of Iron. While 
there is no method external to J.M. Coetzee to positively answer this question, 
my own sense is that no characters seem to come close to the despondent father 
of Boyhood and Summertime. By directing the reader’s attention to the father’s 
absence in the fiction, the third memoir imagines the lives that the subject may 
have failed to acknowledge in his own obsessions. Its writing testifies to the 
thought that, no matter how well written and truth-directed a life story may be, 
the writing subject is bound to overlook or ignore something, or mortality will 
intervene before he gets there. 
John’s estranged relationship with his father continues the memoirs’ 
dynamic engagement with the genre of the confession. In one of the undated 
fragments, John recalls a time when, at the age of sixteen, he scarred the surface 
of his father’s favourite Renata Tebaldi record out of spite against his father. In 
contrast to Boyhood and Youth, the account may be said to be an unsuccessful 
confession with a false and over-the-top tone. Worse still, if we compare its 
content to available external facts, the confession looks to be factually false. In a 
1991 lecture, later published as ‘What Is a Classic?,’271 Coetzee mentions that he 
does not come from a musical family: ‘At home we had no musical instrument, 
no record player’ (9). He relates that, at fifteen, he listened to music from the 
radio or from whatever drifted in from his student neighbours’ gramophone (9). 
This clashes with the story in Summertime that Coetzee’s father returned from 
war service—the return occurred in 1945, according to Kannemeyer, when 
Coetzee was five years old—‘with a new found passion for opera’ and ‘bought a 
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gramophone, their family’s first.’272 The father is additionally referred to in the 
memoir as ‘Corporal Coetzee’ (248), but Kannemeyer relates that ‘Jack had 
never advanced beyond the rank of lance-corporal’ though young John Coetzee 
often omitted the ‘lance’ when talking to his friends.273 If one of these accounts 
is false, the lecture and Kannemeyer’s biography obviously have more credibility 
than the deeply fictional memoir.  
For the first time in Coetzee’s fictional memoirs, the narrative voice in 
this fragment identifies its utterance as a confession and has remarkably 
Rousseau-like characteristics. From his repeated returns to Rousseau’s The 
Confessions in various articles and lectures, we have already seen Coetzee’s 
significant resistance to the widespread critique of the truthfulness of Rousseau’s 
confessions. Rousseau’s work clearly has an irresistible intensity that continues 
to fascinate Coetzee, a fascination that Attwell picked up on and subtly proposed 
to Coetzee in their interview in 2002. 274  Attwell asks Coetzee whether 
Rousseau’s exuberant text might not suggest ‘exactly the kind of creative self-
invention that contemporary identity politics might admire,’ but Coetzee limits 
himself only to saying: ‘On the subject of Rousseau, let me merely say that I 
have not got to the bottom of Jean-Jacques yet, and, given the lack of nuance in 
my knowledge of French, probably never will.’ 275  
The confession in Summertime may provide Coetzee’s most sensitive 
engagement with Rousseau yet. By lapsing into the style of Rousseau, Coetzee 
concedes to its living mystical power. While The Confessions’s inauthentic tone 
and factual inaccuracies mean that it has often been shown in a bad light under 
the scrupulous examinations of scholars, yet despite having been repeatedly and 
conclusively proven to contain untruths and self-deceptions, Rousseau’s 
confessions somehow survive better than many more ‘truthful’ and 
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psychologically aware autobiographical writings. Freudian psychological clarity 
and poetic beauty might not be all there is to the task. 
Without mentioning Rousseau, John’s confession in Summertime is full 
of the Frenchman’s marks. The voice of this episode throws away all the reserve 
and unreflexivity of Boyhood. After detailing how he secretly defaced his 
father’s record with a razor blade, John of Summertime wails: ‘For that mean and 
petty deed of his he has for the past twenty years felt the bitterest remorse, 
remorse that has not receded with the passage of time but on the contrary grown 
keener.’276 This is unmistakably the language of Rousseau’s The Confessions. As 
we have seen, Rousseau writes similarly of his ribbon theft: ‘I took away with 
me lasting memories of a crime and the unbearable weight of a remorse which 
even after forty years, still burdens my conscience. In fact the bitter memory of 
it, far from fading, grows more painful with the years.’277 
The adult John manages to find a similar compilation by the same artist 
upon his return to South Africa, and timidly plays it for his father: ‘He wanted 
his father’s breast to swell with that old joy; if only for an hour, he wanted him to 
relive that lost youth, forget his present crushed and humiliated existence.’278 But 
his father shows no recognition: ‘Tebaldi had, it seemed, lost her charms’ (250). 
On the other hand, the language of John’s guilt grows more fervent. It is said that 
John has wanted, but has not the courage, to express ‘a full confession’ to his 
father. Using the first person to address his father, John gives in fully to the 
confessional impulse in an imaginary scene of confession: 
Forgive me for deliberately and with malice aforethought 
scratching your Tebaldi record. And for more besides, so much 
more that the recital would take all day. For countless acts of 
meanness. For the meanness of heart in which those acts 
originated. In sum, for all I have done since the day I was born, 
and with such success, to make your life a misery. (250) 
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The pages that depict John’s guilt towards his father are emotionally irresistible 
if rationally impeachable. One can easily imagine de Man dissecting this portion 
with the same arguments he has used on Rousseau. Similarities with Rousseau’s 
account include John’s self-important presumption that he has destroyed his 
father’s life. Rousseau also exaggerates his crime of false accusation in this 
manner with no apparent logical support: ‘I may have ruined a nice, honest, and 
decent girl, who was certainly worth a great deal more than I, and doomed her to 
disgrace and misery.’279 
With its crude confessional tone, the writing of Summertime’s John in 
this part feels more emotionally immediate and intimate than in Boyhood and 
Youth. It has an unseemly yet affecting overspill of emotion that recalls passages 
from Mrs. Curren’s letter to her estranged daughter in Age of Iron, particularly 
the passage quoted earlier in this chapter where Mrs. Curren writes feverishly: 
‘How I longed to be able to go upstairs to you, to sit on your bed, run my fingers 
through your hair, whisper in your ear as I did on school mornings…’280 Perhaps 
this sense of vulnerable intimacy has something to do with both being writings 
purported to be meant for no-one’s eyes. It may be enabled by the fact that both 
texts are so wrapped up in fictionalisations that they can hardly be attached to the 
distant and authorial J.M. Coetzee. Whatever the reason, Summertime’s 
confession reminds us that Coetzee’s fictionalisation is, for him, what procures 
the body-soul’s vulnerabilities. These sensitive truths shy away from the harsh 
light of his truth-directed discourse and, therefore, have only limited presence in 
Boyhood and Youth. While Summertime’s confessional section is capped off with 
another author’s note that signals the return of the author’s calculating intellect 
and douses the emotional authenticity of the preceding confession: ‘Theme to 
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carry further: his father and why he lives with him,’281 yet despite all the reasons 
to find the section false, it might yet have the staying power of Rousseau’s text. 
The limit of the transparent narrating voice becomes even clearer in the 
final undated fragment that closes Summertime, which sees its return. The 
fragment concerns Jack’s laryngectomy for his larynx cancer, a condition that 
also afflicted the real Jack Coetzee in his final years. John is informed that after 
the surgery his father will not be able to speak and will need someone to take 
care of him. An unfeeling narrative voice relays John’s thought in response to 
this news and ends Summertime with the following passage:  
He is going to have to abandon some of his personal projects 
and be a nurse. Alternatively, if he will not be a nurse, he must 
announce to his father: I cannot face the prospect of 
ministering to you day and night. I am going to abandon you. 
Goodbye. One or the other: there is no third way. (266, 
emphasis original) 
In this transparent voice, there are only two practical choices: between taking 
care of the father or abandoning the father. Whatever confusions may arise in the 
subject’s mind is of no consequence; ultimately he has to make a decision 
between these two choices—that is the simple, irrefutable truth. In this voice of 
utter clarity there is no room for the softer, more conflicting sentiments that may 
be going through John’s mind like love, anger, remorse, or fear. This might have 
been the reason why one finds no love or kindness in Youth nor does the boy of 
Boyhood love anything unconditionally but the unfeeling Voëlfontien farm. The 
failed confession of Summertime provides the occasion that shows Rousseau’s 
The Confessions to be an emotionally richer discourse than one might first 
realise. The question left for the readers to decide is whether Coetzee’s Scenes 
from Provincial Life has what it takes to survive like Rousseau’s. 
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Conclusion 
Coetzee’s intellectual interest in autobiography, which began to emerge 
with ‘Confession and Double Thoughts’ in 1982, has been present in his writings 
for more than two decades. But the representation of its fading out in 
Summertime reveals just how committed Coetzee is to what I have been 
describing as the living and dying body-soul in his narratives. It is the 
fundamental reality that Coetzee seems to accept and allow to dictate his 
thematic interests. In the interview with Attwell quoted from earlier, Coetzee 
emphasises that ‘the statement that all writing is autobiography is itself 
autobiography, a moment in the autobiographical enterprise. Which is a 
roundabout way of saying that [it]… [does] not exist outside of time and outside 
of my life story.’282 Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime are different stories from a 
life that, in characteristic Coetzee’s fashion, all gesture at their own limits and 
eventually at their collective limit as a series of autobiographical writing. But an 
equally important point to appreciate is that these narratives are openly under the 
influence of a body-soul and its position in specific time and situation—e.g., of 
South Africa, of lineage, of death—which is to say that they have a basis in a 
dimension of reality that is irrefutable. While they may be nothing more than 
records of a life that hope to live on under the auspices of their readers, it may be 
enough to be nothing less. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Writing evil, reading the body-soul:  
‘The Problem of Evil’ and The Master of Petersburg 
‘While she has less and less idea what it could mean to believe 
in God, about the devil she has no doubt.’283 
The above admission by the eponymous protagonist Elizabeth Costello from the 
chapter ‘The Problem of Evil’ strikes me as an incidentally apt summary of many 
of Coetzee’s narratives. Coetzee’s novels do not tend to support or construct any 
coherent system of ethics—religious or secular—that does not, later on in the 
narrative, become incompatible with the advancing situation. The interrogations 
performed by these novels tend to put the protagonist and the reader in a position 
where they grow to have ‘less and less idea what it could mean to believe in 
God.’ But the latter part of the quote that ‘about the devil she has no doubt’ 
touches on a truly fascinating aspect of Coetzee’s fiction: its representations of a 
certainty that is grounded in the characters’ own experience. In this specific 
instance, without any empirical or theoretical justification, Costello’s belief in 
the existence of the devil is upheld by the authority of her personal experience of 
sexual abuse in her youth. So ‘The Problem’ turns this seemingly abstract 
statement about God and the devil into a matter of Costello’s experiences as a 
living being. 
If we compare ‘The Problem’ with academic studies on evil in literature, 
we can better identify the problem of expression that ‘The Problem’ cleverly 
addresses. Ewan Fernie’s monograph The Demonic: Literature and 
Experience284 provides an excellent study on literary representations of the 
demonic. Fernie proposes that evil is an intrinsic part of lived experiences, which 
is also the very venue of the narrative fiction that he studies. As Fernie elegantly 
reasons, the demonic is the force that keeps things grounded in reality because:  
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… the Devil is a tempter, because he is a possessor of souls, 
because he gets right into the bone marrow, making it plain that 
moral objectivity and pride are unsustainable, that life is a 
struggle in which we are always messily and ambivalently 
involved (6). 
Costello and Fernie are clearly in agreement on the reality of evil in the world 
and the unsustainability of moral codes, but in his impersonal academic voice, 
Fernie is forced into making floating statements whose authority rests mainly on 
their eloquence and affective language—e.g., ‘the Devil is a tempter,’ or the 
insidious ‘he gets right into the bone marrow.’ If one feels inclined to agree with 
Fernie, it will not be because he convinces, but rather that his writing covertly 
evokes our comparable experience of being invaded by sinfulness. Against a 
hostile audience, however, this writing is unlikely to have its desired effect. 
Within ‘The Problem’ we also see Costello struggling to impart her fear of the 
devil to her confident lecture audience, but Coetzee’s lecture-narrative in which 
she is housed is alternatively upfront about the experiential basis of this fear. 
The power of this honesty alone, however, may not be able to match the 
unsavoriness of Costello’s specific message. Even more than ‘The Philosophers 
and the Animals’ discussed in Chapter One, ‘The Problem’ shows Costello 
presenting an argument that contradicts the democratic zeitgeist of the time of its 
delivery as a reading in 2002. In the fiction-as-lecture, Costello brazenly 
insinuates self-censorship against representations of gratuitous violence right in 
the stronghold of the democratic world, which is built on the values of liberty 
and the Enlightenment’s self-confidence. On top of this, ‘The Problem’ does so 
with little of the rhetorical charm or the clarity that its real-world author is 
clearly capable of. While in general I see Coetzee’s oeuvre as striving for clarity, 
some of Coetzee’s texts are important exceptions. They seem to take on highly 
resistant, even ugly, human experiences that run counter to the rules of clarity 
and grace—experiences of what Costello calls evil and which deserve an equally 
crooked expression to match. These works require us to reach deeper into our 
own experience to stay with them. In these cases, the confidence in the body-soul 
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becomes pivotal as the last connection between the reader and the text. This 
chapter will examine two of Coetzee’s narratives that fall into this 
uncommunicative category. In addition to Elizabeth Costello’s ‘The Problem of 
Evil’ (2003), it will discuss The Master of Petersburg (1994), 285  arguably 
Coetzee’s most abstruse and unpleasant work to date. Searching always for their 
body-souls, my readings of these texts will attempt to uncover truths that are 
unfortunately without beauty. 
Both narratives, for vastly different reasons, give a sense that they are 
avoiding stating their embodied truths. The negative early reviews that both texts 
spawned reveal the formidable challenge they pose to our establishing easy 
sympathy with them. James Wood recalls that, after Coetzee read out ‘The 
Problem’ at a conference on evil in Amsterdam, it ‘instantly sparked heated 
commentary’ in the lecture theatre. 286  As a reading text, one reviewer of 
Elizabeth Costello confesses to feeling ‘cheated’ by ‘The Problem’ which 
‘promises drama and then withholds it.’287 The Master of Petersburg is also 
levelled with a similar charge of a lack in vitality. Among Coetzee’s oeuvre, the 
novel has arguably been met with the most negative reviews in the press. Its 
distortion of the real Fyodor Dostoevsky’s biographical facts confounds and 
often irritates early reviewers, who also find the novel’s style and 
characterisation disagreeable. A common complaint is that the novel consists of 
many probing passages that fail to gather force and an unlovable, sombre and 
self-obsessed protagonist. In The New York Times, Patrick McGrath finds The 
Master ‘dense and difficult, a novel that frustrates at every turn.’288 Jan Dalley of 
The Independent says it is ‘more admirable than enjoyable: a powerful 
intellectual construction, but without the pulsing immediacy of Coetzee’s 
previous work.’289 Also in The New York Times, 18 November 1994, Michiko 
Kakutani writes scathingly that ‘one finishes The Master of Petersburg 
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marveling at the waste of Mr Coetzee’s copious talents on such an odd and 
unsatisfying enterprise.’290 While harsh, these candid responses truthfully capture 
the unpleasantness that the readers have to confront in reading the novel. To 
appreciate these two unlovable and opaque texts will require more than our 
reading of what it says. It may require us to look beyond their surface with 
forbearance.  
In his essays on rhetoric and English syntax from the 1980s, Coetzee has 
argued that certain grammatical constructions in the English language can 
embody unconscious meanings of the author.291 This group of essays show 
Coetzee’s keen interest in the capacity of linguistic structures to let slip an 
alternative truth of the human unconscious, which may have been intentionally 
or unintentionally withheld by the sentence’s conscious signification. Coetzee’s 
prime example of a sentence structure that carries such unconscious truth is the 
short passive sentence in which the agent of the action, usually indicated after the 
preposition ‘by’ in a full passive sentence, is omitted. The short passives, says 
Coetzee, are sometimes resorted to as a means of withholding the full truth; for 
example, in the sentence ‘I felt compelled to steal’ where the real desire of the ‘I’ 
behind the action is glided over. In ‘The Agentless Sentence as Rhetorical 
Device,’ Coetzee argues against an adoption of condemnatory stance towards 
these concealments. For him, such an occurrence is ‘as good a syntactic 
representation of the unconscious as one is likely to find.’292 Later in ‘The 
Rhetoric of the Passive in English,’ Coetzee again reiterates that grammatical 
choices that on the surface appear to work against truth and clarity should not be 
dismissed offhand as they ‘are items of unconscious knowledge, though not 
unconscious in the same sense that grammatical competence is.’293 
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The underlying contentions of Coetzee in these essays—first, that clarity 
is not always the pinnacle of linguistic expression; and second, that it is 
sometimes possible to read in the style of the writing the unconscious tier of the 
truth—are helpful in appreciating the more abstruse section of Coetzee’s oeuvre. 
While it is feasible to dismiss ‘The Problem’ or The Master as minor blips in 
Coetzee’s otherwise consistent career, I would argue that, if we accept that all 
texts contain living truths, there is sufficient reason to persevere in feeling our 
way into the states of mind that engender resistant narratives and gain further 
insight into life beyond our immediate experiences. The singularity of each of 
Coetzee’s narratives means that these two texts convey dark experiences that can 
be found nowhere else in Coetzee’s oeuvre and to which we are also vulnerable. 
To do justice to them, however, requires more active reading on our part, before 
we can recognise in their so-called stylistic faults and disagreeable assertions a 
subterranean level of embodied meaning. Coetzee’s emphasis on the unconscious 
truth in his essays already gives us an affirmation of his own sympathetic 
outlook for writings that are not stylistically pristine. If Coetzee can maintain his 
interest in the being behind writing into his most technical and disembodied 
explorations, there are likely to be signs of the unconscious in his own writing as 
well. 
While my readings of ‘The Problem’ and The Master uncover different 
truths from each text, the interpretative approach used is uniform in that I look 
outside the narrative’s direct significations for stylistic embodiments of the body-
soul and its difficult experience. In ‘The Problem,’ Costello’s old-fashioned 
argument against representations of atrocities is made clear from the story’s 
outset, but additionally interpreting the piece as one would a work of fiction 
reveals a more sympathetic side to her case. Peripheral details such as the setting, 
the repetitive sequence of the story, or certain sentence structures suggest that 
Costello’s argument is embedded in her unspoken personal experience of 
gratuitous violence, which has convinced her of the human susceptibility to evil. 
The story poses an intriguing question to the current generation of people in the 
metropoles, whether their confidence in human ability to learn from 
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representations of violence depends not on their lucky fortune of being spared 
first-hand experience of atrocities. 
 The final part of this chapter looks at The Master, which, as a novel, 
offers no clear argumentative thrust that can aid our reading. Most critics take the 
point of the novel to be a commentary on art; that the novel uncovers the dark 
side of the creative process through the artist figure of Fyodor Dostoevsky. Such 
accounts, however, seem to ignore the novel’s vital connection to Coetzee’s own 
experience of loss. The narrative’s many correspondences with the premature 
death of Coetzee’s son play only an extraneous supporting role in these 
interpretations. With the help of new biographical works on Coetzee, I advance 
an alternative view that the novel can be most coherently experienced as an 
autobiographical writing out of Coetzee’s conflicting emotions following his 
son’s death. It may be best read not as fiction as it deviously purports to be, but 
as a partly non-fiction writing in which Coetzee recruits the freeing influence of 
fiction for his own ends.  
 
I. ‘The Problem of Evil’ 
Representing absolute depravity 
The circumstances of Coetzee’s presentation of the Costello story ‘The 
Problem of Evil’ are reported by Joseph Frank as follows: 
In the spring of 2002, a colloquium on the problem of evil, 
sponsored by the Nexus Foundation, was held at the University 
of Tilburg in Holland. I was a member of a panel assigned to 
discuss Dostoevsky, certainly the modern writer who has given 
the thematic of evil one of its most powerful expressions. Our 
keynote speaker was the South African novelist J. M. Coetzee, 
who, however, sprung a surprise on his fellow panelists and the 
audience by not speaking about Dostoevsky at all. Instead, he 
read a sketch supposedly written by a fictional personage 
already familiar from his work, a writer like himself named 
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Elizabeth Costello, presumably invited to speak at precisely 
such a conference on precisely such a topic.294 
This sketch would be turned into Lesson 6 of the novel Elizabeth Costello titled 
‘The Problem of Evil,’ in which Costello struggles in vain to convey the gravity 
of evil to a roomful of capable modern folks within the parameters of the lecture. 
In the chapter, the reader meets Elizabeth Costello in Amsterdam as she 
is about to give a talk at a conference on the problem of evil. Costello’s subject 
for her talk is a real novel of much more limited reputation than Dostoevsky’s, 
namely, The Very Rich Hours of Count von Stauffenberg295 by the British-born 
author Paul West, a historical fiction about the unsuccessful July 1944 
assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler. Costello wants to communicate that 
West’s passages depicting the hangman’s intimidation of the arrested plotters 
and the execution scene, is playing with evil to the detriment of its author and the 
readers. However, to her dismay, she finds out that Paul West is also attending 
the conference, which prompts her to re-examine her thinking in a panic before 
finally deciding to go forward with the talk.  
 The significance of Costello’s message is, however, overshadowed by her 
mental and linguistic struggle that communicates its own subterranean meaning. 
Her argument appears didactic and obscure unless one pays attention to the 
evidence of her struggle in the grammatical patterns and word choices, the 
overall effect of which we can call the ‘style’ of the text. In ‘The Problem of 
Evil,’ Costello’s objection against West’s writing is also not directed against the 
story he tells, for she knows the full story of the July plotters prior to reading this 
novel, but against ‘a wanton, an obscene energy that exceeded his commission’ 
in West’s hangman.296 The objection is similar to the one that the monk Tikhon 
from Dostoevsky’s Demons (also translated as The Possessed and The Devils) 
has for the written confession of Dostoevsky’s greatest sinner Nikolai Stavrogin. 
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Tikhon suggests ‘corrections’ for Stavrogin not in the content but to ‘touch up 
the style a little.’297  
Between Costello and West, we have two texts that are quarreling about 
their imperfect styles rather than about what they each says. The style of ‘The 
Problem’ has a content of its own beside its rational argument, and this gradually 
comes through as Costello’s battle to find a clear exposition for her idea is met 
with repeated failure. The chapter has a repetitive structure that forces the reader 
to hear Costello’s one argument multiple times under different formulations. Her 
proposition—which, for brevity, I will summarise as being that certain things are 
better not to be read or written of—is first introduced in its raw stage as a 
sensation that overwhelmed Costello when she first read West’s novel, especially 
during his unsparing description of the execution of the conspirators: ‘… that is 
what she read, sick with the spectacle, sick with herself, sick with a world in 
which such things took place, until at last she pushed the book away and sat with 
her head in her hands.’298 In that moment, one word springs to Costello’s mind 
unbidden: ‘Obscene! she wanted to cry but did not cry because she did not know 
at whom the word should be flung’ (158). The word ‘obscene’ marks the very 
beginning of Costello’s tortuous attempts to capture the experience in words 
clear enough for the lecture hall. Immediately as the task begins, Costello 
perceives that this most basic speech act of exclaiming is already unbefitting the 
experience. Its utterance casts extraneous meaning of an accusation that she does 
not intend. How will she string sentences of subject-verb-object together for a 
lecture not knowing who is ultimately responsible?: ‘It is like a wall that she 
comes up against time and again. She did not want to read but she read; a 
violence was done to her but she conspired in the violation. He made me do it, 
she says, yet she makes others do it’ (180-81).  
The problem persists as Costello continues her attempts to better 
articulate the experience. To illustrate her struggle, I will trace the different 
reiterations of her thesis statement and outline the conditions of their occurrence. 
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Costello’s negative reading experience is soon transformed clumsily into more 
general statements: ‘Specifically, she is no longer sure that people are always 
improved by what they read. Furthermore, she is not sure that writers who 
venture into the darker territories of the soul always return unscathed’ (160). 
However, when Costello arrives in Amsterdam and finds out that West is also 
participating in the conference, she is afraid that her lecture will be taken as a 
mean-spirited ‘personal attack’ on a fellow writer (161), and starts to rewrite and 
rethink the foundation of her lecture in panic. In the process, she poses a question 
to herself of how she, as a fellow novelist who has no qualms about speaking of 
violence in abattoirs, is any different from West, to which her answer is another 
reiteration of the thesis: ‘The answer, as far as she can see, is that she no longer 
believes that story telling is good in itself, whereas for West,… the question does 
not seem to arise’ (167). Then, in the auditorium prior to her lecture, Costello 
approaches West to warn him of what she is about to say and again rehearses her 
argument to him: ‘I think writing like that can harm one. That is what I intend to 
say in my lecture’ (172). Right after this private talk during which West utters 
not a word, the thesis is reiterated again in the lecture itself. ‘That is my thesis 
today,’ announces Costello, ‘that certain things are not good to read or to write’ 
(173). At the lecture closes, Costello proceeds to think to herself in yet a another 
set of terms that ‘[d]eath is a private matter; the artist should not invade the 
deaths of others’ (174). Throughout, Costello never ceases to feel uncomfortable 
about the expression she gives, and her tortuous review process grinds on as she 
leaves the auditorium and locks herself in the toilet cubicle, after which the 
chapter ends. 
The examples I give by no means exhaust Costello’s reproduction of her 
thesis, but they should be enough to demonstrate that while the different 
formations seem to point towards the same meaning, something else is also 
registered in the language. The opinion expressed in ‘The Problem of Evil’ when 
read as an argument may come across as overly rigid and even morally 
questionable in its one-sided treatment of West, but this rigidity is somewhat 
counteracted by the stylistic insecurity. The subjects and predicates of Costello’s 
many thesis sentences shift around wildly between the writer, the reader, the act 
168 
of reading and writing, the scene of violence and its representation. There seems 
no beginning or end to what she is articulating, and her overreliance on 
signalling phrases such as ‘specifically,’ ‘this is what I intend to say,’ or ‘that is 
my thesis today’ read as deeply ironic.  
How this uncertain form developed in relation to ‘evil’ can be tracked 
back to Coetzee’s meditation on the representation of torture in his essay ‘Into 
the Dark Chamber: The Writer and the South African State,’299 collected in 
Doubling the Point. This essay is a provocative companion reading to ‘The 
Problem of Evil,’ which comes sixteen years later, since, side-by-side, the two 
works set off how Coetzee’s thinking on the representation of extreme violence 
has subtly evolved over the years.  
 ‘Into the Dark Chamber’ (1986) comes out of a bleak phase in South 
African history when mass protests and boycotts against apartheid were met with 
increasing government brutality. The essay expresses despair towards the 
possibility of just representations of torture in the climate of violent oppression. 
In the essay, Coetzee produces a passage from Nadine Gordimer’s Burger’s 
Daughter300 as an example of a nuanced representation of feverish violence, one 
that remains alert to the moral problem of representation. Importantly, Coetzee 
observes that the Gordimer passage looks back to a famous horse-flogging scene 
from Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment and it is possible to consider 
Coetzee’s thinking here as enlisting a panoramic view of violence, ranging from 
nineteenth-century Russia to twentieth-century South Africa, which I will then 
connect to the twenty-first century via Costello’s ‘The Problem of Evil.’  
Set in mid 1970s apartheid South Africa, the particular passage from 
Burger’s Daughter describes the protagonist Rosa Burger as she witnesses a 
drunken black man—‘black, poor, brutalized’301—madly flogging a donkey that 
is attached to a cart, which nevertheless stands still. Burger considers intervening 
but is suddenly troubled by the thought of being taken as one of the whites who 
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care more about animals than black people. It is a scene piled over with multiple 
levels of violence—of Burger’s white gaze on black brutality, of the systematic 
white on black oppression of the apartheid, and of humans on animals.  
Amidst this thicket of sinister connotations, Burger feels powerless to 
make a positive impact and her description of the scene reflects a unique view of 
depravity that has gone beyond human agency and history:  
Not seeing the whip, I saw the infliction of pain broken away 
from the will that creates it; broken loose, a force existing of 
itself, ravishment without the ravisher, torture without the 
torturer, rampage, pure cruelty gone beyond the control of the 
humans who have spent thousands of years devising it.302 
Gordimer’s vision here particularly grabs the imagination of Coetzee. After this 
point, Gordimer abandons full sentences, choosing instead to write in short, 
broken noun phrases, which soon break down further into semi-coherent listing 
of all the world’s sufferings, including and going beyond South Africa:  
The entire ingenuity from thumbscrew and rack to electric 
shock, the infinite variety and gradation of suffering… the 
camps, concentration, labor, resettlement, the Siberias of snow 
or sun, the lives of Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Kathrada, 
Kgosana, gull-picked on the Island... (208) 
Gordimer’s great insight lies in her capturing of the experiential truth about the 
kind of violence that cannot be explained within a logical/causal discourse. This 
is syntactically reflected in Burger’s inability to make subject-verb-object 
connections to speak of the scene. In fact, her attempt to make sense of the 
experience within the realm of human history and the human ability to 
comprehend brings about a tragic consequence. The senselessness of the 
experience ‘gone beyond the control of the humans’ temporarily shatters 
Burger’s belief in the possibility of a shared humanity in the country. Soon after 
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the incident, she boards a plane and leaves South Africa; unable, as Coetzee puts 
it, ‘to live in a country that poses such impossible problems in day-to-day 
living.’303 This passage led Coetzee of 1986 to conclude that this ‘world of blind 
force and mute suffering’ comes out of ‘the inner reaches of Dante’s hell, beyond 
the scope of morality’ and ‘beneath good and evil’: ‘For morality is human, 
whereas the two figures locked to the cart belong to a damned, dehumanized 
world’ (367). 
What Burger touches on seems synonymous with what Costello in ‘The 
Problem of Evil’ would refer to as ‘absolute evil.’304 There is a comparable 
passage in the latter text that develops this theme of disengaged atrocity. The 
passage tells of how Costello was maliciously beaten by a man in her youth: ‘It 
was her first brush with evil. She had realized it was nothing less than that, evil’ 
(165). Similar to Burger’s case, the writing shows a decisive break when the 
frustration of the man that was first understandable, turned into an inexplicable 
frenzy—into autonomous violence for the sake of itself. While the scale of the 
violence may not be comparable to the sufferings witnessed and endured under 
apartheid South Africa, their nature feels consistent, and part of Costello’s 
message seems to be that evil remains a constant threat into the twenty-first 
century: ‘In these unfamiliar times Satan is still feeling his way, trying out new 
contrivances, making new accommodations’ (180). 
Coetzee’s description of the absolute experience in ‘The Problem’ 
nevertheless takes a decisively different approach from Gordimer’s. His syntax is 
never allowed to break down, but is precariously negotiated. The writing is 
exceedingly careful to avoid assigning blame to any single person or particular 
action, but also to not allow the agents to evade their full responsibilities. The 
account begins with this striking double-passive sentence: ‘When she was 
nineteen, she remembers, she allowed herself to be picked up on Spencer Street 
bridge’ (165). Costello is portrayed as simultaneously the co-agent and the object 
of this car ride. This is followed by a coherent report of the facts of the event, 
chronologically organised and told entirely in neat subject-verb-object sentences: 
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When she resisted, he tried to force her… To begin with he 
took it as a game. Then he got tired of that, or his desire tired, 
turned to something else, and he began to hit her seriously. He 
lifted her off the bed, punched her breasts, punched her in the 
belly, hit her a terrible blow with his elbow to her face. When 
he was bored with hitting her he tore up her clothes and tried to 
set fire to them in the waste-paper basket. (165) 
As unseemly as it is to suggest, the beating Costello endured is continuous with 
the blows delivered to the Gordimer’s donkey or Dostoevsky’s mare. After a 
certain point, it ceases to be driven by the man’s frustration at the refusal of sex 
and becomes the unknown ‘something else.’ It is as gratuitous as the beatings of 
animals that do not get the carts forward. From the position of Costello, the act is 
divorced from fathomable causes and effects, which leads her to appeal to evil as 
an ‘absolute’ and ‘ancient’ energy. 
However, the traumatic incident does not come across in Coetzee’s text 
as entirely incomprehensible or monstrous. This impression is due, I think, to the 
matter of style—of the regular sentence structures and their exceptionally clear 
relationship with one another. Costello even manages to make a limited logical 
sense of the incident that allows her to put it behind her: ‘By fighting him off she 
had created an opening for the evil in him to emerge, and it emerged in the form 
of glee, first at her pain… then in the childish, malicious destruction of her 
clothes’ (166). The subject of discussion is still the insidious and unknown evil 
energy, but the sentence’s regular structure provides a measured sense of control 
that is absent from Gordimer’s text.  
This structure is enabled by the uncertainty of the term ‘evil,’ which like 
Coetzee’s use of ‘sympathy,’ is left intentionally unsubstantiated. It is the sort of 
irrational concept that would have been distrusted by Burger’s humanist 
discourse as well as by the expectations of an academic conference. Yet 
rationality cannot accommodate what Burger or Costello has been through and, 
as Burger’s case has shown, it is not a match to the irrefutable reality of 
experience. Resting on Gordimer’s heartbreaking portrayal, Coetzee in 1986 
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concedes to the powerlessness against an absolute violence. He ends ‘Into the 
Dark Chamber’ by idealistically looking forward to better days to come:  
…when humanity will be restored across the face of society, 
and therefore when all human acts, including the flogging of an 
animal, will be returned to the ambit of moral judgment. In 
such a society it will once again be meaningful for the gaze of 
the author, the gaze of authority and authoritative judgment, to 
be turned upon scenes of torture. When the choice is no longer 
limited to either looking on in horrified fascination as the 
blows fall or turning one’s eyes away, then the novel can once 
again take as its province the whole of life, and even the torture 
chamber can be accorded a place in the design.305 
Coetzee’s contention in ‘Into the Dark Chamber’ that morality is tied to the 
humanly comprehensible seems to have undergone a fundamental change by the 
time that he writes ‘The Problem of Evil.’ In the latter work, the ambit of 
morality has been pushed beyond human understanding to include 
incomprehensible embodied experiences. Meanwhile, the author figure has lost 
the belief in her authority. The human as embodied in Costello is openly small 
and weak, and susceptible to evil. 
In order to show how the inclusion of the hazy term ‘evil’ allows an 
intelligible structure to be formed without compromising on the complexity of 
the event, I will go back to examine more fully Costello’s final explanation of the 
abuse. The sentence ostensibly forges the cause and effect of the incident, yet the 
blame for what happened is indeterminable in the same manner as we find in 
Burger’s description. The sentence in full is as follows: 
By fighting him off she had created an opening for the evil in 
him to emerge, and it emerged in the form of glee, first at her 
pain (‘You like that, do you?’ he whispered as he twisted her 
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nipples. ‘You like that?’), then in the childish, malicious 
destruction of her clothes.306 
The causal link is perfectly intact from beginning to end, while the man’s 
revolting words are safely contained in parentheses. Without the term ‘evil,’ this 
link would have been broken, leaving only incommensurable images of the 
fighting, the malicious glee and pain. If Burger’s stunted passages convey an 
unbearable helplessness, Costello’s speech seems to espouse a stubborn belief 
that there might still be some meaning left in acting and speaking in this day and 
age, which could partially explain her appearance in Amsterdam. 
 
 ‘The weak vessel’ 
Since Costello feels herself to occupy a position of weakness in relation 
to absolute evil, she is doubtful about the climate of confidence in a twenty-first 
century cosmopolitan society. This tension is set off in ‘The Problem of Evil’ by 
the backdrop of an academic conference in the practical city of Amsterdam 
(which is of course also a simulacrum of Coetzee’s actual participation at the 
Nexus conference). Costello’s objection to the historical novel of Paul West, The 
Very Rich Hours of Count von Stauffenberg, seems also to be based on the 
ground of its air of human pride, as Costello exclaims in a moment of passion 
during her lecture: ‘What arrogance to lay claim to the suffering and death of 
those pitiful men!’ (174).   
Interestingly, we can perceive West’s self-confidence not only from 
Costello’s charge against him, but also from the claim that West himself has 
made in a published response to Coetzee. Following the publication of Elizabeth 
Costello, West released an article in the July issue of Harper’s Magazine in 
2004307 where he asserts the ‘license of human creative power’ that grants artists 
access to all areas of human life. Rather unexpectedly, West’s response actually 
verifies Costello’s impression of his work. As his conclusion, he writes: 
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As I enter the arena of myth after life as a tax-paying novelist, 
we have all only just scraped the surface of what might seem a 
horrendous problem: starting out to denounce horror, yet, in the 
end, accepting it for its own sake, because it further reveals the 
unique license of human creative power. No matter how gross 
the outcome, it will be better to paddle around in its dark 
miasma than to ban it. So long as men are vile, so can art be 
too, and maybe even after. (93) 
Clearly, Costello and West are categorically different in their views of the 
writer’s work and his/her authority. While Costello is beset with doubts 
regarding the intrinsic value of her writing, West deems it his writerly duty to 
expand the frontier of human knowledge into every possible direction. While 
Costello considers tentatively that certain things are not good to know, for West 
to know is always good.  
Not only do their beliefs clash, but Coetzee has also given Costello’s 
speech a style of expression that is fundamentally different. The truth for the 
authoritative West, like his assertion of the ‘unique license of human creative 
power,’ seems always to be in the declarative mode that will remain unchanging 
through time and space. But Costello often feels the need to qualify her truth, 
plot out its limits, and diminish her own authority. ‘She should never have 
come,’ Costello thinks at one point, ‘Conferences are for exchanging thoughts… 
You cannot exchange thoughts when you do not know what you think.’308 As a 
lecture by Coetzee, ‘The Problem of Evil’ solves this problem of expression by 
staging the conflict in a narrative, but Costello is still left to contend with the 
inhospitable environment that demands intellectual clarity from her.  
Costello senses her personal limits deeply in the words she utters. In the 
most critical moment of Costello’s lecture where she tries to summarise her 
points, her speech is bogged down by the repetitions of ‘I take’ and ‘I believe’ or 
‘I do not believe’ that occur in nearly every sentence: 
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I take seriously the claim that the artist risks a great deal by 
venturing into forbidden places: risks, specifically himself; 
risks, perhaps, all. I take this claim seriously because I take 
seriously the forbiddenness of forbidden places. The cellar in 
which the July 1944 plotters were hanged is one such forbidden 
place. I do not believe we should go into that cellar, any of us. I 
do not believe Mr West should go there; and, if he chooses to 
go nevertheless, I believe we should not follow. On the 
contrary, I believe that bars should be erected over the cellar 
mouth, with a bronze memorial plaque saying Here died … 
followed by a list of the dead and their dates, and that should 
be that. (173) 
It would have been more in keeping with the lecture format if Costello had stated 
directly that ‘the artist risks a great deal by venturing into forbidden places’ or 
that ‘we should not go into that cellar, any of us.’ Instead, her insertion of the 
subjective qualifying phrases emphasises the close proximity of her speech to the 
private and contingent nature of her first reading experience.309   
As Costello continues to question her own discursive stance, she begins 
to find that the opinion she is airing in public may be entangled with her 
advancing age and waning virility—her particularly weak position as an old 
woman. Part of her distaste may come from the fact that ‘[s]he does not like to 
see her sisters and brothers humiliated, in ways it is so easy to humiliate the old, 
by making them strip, for example, taking away their dentures, making fun of 
their private parts’ (178). If she had read the novel in her youth, not knowing 
what old age feels like, would she have had the same reaction? What if she were 
a man, would she be able to face the writing squarely since, as she notes, there 
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are ‘[n]o womanly presences in the cellar business’ (181)? The further she gets 
from the experience, it seems, the less certain she is about what it means.  
Costello’s circumstances are particularly unpropitious to her intention. 
Apart from West’s presence, she is besieged by the self-confidence that 
permeates the auditorium populated by people who have lived most of their lives 
in a milieu of peace—the last full-scale war on European soil having ended 57 
years earlier. One male audience member gets up to suggest that Costello might 
simply be a ‘weak vessel’ who is not strong enough to face the scene of torture: 
‘Perhaps Mr West is made of sterner stuff,’ says the audience member to 
knowing smiles, ‘And perhaps we, his readers, are made of sterner stuff too. 
Perhaps we could read what Mr West writes and learn from it, and come out 
stronger rather than weaker, more determined never to let the evil return.’310 At 
this prompting, Costello is overcome by the feeling that 
…a limit has been reached, the limit of what can be achieved 
with a body of balanced, well-informed modern folk in a clean, 
well-lit lecture venue in a well-ordered, well-run European city 
in the dawn of the twenty-first century. (175) 
In this atmosphere of utter lucidity—free from the shadow of petty secrets, of 
devilish violence or of the darker recess of human souls—Costello realises that 
she is fighting a losing battle.311 Meaningful communication feels impossible on 
this unsympathetic ground where knowledge is clearly valued over sympathy. 
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Her response to the man’s question reinstates her position: that the terror of evil 
‘is something that can only be experienced. However, I am recommending to you 
that you do not try it out. You will not learn from such an experience. It will not 
be good for you’ (176). But she cannot get the message across. 
Coetzee makes the bright setting of the auditorium encroach further upon 
Costello’s experiential mode of thinking, intercepting between her and the touch 
of evil she was at first so sure of. Stepping off the stage, the unsettled Costello 
locks herself in a toilet cubicle to regain her private space, which was where the 
accursed reading took place. ‘Go back. Go back to Melbourne, to that Saturday 
morning,’ she urges herself. But the privacy and her train of thought are short-
lived. The cubicle door is raised off the floor, no doubt for the sake of public 
safety, and after a while Costello hears a child says in Dutch: ‘Mammie, er zit 
een vrouw erin, ikkan haar schoenen zien’—mummy, there’s a woman in it. I 
can see her shoes (181, my translation). This minor event epitomises the 
oppressiveness of the drive for clarity in the public space, which is felt most 
acutely by its less able members. ‘If she spoke the language she could enlighten 
the child,’ Costello thinks, ‘Because the older you get the longer it takes. 
Because sometimes you need to be alone’ (181).  
Interestingly, various first-hand accounts of the Holocaust speak of the 
existence of absolute evil312 with similar combinations of experiential certainty 
and intellectual doubt as Costello does. One remarkable example can be found in 
‘At the Mind’s Limits,’313 Jean Améry’s contemplative essay on his time in 
various Nazi concentration camps during the Second World War. Améry writes 
specifically about the fate of intellectuals such as himself at Auschwitz, as they 
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were a breed of men who fared the worst at the camp, being equipped with 
neither the practical skills of use to the SS guards nor the spiritual/political belief 
to contextualise their senseless sufferings. In that environment, they became in a 
very real sense the weak vessels among the prisoners. Améry felt betrayed by the 
impotency of his intellectual refinements. Acute hunger and exhaustion made 
child’s play out of his habits of intellectual ruminations, while the poetic lines 
that had once moved him now lost its power. ‘The word always dies,’ he writes, 
‘where the claim of some reality is total. It died for us a long time ago. And we 
were not even left with the feeling that we must regret its departure’ (20).  
Through this wretchedness, Améry arrives at an entirely opposite view 
from the confident audience member of Costello and from West. For him, there 
is nothing to be learned from the absolute wretchedness of the holocaust. He 
writes: 
We did not become wiser in Auschwitz, if by wisdom one 
understands positive knowledge of the world. We perceived 
nothing there that we would not already have been able to 
perceive on the outside; not a bit of it brought us practical 
guidance. In the camp, too, we did not become ‘deeper,’ if that 
calamitous depth is at all a definable intellectual quantity. It 
goes without saying, I believe, that in Auschwitz we did not 
become better, more human, more humane, and more mature 
ethically. You do not observe dehumanized man committing 
his deeds and misdeeds without having all of your notions of 
inherent human dignity placed in doubt.314 
If any positive can be drawn from the experience, Améry feels it to be the lasting 
damage inflicted on his intellectual arrogance. It has given him a ‘certainty that 
remains ever unshakable’ (20) that his rarefied intellectualisation is not that far 
off from play, and behind this opinion is an immensity of experience such that 
one can barely contend with. 
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II. Everything turned to another use: The Master of Petersburg 
Our discussion of evil in Coetzee’s fiction can only culminate in a 
consideration of his most demonic work to date, The Master of Petersburg. I take 
the novel to be a true anomaly in the Coetzean oeuvre. If Coetzee’s other novels 
can be jointly characterised by an overriding desire to achieve truth and an 
unshrinking confrontation with complex realities, The Master has contrarily been 
accused, and accuses itself, of bottomless perversions. 
The Master establishes a devious relationship with external reality, which 
is central to its perverse meanings. But for the time being, it is worth limiting our 
attention to within the novel’s covers, where we join the Russian author Fyodor 
Dostoevsky in 1869. Dostoevsky has just returned to St. Petersburg from his 
exile in Dresden, having received the news of his stepson’s premature death by a 
fall. In order to hide from his creditors, Dostoevsky travels under the false name 
of Isaev, thus pretending to be his stepson Pavel Alexandrovich Isaev’s 
biological father. There is no business he needs to attend to regarding Pavel’s 
death as the body has been buried. But morbidly compelled to somehow resurrect 
his son, Dostoevsky spends his days wandering around Pavel’s old stamping 
grounds and acquaints himself with Pavel’s landlady and her daughter, and his 
radical friend, another real historical figure, Sergei Nechaev. The despondent 
visit finally bears a sour fruit in Dostoevsky’s feverish writing of a stupendous 
character, Nikolai Stavrogin, the heartless and enigmatic centre of the real 
Dostoevsky’s next novel Demons. In The Master’s final scenes, Pavel is 
transformed into the rabidly cynical Stavrogin who violates a young girl’s 
innocence and pretends to be the lover of a mentally ill woman to entertain 
himself.  
Needless to say, Dostoevsky’s final act of creation only serves to deepen 
the novel’s repressive gloom. With its relentless and intentional despondency, 
The Master resists the ethical mode of reading that has been the main modus 
operandi of Coetzee studies and, noticeably, there are fewer critical 
commentaries on the novel than on many of its counterparts. In recent years, 
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however, we have seen a surge of intriguing commentaries on The Master of a 
non-ethical sort—most notably by Patrick Hayes and John Bolin315—that accept 
the challenge of the novel’s perversity and read the text as a psychological study 
of human desires rather than as a narrative exploration of the ethical. These 
readings of the novel do not try to extort an ethical stance from the novel and, 
consequently, they are better at accommodating the vertiginous nature of The 
Master. Most importantly, this approach enables one to read against the 
changeable claims of the novel’s central figure. Hayes’s reading, for instance, 
exposes Dostoevsky’s amorous desire that at times overrides his attempt to open 
himself up to the text’s alterity, that is, to the voice of Pavel.  
But while these psychological readings help to elucidate the internal logic 
of the novel, there remains a puzzling dissonance between The Master and the 
rest of Coetzee’s oeuvre. The turn towards the unethical and the untrue in The 
Master becomes all the more baffling when one remembers that Coetzee has 
elsewhere expressed his uneasiness over the endless explorations of 
psychological impulses. Drawing on none other than Dostoevsky himself, 
Coetzee on that occasion contends that ‘Dostoevsky is not a psychological 
novelist at all: he is finally not interested in the psyche, which he sees as an arena 
of game-playing, of the middle of the novel.’316 Then, in his essay ‘Confession 
and Double Thoughts,’ Coetzee echoes Michael Holquist in saying that the great 
achievement of Dostoevsky’s later years is his knowing how to put an end to this 
endlessness.317 Yet when he writes of Dostoevsky in The Master, Dostoevsky is 
playing endless games with his own life and work. His final demonic writing is 
still portrayed as part of a game, not existing for itself, but is ‘a trap, a trap to 
catch God.’318 
Another prominent feature of the novel also repressed in the non-ethical 
readings is The Master’s half-buried relationship to the reality outside the text. 
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There is first the covert distortion of Dostoevsky’s life that has already attracted 
a number of criticisms from the novel’s reviewers. Coetzee’s novel revolves 
around the death of Dostoevsky’s stepson Pavel, but the historical Pavel actually 
outlived his stepfather by 20 years. As Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky’s prominent 
biographer, explains; in 1869, the real Dostoevsky stayed with his wife in 
Dresden, Germany in an attempt to avoid debtor’s prison.319 On another level, 
the novel also contains the half-buried truth of the death of Coetzee’s son Nicolas 
on 21 April 1989 under similar circumstances. Countless fragments from 
Coetzee’s relationship with his son are inserted into the novel. JC Kannemeyer’s 
biography of Coetzee, in turn, relays how the complaint Dostoevsky makes about 
young Pavel’s refusal to wake up in the morning reflects the same problem 
Coetzee had with the young Nicolas, while the words Dostoevsky’s wife used to 
inform him of his son’s death: ‘Fedya, Pavel is dead,’320 echo those of Coetzee’s 
ex-wife on the phone to him. 
To maintain that these perversions of historical truth into fiction are of no 
relevance to the text would, I think, be unrealistic from both a practical 
perspective and from the standpoint of authorial intent. For even though they are 
not explicitly stated, the perversions can be easily recovered and are bound to 
enter the public’s perception of the text in due course. Already two substantial 
publications have been released in the form of JC Kannemeyer’s biography J.M. 
Coetzee: A Life in Writing and David Attwell’s study of the Coetzee archive J.M. 
Coetzee and the Life of Writing,321 in which the autobiographical circumstances 
surrounding the novel are made central to its meaning. It is perfectly conceivable 
that, a few decades down the line, a republication of The Master would feature a 
preface that makes these historical discrepancies immediately available even to 
the casual reader. Further, Coetzee’s decision to leave partially exposed the 
images from his own life, while at the same time undermining the mimetic 
pretense of his biographical tale of Dostoevsky with obvious factual 
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contradictions, inevitably challenges any reading that complies strictly with the 
text’s surface meaning. 
There is also a strong argument to be made that these invisible 
biographical alterations are in fact not external to the text at all, but form a 
continuous landscape with its textual trail of perversions. Dostoevsky seems to 
suggest as much about his own writing: ‘Not a matter of fidelity at all. On the 
contrary, a matter of betrayal—betrayal of love first of all, and then of Pavel and 
the mother and child and everyone else. Perversion: everything and everyone to 
be turned to another use.’322 By the same token that Stavrogin is oblivious to 
Dostoevsky’s hand in his creation, so is Coetzee’s Dostoevsky to his author’s, 
and we are elicited by the novel to situate them—the author and his character—
on cascading plains of perverse significations. What is so far apparent is that the 
bracketing off in critical analyses of these perversions of external reality has 
resulted in a critical oblivion regarding Dostoevsky’s grief and guilt despite their 
prominence in the novel. For Attwell, unless the biographical loss is 
acknowledged, the novel ‘will have at its centre an unaccommodated grief.’323  
 
 From grief to perversions 
From Attwell’s research into Coetzee’s manuscripts, it is clear that the 
writing of The Master was part of Coetzee’s effort to come to terms with the 
death of his son Nicolas. Attwell quotes from Coetzee’s notes for the novel on 
Christmas Day of 1992: ‘Christmas Day and Nicolas is not here. The project: to 
recover the truth of his relation to the dead boy. That truth: not to bring the dead 
boy back into this world but to go into the world of death without fear.’324 Then, 
in another entry, Coetzee has his protagonist declare an intention that could also 
be assigned to himself: ‘What kept him calm at the funeral service, what gave 
him an air almost of equanimity, was the vow he had made: that he would write 
his son into immortality’ (193). The intention Coetzee had, as Attwell gathers, 
was to breathe life back into his son via a reworking of fictional materials (199). 
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It is a baffling project for Coetzee to have conceived: to bring the son 
immortality through fragments of stories from Russia as opposed to a more direct 
representation, and the indications we have of Coetzee’s reasoning behind its 
conception are similarly tortuous. Late in January 1992, almost a year into the 
writing, Coetzee begins to conceptualise the work as the thematisation of ‘the 
question of disguise, of pretending.’325 According to the author, it is a concept 
that he had yet to explore in his work: ‘In my own fiction, there is plenty of 
pretending to be natives, women, but all the pretending is done by me. Disguise 
is not thematized. No one in the books pretends to be anyone else’ (521). 
Coetzee explores the possibility of disguise as a means to disrupt the rigidity of 
names and subject positions in realism, which he collates with the immutability 
of death that ‘cannot be pretended’ (522). He surmised that to pretend, which is 
to give in to a ‘[l]ove… that transforms the face of the beloved,’ might offer a 
way of ‘bringing Pavel back to life’ and he was hopeful that this strand might yet 
lead to a liberation that will ‘redeem [Dostoevsky’s] betrayals’ (522). 
This reasoning is shot through with the desire to alter the reality of the 
son’s death. For this, Coetzee was prepared to play fast and loose with signs until 
‘death’ can again mean ‘life,’ and the being behind the name ‘Pavel’ or ‘Nicolas’ 
will not have disappeared but become transformed into another immortal name. 
That this name will be Stavrogin, Coetzee has decided from his very first entry in 
February of 1991, 326  but his personal mission was that, unlike in the 
Dostoevsky’s novel, his Stavrogin would not in the end commit a suicide: 
The idea was that his son could be resurrected in Stavrogin, if 
Stavrogin could be resurrected from the death to which 
Stavrogin’s maker had consigned him. It was an audacious 
idea, since Stavrogin’s maker was Fyodor Dostoevsky and the 
death to which Stavrogin has been consigned by his maker a 
powerful death. But the idea could not be forgotten, which is to 
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say (he thought) he must have faith in it. What he thought was: 
there must be life in the idea, or else it would die.327 
As before, the above passage contains the hopeful desire to restore life that 
motivated the writing of the novel. This is an invaluable thing that has emerged 
from the manuscripts for the fact that it finally provides a credible motivation, a 
vital life force, for a novel bogged down by unrelenting despondency.  
While the justification can be found outside the novel, the novel itself 
gives us glimpses into the emotional state that accompanies this rational 
sophistry. Near the end, Dostoevsky reveals his great sadness that his acts of love 
can turn sour against the best intentions—that even love can become perverted. 
In the chapter ‘The diary,’ Dostoevsky discovers in Pavel’s diary a derisive 
version of the night when the stepfather found his son incapacitated and barefoot 
after a bout of heavy drinking. Dostoevsky guided Pavel home and washed his 
feet. However, the boy registered only the furtiveness of his stepfather and 
recorded in his diary: ‘had he been with a whore?,’ ‘loves to play the father 
forgiving the prodigal son,’ before concluding ‘All v. embarrassing.’328  
To Anna Sergeyevna, Dostoevsky pours out his own very different 
memory of that time in words full of loving imageries; of how, undressing Pavel 
that night, he was struck by ‘how small his toenails were, as though they had not 
grown since he was a child.’ Dostoevsky had that day imagined ‘Pavel tramping 
the cold street after midnight in his socks. A lost angel, an imperfect angel, one 
of God’s castoffs’ (220-21). The boy is recalled as ‘[f]eathered but unable to fly,’ 
like ‘pelicans: gangling creatures, ungainliest of birds, till they spread those great 
wings of theirs and leave the ground.’ At the end of his reminiscing, Dostoevsky 
laments: ‘Unfortunately, that is not how Pavel remembered the night. In his 
account there is nothing about birds or angels. Nothing about parental care either. 
Parental love’ (221). The image of Coetzee and his strained relationship with 
Nicolas poignantly overlays his character’s here given the sudden burst of rich 
detailing. 
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This painful recognition seems to gnaw at Dostoevsky’s faith in a 
coherent world—where a father’s love should have produced positive effects—
and it eventually initiates his fall into an utterly perverted writing that produces 
Stavrogin. At the same time, The Master serves to turn the sense of personal 
failure as a father into a flaw in the system of Russia, a fault of the age: ‘But 
when was it last that words could be trusted to travel from heart to heart? An age 
of acting, an age of disguise’ (195). It is better that Dostoevsky’s whole world be 
cast in chaos than the thought that he has failed his son. 
v 
The commanding scale of Dostoevsky’s task to refute his son’s death 
may be best gauged by our reactions to his constant outpourings as well as those 
of the people around him. From his first visit to Pavel’s grave with Anna 
Sergeyevna and her daughter, Dostoevsky has been denying the death: ‘“He is 
not here, he is not dead,” he says, his voice cracking’ (10). To Katri, Nechaev’s 
Finnish comrade, he repeats ‘Pavel is not dead. He would have died, but by great 
fortune he escaped with his life’ (99), but no one takes him seriously. 
Dostoevsky’s practical task, as he sees it, is to find a way of speaking this untruth 
in a way that it becomes, as Coetzee has said of Robinson Crusoe: ‘transfigured, 
real.’329 Faced with the impatience of Anna Sergeyevna, he muses:  
To make her understand he would have to speak in a voice 
from under the waters, a boy’s clear bell-voice pleading out of 
the deep dark… the voice would have to call, and she would 
have to hear. Somewhere within himself he would have to find 
not only that voice but the words, the true words. Here and now 
he does not have the words.330  
The boy’s words cannot be realised perhaps because the voice is gone forever. 
Dostoevsky is, in a sense, fighting the cruel and unyielding reality of death. 
The novel’s realist mannerism is arguably a part of this project to create a 
false reality that will rival death. Coetzee constructs plenty of the mimetic signs 
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of Dostoevsky’s Russia, but behind this smokescreen, reality is in fact being 
fundamentally dislodged and betrayed. Page one of the novel bears the title 
‘Petersburg,’ which is followed by a historical scene setting that leads the reader 
to expect a historical novel: ‘October, 1869. A droshky passes slowly down a 
street in the Haymarket district of Petersburg. Before a tall tenement building the 
driver reins in his horse’ (1). Uncharacteristic for Coetzee, the text does not 
doubt its own authenticity in putting forth this simple toy model of St. 
Petersburg, a foreign city and culture where Coetzee had never personally 
visited.331 The text is not after the truth but, on the contrary, hopes to transform 
truths. Margaret Scanlan delightfully sums up the little quirks of Dostoevsky that 
Coetzee inserts to great realistic effect: 
 [T]rue enough to the biographical facts: his Dostoevsky 
worries about his indigestion and his hemorrhoids quite as 
much as about the famous epilepsy; evinces mild anti-
Semitism, needs a bath and a change of underwear, is 
improvident, writes begging letters to his long-suffering friend 
Apollon Maikov.332 
Only by consulting external historical records will the reader learn that this 
realistic effect is false. Within the novel, everything seems as innocuous as it 
should be. At the time of its publication, The Master also deflected many 
people’s expectation in its abandonment of the South African context at a 
moment when the country was undergoing important reform into a democratic 
state,333 which in a sense also deepens the betrayals that the novel accumulates. 
In contrast to the real names used in Coetzee’s fictional memoirs, The 
Master produces the situation where the characters have multiple names. 
Dostoevsky also assumes the name of ‘Isaev.’ The figure of the son in the novel 
appears under ‘Pavel,’ ‘Nechaev,’ or ‘Stavrogin.’ Finding the one true son 
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amidst this confusion becomes an impossible labour, yet one finds the narrative 
boldly following through with the consequences of its desire to bring back the 
son under a different guise. Chapter 8, ‘Ivan,’ demonstrates the overflowing of 
mystifications within Dostoevsky’s psyche as a result of this perverse task. One 
night Dostoevsky is awoken by a ‘disembodied’ call he first hears as ‘Isaev!.’334 
It is not his name but the false name he temporarily assumes—and as the reader 
we are aware that the novel’s use of the name ‘Dostoevsky’ rests on similarly 
shaky ground. Whatever the name called, the fact is that he is stirred by it. As the 
call repeats, he realises it is not a human voice but the wailing of a dog, and the 
misrecognition launches him into a tortuous contemplation that is emblematic of 
the novel: 
A dog, not a wolf; a dog, not his son. Therefore? Therefore he 
must not go back to bed but must get dressed and answer the 
call. If he expects his son to come as a thief in the night, and 
listens only for the call of the thief, he will never see him. If he 
expects his son to speak in the voice of the unexpected, he will 
never hear him. As long as he expects what he does not expect, 
what he does not expect will not come. Therefore—paradox 
within paradox, darkness swaddled in darkness—he must 
answer to what he does not expect. (80) 
Since nothing is to be what it seems, the regressive and equivocating logic draws 
on, seeming to reach a plan of action but then turns on its head. When the 
disoriented Dostoevsky finally locates the dog chained to a drainpipe in the 
freezing temperature, he untangles the chain but does not release it. 
Symbolically, it seems that something in Dostoevsky still resists cutting loose the 
chain that connect signs to their intended meaning—resists, that is, the notion of 
the dog as his son and the boundless responsibility that the refusal of the 
established system would demand.  
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It is not my son, it is just a dog, he protests… Yet even as he 
protests he knows the answer: Pavel will not be saved till he 
has freed the dog and brought it into his bed, brought the least 
thing, the beggarmen and the beggarwomen too, and much else 
he does not yet know of; and even then there will be no 
certainty. (82) 
It is in this chapter that the motif of gambling is introduced into the novel 
to signal Dostoevsky’s further steps into the abyss. The idea of gambling 
provides a comforting rationale for Dostoevsky’s inability to cope with the 
rapidly multiplying signs of his son. It offers him a blind to block out the 
devastating thought that he is a father who has failed to nurture his son into life. 
Unable to save all, Dostoevsky begins to think of his finite action in terms of a 
random bet. He is ‘betting… that the dog is not the sign’ (83). Within this 
metaphor, Dostoevsky’s half-hearted response to the dog belongs not to a 
straightforward causality and is, therefore, not entirely blameworthy. Beyond 
everything, it is not the dog that he wishes to save but his son. Any action of his 
towards the animal is but a blind wager whose significance is arbitrarily 
determined. ‘Without the risk,’ Dostoevsky reasons, ‘without subjecting oneself 
to the voice speaking from elsewhere in the fall of the dice, what is left that is 
divine?’ (84). It is an irresistible argument, but also one of the long string of 
excuses produced in the novel that deplete Dostoevsky’s agency and chip away 
at his more immediate responsibilities, not least the wife and child he has left in 
Dresden, his unpaid debts and the promised visit to the grave of Pavel. Fittingly, 
the policeman Maximov, the guardian of order, reminds him at one point: ‘But 
remember, you have a wife and child who depend on you. If only for their sake, 
you cannot afford to abandon yourself to fate’ (43).  
v 
Beyond the dog, the next perverse figure of the son that Dostoevsky has 
to cast aside is embodied in the destructive force of Sergei Nechaev, a historical 
figure behind the 1869 murder in Russia of Ivanov, a fellow student activist. 
With Pavel being portrayed as the helpless saint, Nechaev is the rebellious son 
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par excellence, and he perhaps gives Coetzee the occasion to explore the father-
son animosity that was very much a part of his own relationship to Nicolas.335 
The Freudian primal horde myth of rivalry between fathers and sons for riches 
and women has been alluded to in various readings of this Nechaev-Dostoevsky 
relationship,336 but it may be too simplistic a model for the varied sentiments The 
Master gives rise to. Unlike the horde myth, this novel struggles to determine 
what sentiment is truly foundational in the father-son relation: love or hate. 
Before their meeting, Dostoevsky has declared his abhorrence of 
Nechaev’s ideology and practice: ‘[He] is a conspirator and an insurrectionist 
whose designs I repudiate with the utmost force’; ‘I reject everything he stands 
for’ (35), but Nechaev has the same—if cruder—desire for a new beginning as 
the grieving Dostoevsky. As Bolin notes, Dostoevsky becomes increasingly 
aware of his similarities to this ideological enemy.337 ‘He is like me, I was like 
him,’ Coetzee’s Dostoevsky thinks, ‘only I did not have the courage.’ 338 
Nechaev’s goal to bring about ‘the end of everything old, including fathers and 
sons… When everything is reinvented, everything erased and reborn: law, 
morality, the family, everything’ (189) is a variation of Dostoevsky’s unspoken 
task, even if it comes from the place of hatred rather than love. The two share the 
method of perversions as theirs is mimetic rivalry as defined by René Girard. For 
Nechaev too, ‘[e]verything is permitted for the sake of the future’ (200). 
Listening to Nechaev’s vision for the new world order, Dostoevsky 
cynically questions the young man without any sympathy for the cause—‘And 
money… will you redistribute the money?’; ‘And God?’; ‘And the angels?’; 
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‘And the souls of the dead?’—yet in the artless answers of Nechaev lies the 
world vision that Dostoevsky is also after: ‘The souls of the dead too, Fyodor 
Mikhailovich, if you like. We shall have the souls of the dead walking the earth 
again—Pavel Isaev too, if you like. There are no bounds to what can be done’ 
(190). ‘What a charlatan!,’ Doestoevsky thinks, but he also knows he has been 
perversely comforted by Nechaev’s lie, the very same lie he has been 
maintaining to everyone. His initial disgust transforms into amusement, unable to 
say ‘whether he is playing with Nechaev or Nechaev with him’: ‘All barriers 
seem to be crumbling at once: the barrier on tears, the barrier on laughter’ (190). 
In the next moment, quite inexplicably, Dostoevsky embraces Nechaev, who is 
no longer referred to by his name as before: ‘Embracing the boy…, sobbing, 
laughing, he kisses him on the left cheek and on the right’ (190). From enemy, 
Nechaev is morphing into a surrogate prodigal son for Dostoevsky to play the 
forgiving father.  
Unmistakably, both characters are playacting in the roles of their 
respective fantasies, competing for the ascendency of their fictional narratives—
one of the oppressed son and the other the forgiving father. Nechaev proudly 
stresses that he ran away from his oppressive father when he was sixteen 
‘[b]ecause he beat me’ (194), while Dostoevsky privately notes that the radical is 
‘[d]esperate to be betrayed, desperate to find a father to betray him’ (194). But 
Dostoevsky is also desperate to find an unrepentant prodigal son whom he can 
pardon and be betrayed by. Already, he has acquiesced—suspiciously easily—to 
giving the roguish Nechaev money during his escape from the police like a 
devoted father would (158), and then takes on the responsibility to dispose of the 
incriminating evidence the radical left behind (162). For a brief moment before 
Nechaev’s plan implicates him, Dostoevsky has the image of the man as ‘a child 
alone in the sea, fighting and drowning’ (195), echoing the vision of Pavel he has 
had several times before.  
It is difficult to discern the truth of the two characters’ psyches in all the 
rehearsed and self-satisfied performances. Uncharacteristically for Coetzee, the 
free indirect voice of his protagonist Dostoevsky leaves so much of its own 
pretensions uninterrogated in a pertinacious effort to disrupt the reality of the 
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son’s death. Nevertheless, Dostoevsky is after not just any perversion, but one 
that will become as powerful as truth itself—an autonomous, bona fide literary 
creation. To revive his son, Dostoevsky feels his way through the falsities and 
disguises that remain attached to the old order of the truth, that are not perverse 
enough, and eventually overcomes them. Strictly within the novel, it has much in 
common with Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground,339 which, as Michael 
Holquist put it, has ‘a plot against plots.’ Holquist explains the novella in terms 
that also feel applicable to The Master of Petersburg:   
The basic pattern of the Notes is a cycle of well-made stories 
that—in themselves—make sense, have traditional, literary 
plots. The structure of these stories is then subverted, one by 
one, as they are shown in the face of reality, in the face of the 
very contingency they abjured to achieve their shapely form—
to be just that: shapely forms.340 
Nechaev’s rejection of the father, for instance, comes in words that break down 
under scrutiny; a reflection of Dostoevsky’s current unconvincing role as the 
forgiving father. ‘I am my own father now. I have made myself over’ declares 
Nechaev, ‘I don’t need any father to hide me. If I need to hide, the people will 
hide me.’341 It would appear that Nechaev’s political cause provides a surrogate 
paternal care—his ferociousness a disguise he hides behind for protection.  
In the chapter ‘The printing press,’ Nechaev manages to ‘deceive’ 
Dostoevsky into writing a pamphlet for his illegal press, but predictably 
Dostoevsky relents too easily in a show of fatherly sacrifice: ‘I am the one who 
carries the madness. My fate, my burden, not yours. You are too much of a child 
to begin to bear the weight’ (202). The content of the pamphlet, which accuses 
Nechaev of Pavel’s murder, is of no significance to Nechaev. Any sensational 
claim would do to create the condition of social maelstrom that will stretch the 
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authorities and further his cause, but his guile is evenly matched by that of 
Dostoevsky, who quickly takes the opportunity to portray himself as a loyal 
father betrayed for his love: ‘A trap, a devilish trap… Pavel’s death was merely 
the bait to lure him from Dresden to Petersburg. He has been the quarry all the 
time. He has been lured out of hiding, and now Nechaev has pounced and has 
him by the throat’ (203). Dostoevsky’s self-important tone and the sudden 
diminution of Pavel feel false, but the novel insidiously lets it stand. 
v 
The Master is edging ever closer with each chapter to the agentless 
condition in which absolute evil thrives. If Pavel is to be brought back, 
Dostoevsky reasons that he has to get to that final stage where all ties are 
severed. Everyone connected has to be betrayed before the words can be re-
signified and Pavel resurrected. In the final chapter, ‘Stavrogin,’ Dostoevsky 
finally reaches the ultimate state of untethered madness where the meanings and 
attachments in his heart are ferociously invalidated. He is left with only a self-
aggrandising vision of himself as ‘a body which contains its own falling and its 
own darkness.’342 The detachment reaches its completion when Dostoevsky sits 
down to write a character study that will become Nikolai Stavrogin in the novel 
Demons. In the draft, he describes Stavrogin having sex with a girl with the door 
ajar, knowing that a child is also home and watching. Having written it, 
Dostoevsky then leaves the draft open on the table, knowing also that it would 
attract the interest of his landlady’s daughter, Matryona: ‘It is an assault upon the 
innocence of a child. It is an act for which he can expect no forgiveness. With it 
he has crossed the threshold… I have lost my place in my soul, he thinks’ (249). 
Shedding all pretence of his obligation to Pavel, ‘[f]or the first time it occurs to 
him that Pavel might be better dead’ (247). Dostoevsky’s earlier comment on 
Nechaev, in a sense, applies to him too: ‘Lonely, lone. His proper place a throne 
in a bare room’ (196). His standing was once determined by his social and 
familial responsibilities, but now he has betrayed all. It is a state of death in life 
in which finally he can fall with his son: ‘Nothing he says is true, nothing is 
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false, nothing to be trusted, nothing to be dismissed. There is nothing to hold to, 
nothing to do but fall’ (235).  
Dostoevsky is under no illusion about the heinousness of the writing he is 
about to commit or the harm it will inflict to his soul. He confronts it as 
‘representations that have no place in the world,’ but then ‘if that is what must 
be’ to bring about ‘the resurrection,’ then ‘he will do it’ (241). Given 
Dostoevsky’s brutal lucidity, the narrative of The Master never achieves better 
moral clarity than its protagonist. The novel is indeed fundamentally uninterested 
in ethical choices, for which personal responsibility has to be assumed. It knows 
the responsibilities and has chosen to shun all in protest against the world that 
has taken away the beloved son. It is difficult to imagine how we can appreciate 
this perverse novel if not with the firm knowledge of the inconsolable grief from 
which it has sprung. With its unapologetic attitude and repeated falsehood, the 
novel makes it near impossible to sympathise with Dostoevsky and follow him 
on his devious trail unless we read against him, behind him, and outside him. For 
the novel’s real beginning and end seem to be outside the fiction. They are in the 
life of J.M. Coetzee that has here been betrayed.
CONCLUSION 
 
 None of Coetzee’s fiction I have examined in this study offers resolutions 
for its characters. Resolutions, for Coetzee, seem to signify death, when his 
fiction strives to embed itself as intimately as possible in life, and to hopefully 
live on beyond its author on account of being read by other living beings. Despite 
the lack of resolution, Coetzee’s narratives can be observed to embody the 
realities of different body-souls at given times and places, whose truth-value 
cannot be thoroughly delegitimised by remarks about their transient nature. Since 
critical discourse is wont to argue that the instability and self-consciousness of 
Coetzee’s narratives disrupt stable meanings, it may be easy to lose sight of the 
fact that the narratives still mean something—that is, they are still capable of 
affecting us as readers, as embodied souls, despite our inability to conceptualise 
what their meanings are. So while it is true that Elizabeth Costello’s 
vegetarianism wavers in front of her family members; Mrs. Curren’s angel of 
death is himself vulnerable to death; the literary novel is losing its purchase in 
Slow Man; the truths of John Coetzee change with his chosen register and age; or 
The Master of Petersburg contains only false names, etc., this thesis has been an 
attempt to reinstate the fact that Coetzee’s narratives have given life to these 
positions and invited us to experience them sympathetically as embodied truths 
that had lived, even if imaginatively, and are real.  
 I do not propose, however, that one should always read Coetzee for the 
body-soul. It should be made clear that the concept came into prominence with 
Coetzee’s late apartheid novels—namely, from Age of Iron (1990) on—and 
becomes explicit in his Australian fictions. To apply it outside of this window 
will likely entail some failure to respond to the other texts’ different singularity. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine how attention to the body-soul would significantly 
add to existing readings of Coetzee’s novels from his early apartheid years, 
during which the literary universe provided Coetzee with a much-needed shelter 
from the demands of the political. Writing of Michael K (1983), Valdez Moses 
identifies a desire that resonates through Coetzee’s early works: ‘the desire for a 
195 
realm outside of history: a life on the island of fiction.’343 The sense of 
embattlement between the literary and the political also pervades Coetzee’s 1988 
essay ‘The Novel Today,’ whose impassioned plea betrays its author’s painful 
struggle against the pressure of historical reality, as well as his preference at the 
time for novelistic truths. Because of the early novels’ active involvement with 
the novel form, literary criticism as a discipline becomes well situated to respond 
to them and to defend them. On the other hand, Coetzee’s genre-crossing 
Australian fictions in which the literary gets differentiated into a myriad of 
genres, each representing a facet of the truth alongside other non-literary 
discourses, can be much better accommodated in a reading practice that looks 
beyond the text to the body-soul. The one constant and unquestionable truth by 
this point in Coetzee’s career is the living beings, both of the author himself and 
the characters, that engender each piece of writing. This presence of the body-
soul provides a way for us to sensitively approach and situate Coetzee’s 
Australian texts and fictional memoirs within a coherent oeuvre along side his 
previous novels.  
This ground of reading cannot be true unless it is itself subjected to the 
reality of living and dying. The body-soul in Coetzee’s fiction also has its shelf 
life, and already Coetzee’s most recent novel, The Childhood of Jesus, shows 
clear signs that Coetzee is moving his attention beyond ‘life’ and into the 
afterlife. The story of The Childhood is populated by characters who are washed 
clean of their past memories, all of whom have landed mysteriously in a Spanish-
speaking port town of Novilla with the purpose of starting a new life away from 
their old attachments. In the narrative’s formal simplicity and generic details, it 
shares clear characteristics with parables, and its title recalls the parables of Jesus 
in which the meanings of what is said are never immediately apparent but have 
to be allegorically deduced. In contrast to Coetzee’s preceding embodied novels, 
this story plunges into the world of spiritual and universal truth and tries to 
imagine the difficult journey back to life. As Simón remarks near the end of the 
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novel: ‘how shall I ever get from zero to one? From no where to somewhere: it 
seemed to demand a miracle each time.’344 
  Within this parable world are two misfits, the protagonist Simón and the 
boy in his care, David, who appear trapped in the parable when they long to be 
returned to the full life of Coetzee’s previous novels, or at least to be delivered to 
their new ones. Though the novel’s imaginary setting may be compared to that of 
Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians, life inside Novilla is distinctly devoid of 
the predecessor’s gritty reality or the pains of the body under torture. In all areas, 
the people of Novilla desire no more than their basic needs, which the town’s 
system adequately caters for. They are neither burning with Paul Rayment’s love 
nor Costello’s fraught writerly desire, and they certainly do not experience 
hunger like Michael K—a hunger that forcefully reminds K that he is alive. 
Instead, hunger is treated in Novilla as a beastly desire to be overcome. Ana, a 
staff member at the town’s relocation centre, advises: ‘Adapt to a moderate 
diet… Hunger is like a dog in your belly: the more you feed it, the more it 
demands.’345 Fittingly, the novel follows Summertime (2009) in which Coetzee 
imagines the creation of his biography following his own death. Childhood is a 
story of the afterlife beyond the body-soul, in which there are still remnants of 
the body-soul’s desires in the novel’s main characters that keep them moving and 
eventually taking them away from the town of Novilla towards another new life. 
Many of the claims I have made in this study, especially one about the 
general clarity of Coetzee’s meanings with their clear correlatives in the body-
soul’s reality, is flouted by this new tale that imagines the hereafter. One can still 
trail Simón and sense his lingering habits from the days of living, but it is 
undeniable that he is consumed by an inexplicable loyalty to the boy rather than 
to his own existence, while the boy himself seems magically above matters of 
mortal vulnerabilities. His make-believe magical quality is a new addition to the 
Coetzee’s oeuvre that even the fabulist Costello cannot lay claim to. To approach 
the singularity of this narrative may require another reshuffling to our mode of 
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reading in which allegorical meanings take precedence, while the body-soul only 
makes faint, thought distinct, calls. But whatever is required, at least it is worth 
making an effort to understand the novel knowing that Coetzee’s most recent 
work is still alive and kicking, even after four decades of writing. 
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